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Like every other subject in American history, Populism 
has seen major changes in historiography as historians from 
different perspectives have examined the farmers' movement 
that disrupted the politics of the Great Plains, South, and 
Rocky Mountain states during the 1890s. Each generation of 
scholars has added its questions, techniques, and talent to 
the work of its predecessors in assessing the origins, sig- 
nificance, and contributions of the Populists. Some of this 
scholarship entailed criticizing the weaknesses and over- 
sights of earlier historians. Some has been devoted to ask- 
ing new questions that have arisen in light of developments 
in the interpretation of American history. Some has con~en- 
trated on applying new methods to the study of old problems 
to determine what else can be learned about the past. The 
result of all this effort is an extensive.body of literature 
that reveals how historians have thought about the Populist 
movement and each other for the last half ~entury. 
In 1 ·:1J1 John D. Hicks published his The Populist Re·rol t, 
what would soon become the standard--though not definitive, 
as one of his conte~poraries was quick to point out--w~rk o~ 
the Populist party. Still under the influence of Frederick 
Jackson Turner's frontier thesis, Hicks saw the agrarian rad- 
icals as farmers oppressed by corporations, heavy.debt, and 
an unmerciful environment. Lacking the choice that farmers 
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had been afforded earlier in American history--that of moving 
on to the next frontier to escape--men resorted to a politi- 
cal solution to their problems. The Populist demands went 
back to the democratic heritage of the nation and foreshad- 
owed many of the reforms of the twentieth century, particu- 
larly of the Progressive era.1 
This benign interpretation of Populism held the histo- 
riographical field for two decades. Then in the postwar 
years opinion on the Populists began to shift to a more crit- 
ical stance. Stinging from attacks during the McCarthy era, 
intellectuals sought to trace the roots of such demagogery in 
American history. One of their targets was the Populist 
movement, a force that had also shown anti-intellectual tend- 
encies, provincialism, and distrust of the cities. Some went 
so far as to see the Populists as the forerunners of fas- 
cists.2 
The major statement of the revisionist school is that of 
Richard Hofstadter. In his Age of Reform Hofstadter saw the 
real problem of the American farmer not in the dominance of 
corporations, but the agrarians' participation in an interna- 
tional market for which they were not prepared. Though in 
prosperity the farmer considered himself a commercial opera- 
tor, hard times forced him to retreat into an agrarian myth 
in which he saw himself as a yeoman farmer seeking to hold 
onto what was his. As industrialization and urbanization 
wrought sweeping changes in American society, American farmers 
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saw themselves left behind and turned to independent politi- 
cal action for help. 
Hofstadter probed what has been termed the darker side 
of Populism. In analyzing the Populist character he iso- 
lated five traits that he felt were important strains in 
the agrarian radical mind. Populists looked back to a gold- 
en age of agriculture when the yeoman ruled society. They 
saw an essential unity of interests among all producers, 
farmers and laborers alike, Populists looked at things in 
terms of black and white, good and evil. History was the 
product of conspiracies against the common man, generally 
directed by a vast international money power. Money was of 
primary importance to the Populists and many of their reform 
ideas reflected their desires to boost the money supply. 
Such characteristics have led critics of the Populists to 
label them provincial nativists, fundamentally irrational, 
whose nationalism directed them into jingoism.J 
Hofstadter's indictment of a political movement that 
had errt e r ta i.ned the public's sympa t hy for d e cad e s spawned no 
small discussion. Hofstadter incited new interest in a 
field that had not received major scholarly attention since 
Hick's book was published. The result was reaction, recon- 
sideration, and reinterpretation as historians poured through 
the evidence another time and sought out new information on 
the Populists. 
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The most persistent of these critics to Hofstadter's 
interpretation has been Norman Pollack. In a 1960 article 
Pollack challenged Hofstadter's contention that much of Pop- 
ulist thought and action was irrational, attacked his meth- 
odology and evidence, and offered explanations for the char- 
acter traits Hofstadter examined. Two years later Pollack 
presented his full-scale defense of Populists in The Populist 
Response to Industrial America. The agrarian radicals were 
far from irrational, backward-looking men who wanted to turn 
back the clock. Rather, they represented a "progressive 
social force" that was willing to accept industrialism if it 
could be controlled to eliminate oppression. Much of their 
ideology resembled Marxism. Indeed, the Populists met a 
major defeat when organized labor repudiated the movement as 
being too radical. Three years later he again took up his 
pen to defend the Populists and the radical strain in Ameri- 
can history as a whole. The consensus approach to history, 
according to Pollack, threatened to distort our view of the 
4 past. 
The critics have had their critics. In 1965 Agricul- 
tural History published a series of major articles on the 
problems of interpreting Populism. Irwin Unger defended , 
Hofstadter ag8inst Pollack by pointing out the Populists' 
readiness to seize on simple and naive solutions to the com- 
plex problems of American society. J. Rogers Hollingsworth 
cautioned historians about accepting Populist rhetoric too 
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freely and urged them to seek further data about the social 
.bases of Populism. Oscar Handlin was critical of both the 
defenders and detractors of Populism, feeling that they had 
wasted too much time haggling over minor points.5 The next 
year Theodore Saloutos, sympathetic to Hick's interpretation, 
questioned the commitment of farmers to labor and tried to 
place attitudes of the Populist movement into an historical 
6 background. 
One historian has taken a tack exactly opposite of 
Pollack. Karel Bicha has suggested that, far from being 
early representatives of the leftist movement in America, the 
Populists were ideologically conservative. Their philosophy 
was deeply rooted in the rightist tradition; their occasional 
reforms that might seem radical were merely a means to re- 
store an earlier balance of power.7 
Other historians have focused their efforts on particu- 
lar aspects of Hofstadter's thesis rather than attacking the 
whole. In a study of Kansas '··Jal ter T. K. Nugent examined 
charges that Populi~ts were nativistic and concluded that 
Populists made every effort to attract immigrants to their 
cause. Accusations of anti-Semitism had little basis in fact 
other than Populist condemnations of Jews in financial circles. 
Agrarian jingoism in 1898 came not from a desire to conquer 
territory, but from humanitarian motives to free Cuba. Nugent 
failed to perceive that, despite Populist entreaties, some 
groups like Germans viewed the Populists with suspicion be- 
6 
cause many of the movement's leaders had been involved with 
cultural reforms.8 A number of historians have exerted con- 
siderable effort in discussing the nature of Populists' atti- 
tudes toward the Jews, with some being ardent defenders 
against charges of anti-Semitism and others taking the more 
realistic approach of acknowledging that Populists felt much 
the same way as did other sectors of American society.9 
Some historians have pointed out similarities between 
Populists and other groups and have called for a more 
searching analysis of Populism, particularly of its lower- 
level leaders and the rank and file, and comparisons with 
t . 10 . members of the old par ies. Their colleagues have responded 
with a number of studies that attempt to assess the Populist 
party on the local level and to compare the traits of the 
agrarian reformers with those of their political foes. 
Stanley B. Parsons took up this call in 1963 with an 
article that dealt with Populists in Nebraska. He found an- 
tagonisms between farmers and townsmen over local leadership 
which the latter were reluctant to surrender. The Populists 
drew much of their strength from the wheat belt where farmers 
were so dependent on wheat for a crop that they left them- 
selves open for disaster. Protestants favored and Catholics 
opposed the new third party. He emphasized these points 
again in his book a decade later.11 
·:alter T. K. Nugent found similar results in·Kansas in 
that Republicans tended to have a far higher proportion of 
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urbanites among their local leaders than Populists did. Com- 
parisons of rates of mortgaging and other transactions in- 
volving land showed that Populists were less speculative with 
their resources, preferring to invest their capital in farms. 
Populists did, however, have a higher involvement in corn and 
12 hogs than did their opponents. 
A recent study of the Farmers' Alliance in South Dakota 
confirms some of Nugent's findings. There the Allianceman-- 
a member of the group most likely to join the Populists--was 
a farmer who was recently upwardly mobile. He had often in- 
vested heavily in his farm and could not afford to lose it.13 
In a recent extensive study of Nebraska politicia~s 
during the Populist era Robert W. Cherny found that Repub- 
licans were most likely to come from urban occupaticr.s and 
from Protestant bodies, Democrats came from ritualistic back- 
grounds, might be professionals, and were more likely to be 
of immigrant stock. The Populists were far more likely than 
either of the other groups to be farmers and tended to be a 
composite of the other parties for other sociolcgical var- 
. bl 14 ia es. 
In the last decade and a half historians have applied 
the methods of the social sciences to the study of political 
behavior in the Populist era. Frederick C. Luebke, one of 
the first scholars using these techniques,found that the 
Germans of Nebraska shunned the P'JPLt~ is-Cs wheri they asuoc i- 
ated that party with cultural issues like prohibition, but 
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could show a bit more sympathy for it when they could react 
to the movement without such cultural values having a high 
saliency. Robert Cherny's more sophisticated study of voting 
trends in Nebraska revealed that during the first part of 
the 1890s a Populist's political choice was likely to be 
governed by economic factors while a Democrat was more likely 
to be motivated by cultural.issues. During the latter por- 
tion of the Populist era when fusion was in effect, both 
cultural and economic factors can be isolated as sources of 
anti-Republican sentiment.15 
One historian has recently attempted a major new inter- 
pretation of Populism. Lawrence GoodwYn has suggested that 
true Populism had its origins in the cooperative ventures of 
the Alliance and similar farm organizations and that it drew 
its ideology from the Greenback movement. Without the expe- 
rience of cooperative economic ventures, no real Populist 
movement could exist in a state, for only that experience 
could radicalize agrarians sufficiently to create .Populism. 
Any state party without such a genesis was nothing more than 
a "shadow movement," a term that he applies to Nebraska Pop- 
ulism. Goodwyn's expertise lies in the field of Texas Pop- 
ulism, where the scenario he paints holds true. He errs in 
believing that the entire Populist movement was nothing more 
than the Texas example written large. Indeed, the Alliance 
in South Da~ota had already begun its political demands be- 
fore its cooperative enterprises had a chance to fail. 
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Serious questions have been raised concerning Goodwyn's meth- 
odology and the quality of his research for Nebraska. He 
is also guilty of sloppy work in his documentation of the 
South Dakota Populists.16 
Works specifically dealing with South Dakota Populism 
have generally followed in Hicks's trail in applying a pro- 
gressive interpretation to the movement. Foremost among 
these historians have been Herbert S. Schell and his student 
Kenneth E. Hendrickson, Jr.17 Brian Jason Need, taking 
Pollack's approach, has viewed the state's Populism as a 
progressive social force that grappled with problems and 
questions raised by industrialization, even though the 
Populists exhibited the traits Hofstadter discerns.18 
Two historians have applied statisti~al techniques to 
South Dakota's agrarian radicals. Michael P. Rogin, in a 
study of the connec:ions between McCarthy and earlier politi- 
cal movements in a number of midwestern states, including 
South Dakota, analyzed a variety of f'ac to r s influencing poli- 
tics. Although he fourd no ties between the Populists anj 
the Senator from .lisconsin, he deter~ined that the weaith of 
the counties was the best indicator of Populist stre~gt~, 
with the proportion of Populist votes going ~p with wealtt1 
until the top levels are reached, where~pon the support for 
the farmers fell off. Crop patterro were the sec end most Im- 
portant factor, according to Rogin, wi t h Popu Li sru c cnc ent r a t- 
ed in the wheat ~ounties. His third indicator was ethnicity, 
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which was sometimes strong enough to displace the correla- 
tions in wheat areas. 
There are several problems with Rogin's study. He gives 
no indication of having considered settlement patterns when 
analyzing the wealth of the counties. If the eastern tiers 
of counties were among the richest--and they may well have 
been because they were settl~d early--the presence of many 
Scandinavians in that area would have thrown off his data. 
He lists so many exceptions to his dominant patterns due to 
the presence of certain ethnic groups that one wonders if 
the primary emphasis should not be on immigrant groups. His 
study is done on the county level rather than by precinct so 
he cannot discern important trends within counties. Thus he 
implies that Czechs opposed Populism, but that result was 
likely to be due to the presence of Russian-Germans rather 
than Czechs in at least one South Dakota county. He also 
suggests that there was such a thing as an Austrian county 
in the state at a time when the county with the highest pro- 
portion of Austrian-born immigrants in 1900 had only 1.94 % 
of its population in that group, most of whom were Slavs.19 
Jchn D. Dibber.n's recent dissertation is a significant 
contribution to our understanding of the Farmers' Alliance in 
South Dakota, the organization that provided a good share of 
the earliest Pcpu Li.s t strength. Using the membe:cship roles 
of the l'r.arshall County Alliance, Dibbern was able to·produce 
a composite sketch cf Alliance members in the 1880s. He 
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found them to be men who were recently upwardly mobile and 
who were heavily in debt, usually to improve their holdings. 
They were attracted to the Populist party, Dibbern suggests, 
in order to defend themselves against foreclosures and loss 
of status, although he can offer no proof that the Alliance 
men did join the third party. His study also showed that im- 
migrants were disproportionately represented among Alliance 
ranks.20 
Like Joseph's coat, Populism was a thing of many colors. 
Elements within it can be taken as evidence for many inter- 
pretations. Some Populist editorials in the mining districts 
of the Black Hills warned of wage slavery and local Alliances 
expressed support for the Knights of Labor in strikes, but 
the movement as a whole seems to have been conservative in 
the state. There were occasional mentions of Jewish ban~ers 
that might be taken as anti-Semitism, but the condemnation 
was never hurled at the average Jew and the party made suc- 
cessful overtures to many of the state's immigrant groups. 
The Populists of the state called for war asainst Spain in 
1898 but jingoism was not the motive, for less than two years 
latter the same Populists were agitating to have the state's 
contingent of troops returned from the Philippines. 
South Dakota's Populist movement resembles Hicks' inter- 
pretation more than Hofstadter's. The Populists were com- 
mercial farmers, or soon hoped to be when rail lines· came 
through, but the problems the state's agrarians faced with 
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drought and corporations were serious. Farmers moved out 
onto the Plains not fully prepared for the conditions they 
would meet there during dry seasons and had to learn through 
hard lessons. Railroad rates consumed a large share of the 
value of the year's crops and through their political influ- 
ence the corporations exerted a degree of control over the 
state government. For some, debt was no doubt a serious 
problem and threatened newly-won status. One cannot say 
that the frontier had closed in South Dakota, for through 
th~ 1890s and early 1900s the Indian reservations west of 
the Missouri River were opened to white settlement, but most 
21 of the other elements of Hicks' interpretation were preser:tt. 
Of the chapters that follow, the first two set the stage 
for the Populist movement, dealing with the Great 0akota 
Boom, the bust that succeeded it, and the growth of the 
Farmers' Alliance. The next three chapters recount the 
course of the Populist movement during the 1890s, dealing 
with its rise, its long years of iefeat, and firyally fusion 
and its de~ise. Chapter Six is a stujy of the administration 
of South Dakota's Populist governor, focusing on the barriers 
to effective reform that he met during his two terms. The 
final chapter applies some of the techniques used by quanti- 
tative historians in an analysis of the reaction of several 
of the state's major ethnic groups to the political cam- 
paigns of the 1890s. 
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CHAPTER I 
DAKOTA BOOM AND BUST 
The background for South Dakota's Populist era was 
the Great Dakota Boom, a period in the territory's history 
stretching from 1878 to 1887. These were years of tremen- 
dous growth in the area as speculators and settlers flocked 
in from the East and foreign countries. The population 
grew at fantaRtic rates. For the first time large scale 
settlement edged away from the southeastern quarter and 
eastern border of what would become South Dakota. It was 
an era of high hopes, great speculation, and, as the diffi- 
cult years of the 1890s would prove, overextension of agri- 
cultural techniques designed for a more humid climate. It 
is in this context that the magnitude of the bust and the 
severity of the problems farmers faced can be understood. 
Many of the grievances and conditions that ignited the agrar- 
ian revolt of the 1890s had their origins in this earlier, 
more optimistic time. 
Census figures give an indication of the extent of the 
boom. South Dakota's exact population on the eve of the 
Dakota Boom is not known. The area's population in 1870 
had been 7,919. By 18EO, two years after the boom began, 
Dakota's southern half claimed 64,708 residents. A decade 
later the new state of South Dakota boasted of 237,753 in- 
habitants, and this was after the harsh conditions of the 
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late 1880s had already forced some to flee.1 The expansion 
of agriculture in the southern half of the territory during 
the Dakota Boom is equally impressive. In 1880 the entire 
territory had only 17,435 farms, nearly fourteen thousand of 
which were in the southern half, totaling about J,800,000 
acres. Ten years later South Dakota alone had over 50,000 
farms comprising over eleven million acres.2 
The gross totals tell only part of the story. Such 
figures indicate the size of the influx, but not where these 
people settled. A large proportion found new homes in the 
western and northern areas away from the more humid south- 
eastern and eastern edges of Dakota. The settled counties 
of the southeastern tip of Dakota Territory also registered 
large gains in the 1880s--Clay County's population grew 
fifty percent. The most remarkable growth, however, took 
place farther west. By 1879 the Big Sioux River valley was 
filled and settlement was spilling over the prairie to ffieet 
with that coming up the James River valley.J By 1890 the 
counties along the hlissouri were being settled. ?or example, 
the population of South Dakota counties bounded on the west 
by the ~issouri had exploded from about 1,400 residents in 
1880 to nearly J0,000 in 1890.4 
The Great Dakota Boom was the resurgence of immigration 
into Dakota Territory after westward movement had been 
stalled for several years due to depression, drought, and 
grasshopper plagues. Its course can be charted in the num- 
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ber of acres filed on in the southern part of the territory 
between 1878 and 1887. Land entries in 1877 amounted to 
only 16J,7J9 acres, but the total for the following year 
topped 940,000. Claims climbed steadily to a peak of nearly 
five and a half million acres in 1883 (though 1884 was the 
high for the territory was a whole), and declined to 
1,12J,2JJ acres in 1887.5 
A variety of factors lay behind this rapid growth. 
Foremost among these was the renewed construction of rail- 
roads in Dakota. The first lines reached the fringes of 
southern Dakota in 1872, but by the next year, when building 
ceased because of the Panic of 187J, less than 100 miles of 
track had been laid. 6 ·:Jhen improving conditions in the East 
permitted investment in western railroads again, a web of 
rail lines spread across the territory. A major impetus for 
this construction was a rivalry between the Chicago, Milwau- 
kee, & St. Paul and the Chicago & North Western roads, both 
of which decided to extend their lines into the area in the 
late 1870s.7 
Secondly, increased rainfall after the drought of the 
early 1870s convinced many settlers that South Dakota offer- 
ed a more humid climate than was actually the case.8 This 
was particularly true for central and northern South Dakota 
where settlement moved onto the Great Plains proper. Here 
conventional agriculture as practiced further east was 
suitable during wet seasons, but as the rainfall cycle 
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entered a dry phase in the mid-1880s many farmers found 
themselves unable to cope with the changing conditions. 
A third factor in the Dakota Boom was the promotional 
efforts of a varity of sources, all extolling the glories 
of the territory. Boomer literature was by no means limited 
to the years of the actual boom, but there was a profusion 
of it in the 1880s and soon after. The railroads were pri- 
marily responsible for such advertisement in the 1870s and 
early 1880s, although other private sources like townsite 
companies, newspapers, and steamship lines contributed their 
share.9 The Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul was particularly 
active in promoting migration to Dakota, but other roads 
were also responsible for pamphlets, special excursion rates, 
emigration agents, and exhibition cars that toured eastern 
states.10 
Dakotans were not willing to leave the task of inform- 
ing the outside world of the region's benefits to private 
hands. In the mid-1870s a territorial immigration bureau 
operated for a time, sending out literature in English, 
German, and Norwegian. This was revived in 1885 and distrib- 
uted thousands of pamphlets, reports, maps, lithographs, and 
11 books. 
Other factors in the Dakota Boom included the avail- 
ability of capital for investment in the West and advances 
in agricultural technology. As economic conditions im- 
proved after the Panic of 1873 capital flowed westward to 
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lucrative markets. Part of it went into railroads and Black 
Hills mines, but much of this money--especially that coming 
12 from small investors--found its way into farm mortgages. 
This was welcomed by settlers who were just starting farms 
and needed capital from the outside to make necessary im- 
provements and to buy the machinery required for prairie 
agriculture. 
Progress in agricultural techniques and tools helped 
make possible the boom. Better plows and reapers aided in 
working large tracts of ground. Changes in flour milling 
allowed the commercial cultivation of hard spring wheat, a 
crop much more suited to Dakota's climate than soft winter 
wheat, and contributed to the development of the wheat belt 
of northern South Dakota. The danger present in this new 
technology was its cost. Many farmers went into debt to 
purchase machinery and were caught short when the boom 
broke.1J 
The boom could not last forever: something had to 
break. In :~kota in the 1830s what broke was the stretch 
of wet years. Localized drought struck in 1886, hitting 
small grains in particular. Widespread drought came in 1887, 
though it was only spotty in 1888. Severe drought returned 
in 1889 and, with some exceptions, a shortage of rainfall 
plagued the state until the mid-1890s.14 
The effect of the drought was devastating, particularly 
in the western areas. Eastern and southeastern southern 
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Dakota fared better than the counties in the northern and 
central portions. The sections settled earlier received 
more rain than those settled during the boom and their farm 
economy was more diversified, thus able to absorb the shock 
better.15 :iJheat in the entire territory averaged less than 
ten bushels per acre in 1889, and some areas harvested con- 
siderably less. Many were faced with destitution in an era 
when state government was too limited to provide substantial 
assistance. In Miner County crops were so poor that star- 
vation was imminent for thousands.16 John B. Streng, a 
German farmer living a few miles south of that county, wrote 
to H.T. Helgesen, commissioner of the North Dakota Depart- 
ment of Agriculture and Labor, whom he had heard was col- 
lecting funds for Dakota's needy, "~e have 4 little child- 
ren and nothing to eat and no shoes for our children a~d no 
feed for our horses . . . . [ :-1] e shall perish with hunger, 
all my neighbors are as badly circumstanced."17 
The course of the boom and bust has been ably chron- 
icled in one wheat belt county. Brown County, situated on 
the edge of the Great Plains in northern South Dakota, had 
only J5J residents and 28 farms in 1880. In the next years 
the boom overtook it and by 1885 Brown had 12,011 inhabi- 
tants and 2,441 farms.18 By 1890 the population reached 
16,855 and the number of farms totaled 2,527.19 In 1882 
Brown County farmers harvested a bumper wheat crop, a 
success that insured the crop's prominence in future plant- 
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ing. In 188) over three times more land was devoted to 
wheat than any other crop. Good harvests continued through 
1885, but the beginning of the drought in 1886 damaged the 
small grain crops. Some areas in the county averaged only 
three to four bushels an acre that year. Furthermore, the 
price of wheat in Aberdeen ranged from only$.45 to$.62 a 
bushel. Despite a poor showing in 1886, settlers continued 
to come to the county and farmers continued to plant wheat. 
The next year increased rainfall brought some relief, but 
it did not last. The severe winter of 1887-1888 presaged 
continued drought and yields were low in 1888. Prices reach- 
ed $1.27 per bushel for wheat in Aberdeen, but only under 
the artificial stimulus of an active local board of trade. 
Such high prices may have done the county more harm than 
good because it only reinforced farmers' tendency to stay 
with a single crop rather than diversify. Even with the 
risk, the chance of a large crop at that price was a poten- 
tial bonanza that was hard to pass. Hence, over a quarter 
of a ~illion acres in 3rown County were plantej with wheat 
in 1839, more than five times the acreage devoted to oats, 
King -~1eat's closest competitor. The dry weather continued 
in 1890 and was complicated by prairie fires and low market 
prices.20 Brown County farmers eventually turned to more 
diversified crops to protect themselves against losing every- 
thing with a poor wheat crop, but it was a lesson learned 
through hardship. 
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Census returns can be used to measure the bust as well 
as the boom. Between 1890 and 1895 twenty-seven counties in 
South Dakota lost population, most of them located in the 
region east of the Missouri River, but north and west of the 
counties settled before the boom.21 Between 1890 and 1900 
drought and other factors caused a drop in the population of 
sixteen South Dakota counties, all of which lay on or west 
of the James River. Most of these lay between the James and 
the Missouri, the area that received the greatest influx of 
settlers during the boom and that is the eastern edge of the 
Great Plains in the state.22 Furthermore, the counties that 
lost population often had urban sites that were growing, a 
fact that conceals the true loss in rural districts.2) Most 
of those regaining population losses between 1895 and 1900 
were situated east of the Great Plains or in the Black Hills. 
Other factors contributed to the end of the boom. Rail- 
road construction dropped dramatically in 1838.24 During 
the good years farmers had been too willing to mortgage 
their land in or]er to get established or to expand. The 
result was that they had too much debt and not enough cap- 
ital to survive a series of bad years.25 In 1890 South 
Dakota ranked ninth in the nation in the percenta~e of fam- 
ilies living in owned but mortgaged homes, following only 
Kansas of the Plains states.26 The farmers' inability to 
secure additional capital was compounded by a tightening 
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money market due to a slump in business in the East and 
eastern reluctance to invest because of fraud and failure 
in speculative ventures in the West.27 
Many of the seeds of the Populist movement were sown 
during the Dakota Boom between 1878 and 1887. That is when 
settlers moved out into a region for which they were not 
prepared. That is the era when railroads stretched through 
the future state, making commercial agriculture on a large 
scale feasible, but also binding the farmers' fate to them. 
That is when farmers shouldered a mortgage burden too heavy 
for them to carry during hard years. These were seeds that 
would come to fruition in the 1890s. The organization that 
harvested those seeds was the Dakota Farmers' Alliance. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE DAKOTA FARMERS' ALLIANCE 
When Dakota farmers found themselves in hard straits 
during the nineteenth century their response was organiza- 
tion to act against a common threat. This was first seen in 
the Grange in Dakota Territory in the 1870s. As farmers 
faced difficulties in the late 1880s and 1890s they again 
flocked to a farm order to seek relief, turning this time 
to the Farmers' Alliance. 
In the years just prior to South Dakota's statehood in 
1889, the agrarians in the region were confronted by serious 
problems. The Great Dakota Boom ended, leaving many farmers 
poorly prepared for hardships and deeply in debt. Sagging 
prices due to deflation and overproduction made wresting a 
living from a stubborn climate more difficult. Located far 
from adequate markets, South Dakota's farmers depended 
heavily on elevators and railroads to buy, store, and ship 
their crops to eastern cities. These corporations were, 
however, powerful institutions that were accusej of exploit- 
ing helpless farmers. 
The Farmers' Alliance offered embattled farmers a tool 
to combat such barriers to agricultural prosperity. Part of 
the farm order's solution to these problems lay in coopera- 
tive enterprises that would allow agrarians a chance to 
overcome some of the sources of oppression. Hence the Alli- 
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ance gave rise to a host of business operations such as in- 
surance companies, purchasing cooperatives, and elevators. 
In addition, the Alliance appealed to sources outside agri- 
cultural circles for support against its enemies, petition- 
ing particularly to laborers, whom it saw as common members 
of a great producing class that was endangered by those who 
would seek to enrich themselves from the labor of others. 
The problems Dakota farmers encountered in the eighties 
and nineties were not new to the region. During the early 
1870s the Patrons of Husbandry, a farm order that had been 
organized by Oliver Kelley in Nashington, D.C., in 1867, 
gathered some strength among settlers in southeastern Dakota 
Territory who were suffering under an oppressive credit 
system. The Grange, as the organization is more commonly 
known,first began in Dakota Territory in late 1872 and 
quickly grew to about 2,000 members in fifty-six lodges. 
Although the Dakota State Grange made efforts to eliminate 
middlemen who siphoned farmers' profits, it met with little 
success. A brief foray into politics in combination with 
the Democrats by a portion of the Grange as the Anti-Mono- 
poly Party in 1874 was also a failure and the organization 
faded into obscurity.1 
A few years later farmers turned to another organiza- 
tion to replace the Grange. Milton George, the Illinois 
editor who started the National Farmers' Alliance,issued the 
first charter to a local alliance in Dakota in 1881.2 The 
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first few years of the Northern Alliance, as the National 
Farmers' Alliance is generally known, were marked by slow 
progress in the territory. By 1884, however, difficulties 
with credit, railroad and elevator abuses, and declining 
wheat prices convinced many farmers of the need to organize 
more thoroughly.J 
The forerunner of the Dakota Territorial Alliance was 
the Beadle County Farmers' Protective Association, an or- 
ganization formed by farmers on the edge of the Great Plains 
in 1884 in search of a means of obtaining higher prices for 
their crops and lower prices for their purchases.4 In 
December 1884 a meeting of all granges, alliances and other 
agricultural groups was called by W.F.T. Bushnell, the edi- 
tor of the Dakota Farmer, to gather in Huron, the county 
seat of Beadle County. Although many of the territory's 
sixty local alliances were not represented, the convention 
effected an organization and adopted a platform calling for 
the equal taxation of all property, an end to railroad 
passes to gover~1~nt officials, the regulation of transport 
rates by law, and legislation in the interest of farmers.5 
In February 1885 the farmers again met in Huron to 
elect a new slate of officers, adopt a constitution, and 
formally become the Dakota Territorial Alliance. Only 
forty-three delegates, mostly from central South Dakota and 
none from the northern half of the territory, attendect.6 The 
following January the Alliance convened in Watertown where 
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Henry L. Loucks was elected president.? 
Henry Langford Loucks was inseparably bound to the 
Dakota Alliance and South Dakota's Populist movement. Born 
in Canada in 1846, Loucks lived in the United States briefly 
during the mid-1860s before returning to his homeland. He 
re-emigrated in 1879. After a few years in Missouri he 
located on a farm in Deuel County, Dakota, in 188J. In 
1884 Loucks organized a farm club in Deuel that later be- 
came an alliance. His election to the presidency of the 
Dakota Alliance in 1886 was only the beginning of his rise 
in agrarian politics. In 1889 he became the president of 
the Northern Alliance, but soon led the Dakota farm order 
into the Southern Alliance where he was elected vice-presi- 
dent. When the president, Leonidas L. Polk, died in June 
1892, Loucks succeeded him and was elected president in his 
own right in November of that year. He also made several 
bids for major office in South Dakota politics before his 
death in 1928. Condemned as an unprincipled schemer and 
office seeker by his enemies and hailed as the "~~oses" of 
the Alliance and the "patron saint of South Dakota populists" 
by friends, Loucks left a large imprint on the state's 
political scene in the 1890s.8 
The Alliance grew rapidly under the adverse conditions 
the farmers faced in the 1880s. In December 1884 only about 
sixty local alliances existed in Dakota. In two years the 
number quadrupled. By December 1888, 744 suballiances dotted 
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the territory with approximately 28,000 members. By the end 
of July 1889, over one hundred thirty more charters had been 
issued.9 The order's early strength was concentrated in the 
in the wheat belt counties of southern Dakota and in the Red 
River Valley of northern Dakota, but it eventually spread to 
cover all settled sections of the territory.10 
As commercial fc:Giers, Dakota's agricultural settlers 
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depended heavily on the various aspects of the marketing 
system for their success. Abuses in this system and the 
problems inherent in a frontier area drew farmers into the 
Alliance as a means of meeting their problems with a united 
front. 9ifficulties with railroads and elevators were part 
of the problem. Carrying a heavy burden of debt that was 
a constant drain on the scant resources of the region was 
another element in the Alliance's rise. The disillusiorur.ent 
caused by the end of the boom, the hardships created by the 
drought, and the frustration experienced when it took larger 
crops to bring the same return as prices spiraled downward 
all combined to fuel the Farmers' Alliance. When their ow~1 
institution proved incapable of solving their problems and 
when the two major parties showed themselves unresponsive to 
the needs of farmers, the agrarians took the promising road 
of independent political action. 
The farmers' heavy dependence'on the railroad made it 
a particular point of concern for the Alliance. Extensive· 
commercial agriculture was possible in large sections of 
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South Dakota only because of the ready access to markets 
afforded by railroads. The roads could literally decide the 
life or death of a community by where they laid the tracks 
as they expanded across 0akota. A bumper wheat harvest was 
meaningless unless it could be moved to market economically. 
Settlers viewed these giant corporations with hope, for only 
the steel rails could bring prosperity and growth, yet with 
fear and suspicion of the power they could exert. That 
alarm was justified. The railroads in South Dakota, in the 
eyes of agrarians, abused their unbridled power and had to 
be checkej, 
Their first complaint was that freight rates were too 
high. Farmers found that excessive rates, especially as the 
prices they received for their produce iecline1, could easily 
gobble up one-third to one-half of their year's profits.11 
The actual effect of railroad rates on farmers in the 1890s 
has generated some controversy among histcrians, but recent 
scholarship suggests that farmers, particularly those west 
of the ~issouri, wsre injeed laboring under hie~ r~tes.12 
The railroads contendej that such rates were justified 
because the low volume of traffic in the state was carrie1 
over long distances, which meant a high fixed cost of oper- 
ation. Severe winters also added to the costs of running 
the roads. Furthermore, most of Dakota's railroads had been 
recently built. Rates had to be high enough to earn suffi- 
cient revenue to pay debts from construction, especially in 
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areas where there was little business.13 
This was an era when stock watering was common and the 
fact that new railroads were often over-capitalized meant 
higher rates were necessary to pay expected dividends. In 
addition, the valuation of the track and railroad equipment 
was often undervalued to escape state taxes. Farmers paid 
higher rates at the depot and higher taxes at the court- 
house because of such practices.14 The issue of raising the 
assessments on railroad property later became a major point 
in Populist Governor Andrew E. Lee's program. 
Jarious other aspects of the railroads' service worked 
hardships on the farmers. Competition among lines in some 
areas forced prices down and the common practice was to make 
up such losses in areas where a road held a monopoly. This 
often resultej in higher prices for a short haul to a large 
center than for the much longer distanc~s between large 
cities. It could be cheaper to ship a bushel of grain from 
Chicago to ~nglanj than from ~akota to~e millers of Minnea- 
polis. Railroais also solj transit between Jakcta and 
Milwaukee rather than for the shorter route to the Twin 
Cities to prevent the transfer of grain to a competing line. 
The farmer could sell his wheat at a point closer than 
Milwaukee, but he still had to pay the full rate although he 
might be able to _sell his remaining mileage at a discount.15 
Discrimination between large shippers and small ones 
was another point of aggravation. Customers who shipped in 
35 
bulk frequently received rebates and special prices for which 
individual farmers could not qualify. Major shippers were 
accorded better service by the railroads. Elevators had few 
problems getting enough cars to ship their grain while in- 
dividuals and small companies went begging for means of 
transporting their crops. Nhen parties did wish to build 
elevators or flathouses in competition with established 
elevator companies the railroads were often reluctant to 
grant space on the right of way for construction or other- 
wise hindered them.16 
Farmers and reformers found that the power of the rail- 
road corporations was an obstacle to redress through the 
political process. The railroads had the organization and 
the money to field strong lobbies and hire attorneys to 
protect their interests in the legislature and the courts. 
The custom of issuing free railroad passes to prominent 
officials and molders of public opinion also infuriated 
farmers. Henry Loucks railed against the practice. "The 
syste~ [of passesJ is a da~nable lever of ccrrupticn, by 
which the press, the politicians, and the people's repre- 
sentatives are influenced against the interests of the people 
.... ~e, the victims, are charged enough extra to make up 
for the free travelling, railroad lobbying, etc."17 
Farmers also had grievances against the grain elevators 
they normally had to deal with while marketing their crops. 
Like the railroads, the elevators were frequently monopolis- 
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tic institutions in small towns. Seldom did farmers have a 
wide range of grain buyers with whom to do business, hence 
the prices offered for their products were easily manipulat- 
ed. Line elevator companies--those operating a string of 
elevators along a particular railroad--had good relations 
with railway officials and both companies were hesitant to 
allow other competitors in. Some of these elevator chains 
were huge affairs. In 1889 an English syndicate purchased 
78 elevators of the Van Duzen Company in ~akota and Minne- 
sota and was negotiating for a dozen more.18 Even when 
local elevators were willing to pay good prices, grain 
dealers in the major terminals worked to keep the prices 
down. In 1889 there were reports that Minneapolis dealers 
were exaggerating the size of the Dakota wheat crop to sup- 
. 19 press prices. 
Local elevator agents controlled the grading of grain 
as well, so a man's crop might receive a low grade at the 
elevator, but be sold to a miller in Minneapolis at a higher 
one, with the elevatcr op~rator pocketing the extra profit.20 
Lacking adequate storage space on his farn, the typical 
South ~akota far~er us~ally had to sell his grain as soon 
as possible, taking whatever the local elevator woulj offer. 
Consigning the crop to the elevator was an alternative, but 
the farmer had to pay storage fees and still could not be 
certain of a higher price at a lat2r date. Often settlers 
had no choice but to sell because they had to satisfy debtors. 
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Farmers with initiative might try to ship their wheat them- 
selves, but they generally encountered problems getting 
21 cars. 
Even when a farmer's prices were not manipulated, he 
often found little return in the marketplace. Agricultural 
prices were on a downward slope in the years following the 
Civil :·Jar for two reasons. One was the general decline in 
the level of prices in the deflation that occurred as the 
economy wound down from its wartime rate. A second cause 
was the vast increases in production that characterized 
American and worldwide agriculture in the latter half of 
the nineteenth century. 
As the government retired the greenbacks that had 
circulated during the Civil War, price levels dropped to 
match the subsequent appreciation of the currency left in 
the economy. Between 1865 and 1870 alone the money in cir- 
culation dropped 25 percent. Accor~ing to one authority, 
the general price index between 1865 and 1895 fell from 
about 185 to less than 75, with a~ricultural ccm~odities 
below that.22 The effects of this can be seen in the prices 
paid to farmers in South ~akota. In the early 18~0s wheat 
dropped below a dollar per bushel in Jakota and proved a 
major impetus to the formation of the farmers' organiza- 
tions.2J Using the average price for July 15 of each year, 
wheat brought $0.72 per bushel in 1890 and 1891, but fell to 
$0.60 in 1892. In 189J ~nd 1894 the price was under fifty 
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cents a bushel. After a slight rally in 1895, the price 
dropped to $0.40 in 1896. The remaining years of the decade 
brought prices near or over the $0.60 mark, but only after 
years of privation on South Dakota farms.24 
As agriculture spread westward onto the huge tracts of 
the Great Plains, farm production climbed, depressing prices 
through the natural consequences of an increased supply. 
Improvements in transportation in the United States and in 
other countries expanded the markets of American farmers, 
but also placed them in competition with agriculturalists 
elsewhere.25 
Another burden upon the farmers was the tariff, which 
made the price of goods they bought artificially high but 
which did not offer much protection for the goods they sold. 
As one of the most heatedly debated issues of the Gilded 
Age, the tariff was defended by the Republicans as the means 
of encouraging native industries. It was attacked by Demo- 
crats who looked upon it as an unwarranted aid to a favored 
few at the expense of the many. Although many Alliance men, 
reflecting their Republican roots, favored the tariff, the 
arguments of its critics had some merit. Otto Anderson, a 
Pennington County Alliance member, was a persistent enemy of 
the "tariff robbers" who kept prices high on twine, but low 
on cattle hides that the farmer marketect.26 
The money lending institutions that had been so welcome 
during good years became·enemies during the bad ones. In- 
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terest rates were high before the end of the boom, but loans 
were available. Declining prices made it more difficult to 
pay off mortgages contracted during years of expansion; poor 
harvests made it almost unbearable. Farmers had to r-ef'Lnanc e 
their mortgages or face foreclosure, and, due to the poor 
business conditions in the East, interest rates jumped be- 
cause there was less capital at hand. ilhen real estate mort- 
gages were unavailable hardpressed farmers turned to chattel 
mortgages on their equipment and livestock for ready cash, 
even though it entailed interest rates that could reach J6 
percent. One of the ironies of this alternative was that 
many families could not flee during difficult years because 
their only means of transportation--their wagon and team-- 
was mortgaged and could not be removed.27 Bankers who haj 
been looked upon as friends during prosperous years began to 
be viewed as usurers and symbols of exploitation. 
The ~en most likely to join the Farmers' Alliance were 
precisely those farmers who had the most to lose from drought 
and agric~ltural depression. A recent study of the me~ber- 
ship of the Alliance in one South Dakota county has indicated 
that the order drew most of its members from farmers who had 
recently improved their status and were heavily mortgaged. 
These men were most vulnerable to hard times, for they had 
gone into debt to establish farms and did not yet have the 
resources to weather financial difficulties. 28 
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An example of how the Alliance used adverse conditions 
to recruit new members can be seen in the attempts it made 
to boost grain prices. In 1889 when wheat was bringing only 
t<>.50 to $0.60 a bushel, the Dakota Ruralist, official organ 
of the Territorial Alliance, urged farmers to hold their 
crops as long as possible in hopes of higher prices. "In 
the meantime look about and investigate the Alliance movement 
which seeks to combine the farmers, and in this way meet 
combination with combination."29 
Part of the Dakota Alliance's response to these ad- 
versities was a range of cooperative enterprises. rhe basic 
thrust of these programs was to save money and to give the 
farmer more control over his affairs. Henry Loucks viewed 
cooperation as the means to break trusts that monopolized 
the markets in which farmers operated. A cooperative store 
could sell products for less than the traditional stores or 
force local businessmen to lower their prices.JO 
These various operations benefited the Alliance by 
b +. . t b 1 • OOSvlng 1 s ~e~ ersn1p. The historian of the Southern 
Alliance credits the cooperative portion of the organizations 
activities with being a major lure to farmers.Jl The person- 
nel in these businesses served as recruiters for new members. 
In 1887 the 273 insurance agents operating in ~akota helped 
start 103 new alliances in the territory.32 Indeed, the 
desire to coordinate the efforts of various buying and selling 
operations had been one of the reasons why the Dakota Alli- 
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ance had been formed in the first place, with the price of 
twine and coal being early concerns.JJ 
The first major undertaking by the Alliance was the 
Alliance Hail Association, formed in December 1886 and in- 
corporated the following February. The Association was able 
to insure farmers against one of the environmental hazards 
they faced at a significantly lower rate than traditional 
insurance companies. In its first year the hail insurance 
program paid its claim in full out of an assessment that 
was forty to fifty cents per acre lower than its competitors. 
Over 152,000 acres were covered in 1887, 566,000 the second 
year, and nearly 460,000 the third year.J4 
The hail insurance proved such a success that the Alli- 
ance authorized the formation of a life insurance department 
at its ~ecember 1888 meeting. The Alliance Aid Association 
began operations in early 1889, offering a $2,000 policy to 
members between the ages of 18 and 50 for a $5.00 membership 
fee. ·lhenever a member died, all other members were assessed 
a fee of ~1.00 to $2.00 to cover the costs.35 The Alliance 
also offered fire insurance for a time.36 
The man in charge of the Alliance insurance efforts was 
Alonzo lardall, a Grant County farmer, a long-time agrarian 
leader, and one of the most powerful men in the Dakota Alli- 
anc e . Born in ':'lisconsin in 1845, ·."Jard all saw service in the 
Civil ~Jar before he moved to Iowa where he was a leader in 
the state's Grange movement. He was one of the organizers 
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of the Dakota Alliance after his removal to that territory. 
He also served as a member of the executive board of the 
Southern Alliance. In the early 1890s he started the Alli- 
ance Aid Degree, the national counterpart of the Alliance 
Aid Association.37 
Perhaps the most ambitious cooperative venture by the 
Alliance was the Dakota Farmers' Alliance Company, a joint 
stock company created as a purchasing operation. Authorized 
by the Alliance's executive committee in July 1887, this 
concern began business in January 1888 with George c. Crose 
as president. Its original capital of $200,000 was to come 
from the sale of 20,000 shares of stock, with no member 
allowed to take more than fifty shares to insure that no 
individual could control it. It originally functioned 
through a large network of some five hundred local agents, 
but in 1889 switched to county purchasing agents to improve 
efficiency.JS 
The purchasing cooperative faced severe problems in its 
early years. ~any wholesalers, particularly agricultural 
implement dealers, were reluctant to deal with it. Further- 
more, it lacked the necessary capital to buy in the quantities 
it had hoped.39 
Despite these obstacles, the company managed to do over 
$J5J,OOO in business in its first year, about half of which 
was in twine. In 1888 it sold around 75 carloads of twine, 
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2,000 cars of coal, and 11 cars of barbed wire. As the 
cooperative gained momentum it offered more products. It 
secured a contract with a plow company, and offered miscell- 
aneous farm implements, sewing machines, oil and other items. 
It even had its own illustrated catalog.40 
A third Alliance business struck directly at an old 
enemy. In early 1888 a farmers' elevator company was in- 
corporated in Minneapolis with Henry Loucks as president. 
Only by controlling a terminal with ready markets could 
farmers defeat the power of the line elevators. British 
investors were willing to put up half of the projected two 
million dollars in capital in order to guarantee getting 
pure hard wheat.41 
One of Louck's associates in the firm was C.C. Wolcott, 
the owner of a chain of J2 elevators. When :Jolcott lost 
badly in wheat speculation he had to borrow heavily from 
the company and one of its officers. Milling interests in 
Minneapolis seized this opportunity to discredit their new 
competitor and managed to frighten away English capital. 
This affair and the enm i ty of the traditional commercial 
channels for handling grain brought on the failure of the 
Alliance elevator plans.42 
Not all cooperative enterprises of the era were the work 
of the Territorial Alliance. A number of local alliances and 
other groups made efforts at cooperation. to cut their costs 
and improve their conditions. By 1888 there were 42 farmers' 
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elevators in the territory, eleven of them under the auspices 
of alliances.43 For example, the White Farmers' Alliance 
Elevator Company and a farmers' elevator at Alpena, South 
Dakota, were praised for the savings they producea.44 In 
Grant County a stock company consisting mostly of farmers 
ran a cheese factory.45 
The large scale cooperative businesses of the Alliance 
were not successful in the long term. As was the case with 
the Alliance's elevator company, the hostility of older 
businesses and the lack of capital seriously hindered the 
Dakota Farmers' Alliance Company. The Alliance Hail Associ- 
ation fell on hard times when it could not pay all of its 
claims. It was later denied a certificate to operate in 
the state when the insurance commissioner reported finding 
evidence of favoritism in the manner the company paid 
claims. 
Recent historians have seen the problems the Alliance 
faced in economic cooperation as having "a discernible radi- 
calizing effect on the Dakota leadership, particularly on 
Loucks himself."46 This is true in some cases, but the 
failure of cooperation did not become the sole wellspring 
for the Populist party or for future agrarian radicalism. 
Loucks and Wardall became leaders in the Alliance crusade 
against trusts and in the Independent movement, but not all 
of the top Alliance men reacted in the same fashion. Don C. 
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Needham, once secretary of the Farmers' Alliance Company, 
and A.D. Chase, formerly a director of the hail association, 
remained in the Republican party rather than turn to inde- 
pendent action.47 Those early leaders who did turn to rad- 
icalism often had reformist backgrounds to begin with. 
~ardall had been a Granger in Iowa. He and Loucks had 
48 given support to temperance and woman suffrage. 
Even though some leaders in the Alliance were "radi- 
calized" from their experiences in the cooperative movement, 
this did not always apply to local leaders and the rank and 
file. Not all of the Alliance followed Loucks and his asso- 
ciates into the Independent party with its controversial 
proposals and the Populists alone never drew a majority of 
South Dakota's electorate. The state, despite occasional 
bursts of agrarian reformism and a cooperative movement that 
has been part of the farm economy since the 1880s, re~ains 
conservative. 
The cooperative efforts incurred the displeasure of the 
business community, especially local merchants whose income 
suffered because of the competition.49 In defending the 
cooperative movement from those who attacked it as an appeal 
to man's baser instincts, Loucks retorted that it was a pos- 
itive good. The movement instilled a spirit of cooperation, 
gave the profits to the men who earned them rather than to 
trusts, and developed wholesome qualities like "self~reliance, 
thrift, economy, knowledge, and independence."50 In two 
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editorials in 1889 the Alliance leader disclaimed any desire 
to foster antagonism between the town and country. He assur- 
ed townsmen that he had no intention to destroy the cities, 
but, foreshadowing Bryan's famous statement about the de- 
pendence of urban areas upon rural ones, he pointed out that 
the prosperity of the city depended on the prosperity of the 
farm. He warned town leaders that the farmers would readily 
turn to cooperatives if the profits of middlemen got too 
high.51 
The Alliance made one half-hearted gesture to overcome 
such hostility and formally enlist town dwellers in its 
cause. Such people were urged to form a chapter of the 
National Citizens' Industrial Alliance, an order open to 
everyone but "stockholders, officers or salaried attorneys 
of railway, express, telegraph or national banking corpor- 
ations ... 52 The idea never caught on in South Dakota, al- 
though there was at least one such organization in the state, 
located in Parker with sixty members.5J 
The Alliance also solicited the support of laborers, 
seeking to demonstrate that there was a unity of interest 
between farmers and laborers as members of the producing 
class against the corporations and trusts that oppressed both 
of them. Hugh J. Campbell, a speaker at the Farmers' Alli- 
ance meeting in June 1889, talked of the great battle in 
which they would socn engage, a battle that would decide who 
would govern the state, "the great producing class" or "the 
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great corporations, the corruptionists, the boodlers and the 
political rings ... 54 Some of those attending the 1889 con- 
vention were Knights of Labor, who had been invited to join 
the farmers' assemblage by Loucks and the Knights' Grand 
Master :'Jorkman in the state, Frank Wilder.55 
The columns of the Dakota Ruralist give evidence of 
support among Alliance men f'or the problems of labor, a 
sentiment that seems to go beyond a simple appeal for labor 
votes to achieve farm ends. One might expect an agrarian 
leader and politician such as Loucks to show his sympathy 
for a labor dispute involving ~he Knights of Labor, but 
resolutions by local alliances favoring the cause of the 
labor group against companies that had discriminated against 
the workers' order were common. The '.:Jal worth County Alli- 
ance voted to boycott the Grand Detour Plow Company, the 
Henderson Shoe Company, and the Rochester Clothing Company. 
The Huffton Alliance in Brown County added the Globe tobacco 
combine to the list of targeted businesses and Rose Alliance, 
No. 74, of 3pink County pledged not to buy from "any other 
company that refuses to hire union labor ... 56 Other local 
alliances criticized the government fer allowing the Pinker- 
tons to interfere in the Homestead steel strike and for 
harsh treatment of Coxey's army. One alliance even endorsed 
T.V. Powderly, the national leader of the Knights of Labor 
for president.57 
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The Knights of Labor do not seem to have played a 
significant role in the politics of the 1890s. The organiz- 
ation had little strength in South Dakota, numbering only 
J6 assemblies.58 The president and business manager of its 
official organ opposed the independent movement and placed 
his paper and himself--in his capacity as a delegate to 
the Alliance convention that voted to form a third party-- 
at the disposal of the Republican governor.59 Nor does it 
appear that other labor organizations or laborers as a whole 
heeded the Alliance siren. 
Confronted by a diverse set of agricultural hardships 
in the late 1880s and early 1890s, South Dakota farmers 
turned to the Farmers' Alliance for solutions to pressing 
problems. Y.any agri~ultural settlers had over-extended 
their resources and abilities and were hard put to cope 
with the end of the Dakota boom. Poor prices made thP 
returns for even bumper crops insufficient. Elevators and 
railroads, upon which farmers depended for marketing, seemed 
to be draining away the meager profit from South Dakota 
farms. In response, the Alliance developed a series of 
cooperative ventures to alleviate some of the difficulties 
and bid for the support of laborers against those interests 
perceived as inimical to the wellbeing of the producing 
class. 
The Alliance recognized early that only part of its 
program could be achieved through cooperation and appeals 
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for unity to others. It quickly turned to political pres- 
sure, although at first in a non-partisan form. The farm 
order tried to work within the structures of the existing 
parties, but it was political action nevertheless. Such 
items as railroad reform, new mortgage laws, and a greater 
money supply could only be had by taking demands to the 
polls and to the legislature. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE RISE OF THE INDEPENDENT MOVEMENT 
Cooperative enterprises formed only part of the Alli- 
ance response to agrarian problems. The organization's 
members understood from the beginning that some of their 
goals could not be accomplished without political action. 
Business ventures could free farmers from dependence on 
middlemen who drained off profits, but other objectives 
required political remedies. Indeed, the first platform of 
the Dakota Farmers' Alliance, adopted in December 1884, 
called for a number of items that could be achieved solely 
by legislation. 
In 1884 the farmers' demands were rather limited. In 
the course of the next six years, however, the Alliance 
platforms grew in length and scope. By the end of the 
decade, Alliance men called for a sweeping exercise of ~ov- 
er~~ental authority. The reforms they desired became more 
specific. The Alliance found that its early goals were tco 
li~ited and that a stronger role for governrnent--particularly 
the national government--would be necessary. In these years 
the Alliance discovered that their opponents exercised tco 
much control over the government and that changes were needed 
to protect the power of the corrunon man. 
The farmers also made an effort to broaden their appeal 
by including changes called for by other groups. By 1889 the 
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Alliance began to look to other economic interests--espe- 
cially labor--that shared their disadvantages in order to 
establish a common front. 
The farmers first sought to reach their goals by work- 
ing through the existing party structure. They believed 
that in an agrarian state such as South Dakota, where 
farmers formed the bulk of the voting population, they could 
easily compel both of the major parties to meet Alliance 
demands. This proved a false hope, for old party leaders, 
although they attempted to placate agrarian protests, 
followed their own goals and listened more intently to 
other interests. In 1889 the Alliance could claim that the 
final session of the territorial legislature was a farmers' 
legislature because a majority of the members espoused 
agricultural principles, but even with such strength, the 
farmers could not push through their demands. 
By the end of the decade, some South Dakota farmers had 
concluded--reluctantly by their own claims and eagerly 
accordin~ to their enemies--that the old parties could not 
serve as vehicles to Alliance success in the political arena. 
From this dissatisfaction and disillusionment sprang the 
Independent party. The new political venture achieved sur- 
prising success in its ~aiden effort at unseating the old 
parties. Although the state slate went down in defeat, many 
legislative districts polled a majority for the lndependents. 
With the aid of the Democrats, the farmer's party was able 
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to elect a U.S. senator during the 1891 session of the state 
legislature. 
Farmers' clubs began forming in 1884 to start cooper- 
ative enterprises. Representatives of some sixty of these 
local bodies gathered in Huron in December 1884 to discuss 
their problems and needs. These men recognized that their 
objectives would necessitate political action. There was 
no waiting period during which the cooperative ventures 
were tried and found wanting before the farmers took the 
first steps toward involvement in the territory's public 
affairs. That first meeting adopted a platform calling for 
the equal taxation of all property, an end to the practice 
of giving railroad passes to government officials, the reg- 
ulation of transportation rates by law, and legislation in 
1 the interests of the farmers. 
In the next few legislative sessions, the farm element 
made its voice heard, even if it was not always strong enough 
to force legislators to heed its cries. In 1885 the farm- 
ers were able to achievP passa;e of a law establishi~g a 
railroad commission, although the regulatory body proved 
ineffective. In 1887 the Allian:e managed to get a law 
1 . . . h 2 1cens1ng grain ware ouses. 
By 1889 the demands of the Farmers' Alliance had be- 
come much more elaborate. This reflected the continuing 
problems of South Dakota farmers, the realization that a 
more active exercise of governmental authority would be 
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necessary, and bids for the support of other interest groups. 
Meeting in Huron that year, the Alliance accepted a plat- 
form calling for government ownership and operation of all 
public necessities, particularly railroads; a national 
monetary system with the power to issue legal tender direct- 
ly to the people without going through private banks, equal 
taxation, and courts of arbitration. To reduce the power of 
corporations and bosses, the Alliance proposed the secret 
ballot and the direct election of U.S. senators. Perhaps 
reflecting the early interests of some leading Alliance men 
and the desire to garner support from all quarters, the 
platform demanded state and national prohibition. As a 
concession to the Knights of Labor and as a recognition that 
all independent producers of wealth must stand unitej, the 
convention included several issues beneficial to the labor 
movement. Child labor and the hiring out of convict labor 
were to be ended. The contract system was no longer to be 
used by national, state, and city governments.J These con- 
stituted calls for political involvement--albeit in a non- 
partisan fashion--before the business operations of the Alli- 
ance came to grief in the early 1890s. 
Political interest was present in the local alliances 
as well. The Dakota Ruralist recorded the resolution of a 
number of individual alliances that demanded action on one 
subject of concern or another. In some counties, farmers 
established organizations specifically intended to keep a 
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close eye on doings in the 1889 territorial legislature and 
to appraise their representatives of the agrarians' desires 
on legislation.4 
Organizations apparently not connected to the Alliance 
also sprang up to agitate for demands similar to those of 
the farm organization. In Aberdeen a body called the 
Brotherhood of Purpose was established in early 1890. It 
sought a number of the planks of the Alliance platform as 
well as government loans on real estate, free silver, and 
laws against usury. In Lincoln County a group called the 
Farmers' Grader was founded to prevent class legislation.5 
On the local level farmers sometimes were so frustrated 
with the old parties' unresponsiveness that they turned to 
independent political action. In Brookings County, a people~ 
ticket was fielded in 1884, but with no success. Similar 
tickets ran elsewhere in Dakota that same year. In Grant 
County, Territorial Alliance treasurer l.D. Scott gained 
office as an independent later in the decade.6 The corres- 
ponjents of Rep~blican Gover~or Arthur C. Uellette exhibit~d 
concern over the strength of these unorganized efforts to 
make the far~ers' voice heard when the old parties proved 
deaf. Such independent slates made inroads in Republican 
vote totals and sometimes turnej out county office holders.7 
The official line of the Farmers' Alliance, however, 
was that it would work for the interests of its members from 
within the structures of the existing political parties. The 
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early Alliance had no expressed intention of establishing a 
third party, but neither did it propose to stand idly by 
while other·groups dominated the political process. To make 
this point in October 1888, Henry Loucks cited the constitu- 
tion of the Dakota Alliances 
The object of this organization shall 
be to unite the farmers of Dakota for their 
protection against class legislation, and 
the encroachments of concentrated capital, 
and the tyranny of monopoly. To oppose in 
our respective political parties THE ELECTION 
OF ANY CANDIDATE TO OFFICE, COUNTY,TERRITORIAL 
OR NATIONAL, ';JHO IS NOT THOROUGHLY IN 
SYMPATHY ':JITH THE FARMERS' INTEREST. The 
[sic--To?] demand that the existing politi- 
cal parties shall nominate farmers or those 
who are in sympathy with them, for all 
offices in the gift of the people, and to do 
anything in a legitimate mannea that may 
serve to benefit the producer. 
The constitution made no mention of action outside of the 
parties then operating, but Loucks went on to warn the Re- 
publicans and Democrats that if they failed to name men 
acceptable to the Alliance, it would be the farmers' "plain 
duty to call conventions, nominate independent candidates, 
and elect them."9 
The zenith of the official Alliance policy of working 
within the limits of the existing parties came with the leg- 
islature of 1889. This final session of Dakota's territorial 
legislature was dominated by men who professed allegiance to 
the Alliance. The fact that the House actually adopted a 
rule allowing any Alliance matter to be voted on at any 
time if a majority of the members favored such action, 
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regardless of the regular order of bills, speaks of the 
strength of the farm order in this session.10 Indeed, the 
official organ of the Alliance had to remind over-eager 
legislators that the lawmakers were assembled to provide 
legislation beneficial to all of Dakota, not just its 
farmers.11 
The Alliance majority notwithstanding, the 1889 session 
did not produce the legislation clamored for by the agri- 
culturalis~s. Part of this problem lay in poor organization 
an~ inadequate leadership.12 The old party politicos also 
seem to have provided a roadblock to Alliance goals. In one 
case a bill that had been passed by both houses was stolen 
before it reached the committee of engrossed and enrolled 
bills. ~ithout proper action from this committee, the bill 
could not become law.13 An additional obstacle was the 
governor, Democrat Louis K. Church, who used his veto power 
liberally against the Republican legislature. This obstruc- 
tion moved the House to consider a memorial to President- 
• 1 • • f Ch . 14 elect Harrison comp~a1ning o urch's attitude. The 
results of the 1889 legislature--termed an "astonishing de- 
feat" by one historian of Dakota15--did not speak enthusi- 
astically for the official Alliance line of using the old 
parties to achieve agrarian ends. The farmers of Dakota, 
however, were not willing to abandon their old party loyal- 
ties just yet. 
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Loucks, as the president of the Dakota Alliance, pub- 
licly followed the non-partisan policy in the early months 
of 1889. The Alliance was willing to work within the bounds 
of the old parties, but only as long as those parties could 
serve as vehicles to agricultural ends. There were times 
when the carrot of Alliance support or the stick of inde- 
pendent action might be emphasized more than the other, but 
the basic message remained the same.16 
As the annual Alliance convention in late June approach- 
ed, Loucks took pains to quiet fears among old party politi- 
cians that the organization would strike an independent 
course. The farm leader assured the suspicious that the 
Alliance would maintain its current position of working 
through existing parties. This line became one of Louck's 
recommendations to the convention in his presidential ad- 
dress.17 Similarly, Hugh J. Campbell, a Republican politi- 
can sympathetic to the agricultural body, assured the con- 
vention that independent action was unnecessary, for "the 
Republican party comprises four-fifths of the pecple. The 
farmers comprise four-fifths of the Republican party. A 
word to the wise is sufficient.1118 
The farmers convened at Huron agreed. The body resolved 
"that it is the sentiment of this Alliance that our object 
can be best obtained through the machinery of our respective 
parties as we are, in the majority, (sic] in both of them, 
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and we have only to make a systematic effort to possess our- 
selves of them."19 The Dakota Ruralist noted that "certain 
would be advisors" had sought a call for a third party but 
that the convention was hostile to the idea.20 
Republican leaders did have reason to be wary of the 
political intentions of Alliance leaders. Governor Mellette 
received several warnings in 1889 that men high in the farm 
order's circles were plotting for office. In April, Coding- 
ton County politician Frank Crane informed Mellette that A. 
D. Chase, territorial lecturer for the Alliance, had divulged 
details of a plan whereby some aspiring Republicans would 
support Loucks and others for state office if the Alliance 
leadership would back them for congressional seats. Chase 
was a bitter rival of another Alliance leader, Alonzo ·.Jar- 
dall, and was willing to come over to Mellette's side.21 In 
July ~ellette received word from two of his correspondents 
that the Alliance leaders were putting together a slate to 
run in the fall election. C.H. Van Tassell, present at a 
meeting of the Alliance's Executive Boar1, reportGd that the 
organization was considering putting forward John M. Patten 
for governor, Abe Van Osdel for lieutenant governor, and 
Loucks and J.·;. Harden for the U.S. Senate. There was dis- 
agreement about the wisdom of such a move from three members 
present--Don C. Needham, George Crose, and Van Tassell. A 
few weeks earlier, Mellette had been told of a different 
1 t th t b . ·a ct 22 s a e a was e1ng cons1 ere . Although none of these 
64 
letters mentioned the possibility of an independent party, 
Mellette and other prominent Republicans--men who coveted 
the offices on which farm leaders had their eyes--would un- 
derstandably be alarmed by such rumors. 
In the months ahead Loucks carried on an aggressive 
defense of farmers' rights, including using the threat of 
independent action. In late August he warned Republicans 
that their party must respond to Alliance demands. His tone, 
probably designed to influence the nominations of the up- 
coming party convention, was ominous. Warning that farmers 
would tolerate only so much, Loucks informed Republicans 
that "that limit is almost reached."23 
The Republican convention could be considered by many 
to be an Alliance victory. The last territorial governor, 
Arthur C. Mellette.won his party's nomination for governor. 
Candidates with the Alliance's blessing were selected for 
the positions of lieutenant governor, secretary of state, 
attorney general, auditor, and one supreme court justice. 
The treasurer had been endorsed by the Knights of Labor. The 
platform included planks calling for a warehouse law, elected 
railroad commissioners with adequate power, laws against 
trusts, aid for irrigation, and constitutional prohibition.24 
Although the Ruralist expressed its satisfaction with 
the nominees and platform of the convention, Loucks cautioned 
South Dakota's dominant party that there had been a "very 
strong sentiment" at the last meeting of the Alliance for 
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independent political action, a sentiment that would have 
been carried out had it not been for the moderating influ- 
ence of the leaders. :·Jhile the convention of farmers in 
June had agreed to work through the old parties, Alliance 
men were not bound to support the nominees of the regular 
parties.25 
There were elements within and without the Al:iance 
that disagreed with Loucks's stance. George Crose, presi- 
dent of the farmers' purchasing cooperative, argued that 
the June convention had determined the organization's action 
and that Alliance men were obligated to stand behind the old 
parties, particularly the Republican party, which had in- 
corporated many Alliance measures into its platform.26 
Loucks's editorials indicate resistance on the part of the 
Republican leaders who feared the farmers' movement would 
threaten their power. Such politicians spread rumors that 
the Alliance proposed to ally with the Democrats and that 
farmers seeking office did so because they wanted to force 
class legislation upon Dakotans.27 
The legislature--with Republicans in the majority--met 
briefly in October to elect two U.S. senators. The four top 
candidates were R.F. Pettigrew, the leading Republican poli- 
tico; Gideon C. Moody, attorney for the Homestake mine and 
popular in the Black Hills; A. J. Edgerton, who had some 
Alliance support; and Alonzo Wardall, an Alliance of'f i ci.a l.. 
The Republican caucus chose Pettigrew and Moody and the two 
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were elected, much to the chagrin of Wardall. Edgerton had 
not pressed for his own victory and Loucks suspected him of 
remaining in the contest just long enough to prevent ~'lardall 
from obtaining sufficient votes to win a seat. Edgerton's 
reward for the ploy allegedly was to be a federal judgeship, 
a position to which he was appointed shortly after the elec- 
tion. Loucks's charges seem borne out by a letter Mellette 
received a little over a week before the senatorial election. 
D.F. Royer pointed out that the Alliance and the Democrats 
would oppose Pettigrew and Moody and urged Mellette to work 
on the prohibitionists in the legislature to back Moody and 
Pettigrew so that a temperance man like Edgerton could be 
appointed to the federal bench.28 
!\1eeting again in January, the lawmakers enacted a 
number of measures in the interests of the farmers. Most 
important was a law for the regulation ~f grain warehouses. 
Other legislation allowed county co~~issioners to distri- 
bute seed grain to the destitute, provided for the taxation 
of corporate property, and maje illegal certain trusts and 
combinations. Some more substantive reforms long sought by 
the Alliance were not enacted, however. A bill to prohibit 
legislators from accepting railroaj passes was defeated be- 
fore it could even be printed. A measure to regulate tele- 
phone and gas companies failed in the House. A bill requir- 
ing the taxation of mortgages held by non-residents evoked 
fear that it would drive away needed capital. The House op- 
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posed a bill that would have set railroad passenger rates.29 
By the time of the next Farmers' Alliance annual meet- 
ing, set for early June, strong sentiment for independent 
action had developed. The old parties had not responded to 
the needs of the farmers. Efforts to dominate the existing 
political parties had failed. Political bosses had foiled 
farmers' attempts to force their will on the old line politi- 
cos. The only recourse, if the interests of the farmers 
were to be safeguarded, was to take possession of the govern- 
ment as a new party. 
By a vote of 413 to 8J, the farmers assembled in Huron 
voted to blaze an independent trail. Citing the failure of 
the Republicans and Democrats to deliver the state from 
"fSreat evils which, if not removed, will bring retribution," 
the convention felt the formation of a new party was justi- 
fied. The "wealth producers" of the nation were being im- 
poverished while a plutocracy was reaping a fortune from the 
misery of others.JO One participant who disfavorej the move 
wrote of the decision, "The feeling was very strong for in- 
dependent action and it was no use to oppose it. It must 
have its run."31 
South Dakota farmers were not alone in their discontent. 
Throughout the northern and central Great Plains during that 
hot summer, Alliance meetings resolved for independent politi- 
cal action. The earliest efforts to that end seem to have 
been made in Kansas in March, although the first state Alli- 
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ance gathering to issue a call for a convention was South 
Dakota's.32 
Although the Alliance men deferred nominations for state 
offices until July, the convention did put together a plat- 
form. Their first demand was for a flexible amount of cur- 
rency issued by the government directly to the people with- 
out the intervention of private banks. Second, the farmers 
called for government ownership and ope~ation of the rail- 
road, telegraph, and telephone companies and for the pro- 
vision of those services at cost. Third, the new party 
wanted the free and unlimited coinage of silver. Fourth, 
the men in Huron sought the secret ballot in state and na- 
tional elections. Next, the farmers demanded "the most rigid 
economy consistent with the safety of our state and nation." 
Last, the independents wanted laws prohibiting the ownership 
of land by aliens, legal action against the land then held 
by aliens and syndicates, and the repossession of all land 
held by corporations but not being used.JJ 
Two individuals of national reputation addresaed the 
convention. One was Ben Terrill, National Lecturer for the 
Farmers' Alliance. Terrill's presence normally would not 
raise suspicion, since he was attending a meeting of a strong 
state organization of the farm order. However, Terrill had 
been making a tour through the state prior to the convention, 
a tour that can be followed through the pages of the Yankton 
Pr~ and Dakotan, a Republican sheet. In late May the paper 
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reported that Terrill received hearty applause from the Brown 
County Alliance when he spoke against bringing politics into 
the Alliance. In early June, in contrast, the Press and 
Dakotan recorded that Terrill called for independent action 
in a speech to the Minnehaha County Alliance. Shortly after 
the convention that gave birth to South Dakota's Independent 
party, Terrill again talked in favor of the new party. The 
question that remains unanswered--and unanswerable from the 
resources available in this study--is what was Terrill doing 
in the state? Was his presence in South Dakota a mere coin- 
cidence, or was his purpose to sound the sentiment for a 
third party.?34 
The second personage of renown was Susan B. Anthony, the 
national leader of the woman suffrage movement. Anthony had 
been in the state campaigning for suffrage when she received 
word that the Alliance convention was considering forming a 
new party. The year before Loucks and Wardall had con- 
vinced her to tour South Dakota to work for suffrage. She 
had done so on the assurance that the Alliance stood behind 
the reform and that the farm order controlled state politics. 
Anthony rushed to Huron to try to dissuade the convention 
from an independent course, something she feared would make 
suffrage impossible. Not only did the convention choose 
its own direction, it refused to include suffrage in the 
platform. The most the suffragettes received was a resolu- 
tion endorsing the right to vote for women. The women 
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working for the franchise felt betrayed.JS 
The July convention adopted a slightly different plat- 
form for the fall election and nominated candidates. The 
convention called for an end to national banks, the direct 
issue of legal tender notes to the people, taxes on income 
and real estate, the ownership and operation of the rail- 
roads by the government, and·the secret ballot.36 
There was an undercurrent of support for Governor 
Mellette for the Independent nomination for the top execu- 
tive slot, although it is unlikely that he was seriously 
tempted by the possibility of an Independent candidacy.37 The 
nod for the governorship instead went to Henry Loucks. Loucks 
faced a serious challenge from A.E. Van Osdel, a leader in 
the Yankton County Alliance. Although reports of the exact 
vote of the convention vary, Loucks edged Van Osdel by a 
margin ranging between three and sixteen out of nearly 250 
votes. Van Osdel received the nomination for lieutenant 
governor instead.JS 
The reactions from the old parties, especially the 
Republicans, came quickly. The most common tactic was to 
accuse the leaders of the Independents of being nothing but 
office seekers. They were just "blatent [sic] political 
wolves in the clothing of agricultural sheep," according to 
one Republican editor. Deprived of preferment by the old 
parties, argued party heads, these men were willing to pros- 
titute the Alliance for their own political ends.J9 
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Nor were all of the charges levied against the Inde- 
pendents limited to simple office seeking. Loucks was por- 
trayed as a demogogue and as a man who lacked enough sense 
to be trusted with public office. In the words of a pro- 
minent Republican speaking to his party's state convention, 
Loucks was an immigrant "whose ignorance of the character of 
American institutions is only equaled by his impudence and 
insincerity" and was a "public nuisance" who "ought to be 
abatect."40 It was rumored that one of the Independent can- 
dictates for Congress, Fred Zipp, was an atheist and anar- 
h . t 41 C l.S • 
More seriously, Republicans attacked Loucks's citizen- 
ship. Investig~tion of courthouse records in Lo~cks's county 
proved that he did not take out final papers for naturaliz- 
ation until Augu~t 11,1890, Jver a month after his nomination. 
This left him 0pen to charges that he lacked sufficient 
background in American ways to be awarded cffice.42 
Another scare tactic commonly used by Republicans was 
1 • • k h t' T r1 -" • c a1~1ng t1;at teen ire Lnuepen~ent movement was nothing 
but a plot of the Democratic party to oust the GOP from state 
office. By identifying the third party with the old foe, Re- 
publicans hoped to activate traditional loyalties. Any votes 
for Independents would only sap the strength of the Re- 
publicans, tnus allowing Democrats to take the laurels in 
elections. Loucks was condemned as a "valuable and inexpen- 
sive annex to the democratic party." After there were in- 
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dications that Democrats and Independents were fusing in 
some localities, Republican fears seemed confirmed and the 
Independent party was accused of being a "democratic aid 
society."4J Six months before he was nominated, the Yankton 
Press and Dakotan predicted that Loucks would run for gover- 
nor in 1890 with the financial aid of the Democratic national 
•tt 44 commi ee. 
Moreover, the Republicans claimed there was no need 
for independent action. The GOP had offered the farmers 
virtually anything they had asked for. The Republicans 
could point to a number of achievements on the state and 
national levels--the opening of the Sioux reservation, laws 
against trusts, a warehouse law, and prohibition among 
them--for which the Alliance should be thankful. The aura- ::> 
rians had the nu0erical strength to control the Republican 
party so there was no justification for a new party.45 
Not all of the opposition was the work of the old 
parties. Some Alliance men expressed their dissatisfaction 
with the bid for office on the part of their leaders. The 
Turner County Alliance allegedly "repudiated" the Independ- 
ent ticket, while many Clay County farmers felt the Alliance 
should stick to a~riculture. A number of Alliance officers 
were willing to cooperate with th9 Republicans rather than 
go with the new party.46 
The patterr. of attack that the Republicans used aga i ns t 
their opponents in 1390 was virtually identical to the methods 
7J 
the party had use.j in the 1870s against Grangers who con- 
sidered independent action. Then, too, the leaders of the 
movement were accused of being nothing but office seekers 
who would deliver the state to the Democrats even though the 
farmers controlled the Republican party and could force their 
will upon it.47 
The Democrats met in convention a few days after the 
Alliance made its decision for an independent course. Like 
the Independents, the Democrats called for a graduated income 
tax and sought the remonetization of silver. They also op- 
posed the current tariff and the McKinley bill. On cultural 
issues, the Democrats condemned woman suffrage and asked for 
resub~ission of the prohibition amendment. The convention 
found Governor Mellette abhorrent for giving the state a bad 
image in his efforts to c0llect aid for drought sufferers.48 
~:eeting in Mi, tchell in August, the Republicans also 
ado~ted several planks similar to the IndepenJent platform. 
The convention called for an increased circulation o: cur- 
rency, the coina~e of silver, and the secret ballot. To 
appease the groups to which the Independents appealed, the 
Republicans end)rsed aid for artesian irrigation and ac- 
knowledged labor's right to organize. The delegates also 
recommended legislation to control combinations, a protective 
tariff, adequate pensions, the protection of school lands, 
and the enforcement of prohibition.49 
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This last issue proved divisive. The platform com- 
mittee reported a prohibition plank reaffirming the party's 
support for the reform, acknowledging it as the will of the 
people, and pledging faithful enforcement. Sol Star,· speak- 
ing for the Black Hills, immediately protested the plank and 
warned the convention that it could cost the party his sec- 
tion of the state. Star preferred a substitute motion 
pleading that enforcement was impossible. The convention 
chose to compromise with an acknowledgement of prohibition 
as part of the state's fundamental law and a statement prom- 
ising enforcement.50 
The Republicans reco~nized that holding their own in 
the fall elections would require hard work. A third party 
based on Alliance numbers would be a serious challenge to 
Reputlican hegemony. Several of Mellette's correspondents 
counseled swift and thorough organization. Some argued in 
mid-June for founding Republican Leagues in every precinct. 
A Republican State League soon followed.51 
By the end of July, Republicans felt more confident 
about the November contest. By then, it seemed that the In- 
dependents were losing their appeal and that as the election 
approached the farmers were returning to their traditional 
parties. In October, one of Mellette's confidants predicted, 
"The Independent movement has passed high-water mark, and is 
now on the down.grade."52 
The Republicans were concerned about the behavior of 
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some of South Dakota's ethnic groups in 1890. To some na- 
tionalities, the Alliance seemed to have a special appeal. 
To the people of other lands, issues like suffrage and pro- 
hibition touched on cultural nerves. Scandinavians often 
supported the reforms offered by the Independents and Re- 
publicans exhibited some anxiety for that ethnic group. Tl'B 
Germans and Russian-Germans felt threatened by prohibition 
and woman suffrage, issues that challenged their notions 
about personal behavior and the home. To these latter groups, 
the personal liberty of the Democrats and that party's stand 
for resubmission of the prohibition amendment held out the 
hope of defending their cultural values. 
The Scandinavians--primarily Norwegians in South Dakota 
--formed a substantial proportion of the state's population. 
Usually they supported the GOP, but in 1890 the Independents 
began to make inroads in this traditionally Republican bloc. 
One of Mellette's correspondents warned him that the Scandi- 
navians had largely deserted the GOP at Flandreau. In some 
areas of the state, a large portion of the group abandoned 
their old political ties at election time.5J 
The Scandinavians had generally supported prohibition 
in the state. Suffrage was a different matter. Women ap- 
pealed to the group in vain. In Clay County the townships 
that gave the highest votes against the amendment were the 
ones dominated by Scandinavians.54 
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The Germans and Russian-Germans also furnished large 
number of voters, although most of their votes, with the 
exception of Russian-German Protestants, went to the Demo- 
crats. The Germans were anxious to safeguard their cultural 
traditions and treated threats to those traditions with 
hostility. At the Democratic convention a delegation of 
Russian-Germans had appeared wearing badges printed with 
"Against Woman Suffrage and Susan B. Anthony." In one case, 
Russian-Germans refused to allow a suffragette to speak in 
a local school house. The presence of a plank favorable to 
prohibition in the Republican platform proved burdensome in 
the counties settled by the Germans from Russia. Mellette's 
image as a suffragist and prohibitionist caused some concern 
among party members because of the effect upon ethnic groups.55 
Germans had also been wary of the Alliance's militant 
stance for prohibition. Uhen the prohibition amendment was 
before the people in 1889 the farm order had demanded its 
acceptance and rigorous enforcement. In response, a German 
farmer had advised the 2a~ct~ Ruralist to leave the reform 
to women, for it would only hurt the Alliance.56 
Nor were the Czechs in 3outh Dakota enthused about the 
reforms the Independents advocated. In Tabor, the state's 
Czech center, the Independents did not receive a single vote 
in 1890 and suffrage drew a single ballot.57 
At the polls in November the Republicans maintained 
their hold on the state government. Mellette received J4,487 
77 
votes out of 77,562 cast--44.5 percent. In their first try 
at office, the Independents drew 24,591, for 31.7 percent of 
the electorate. The Democrats dropped to third place, get- 
ting just 18,484 ballots in the governor's race, 23.8 per- 
cent of the total vote. In 1889 Mellette had received 
53,964 votes while his Democratic opponent attracted 23,840. 
Suffrage was defeated by a two to one margin.58 
The Republicans swept the executive seats, but the 
legislature was a different story. In the Senate the GOP 
had a tenuous one vote lead over the Independents and Demo- 
crats if the latter parties acted in unison. In the House, 
these two parties had a single seat more than the Republi- 
cans. This margin allowed the Independents and Democrats 
to cooperate in organiz in.g the lower house. ·.Ji th this, th8 
opposition forces were able to gain control of the electic~s 
committee and deny seats to six Republicans on the basis of 
election irregularities.59 
A task that took much of the session was the election 
of a U.S. senator. In 1889 one of the senators chosen haj 
been elected to a short term; now Gideon C. Moody had to 
stand for re-election before a le~islature in which his 
party held a minority of all seats. Victory proved elusive 
for Moody. The Republicans could not muster enough votes of 
their own and they could not attract the needed ballots from 
their opponer.ts. 7he opposition, for their part, could not 
unite on a candidate to replace Moody. Their leading candi- 
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dates in the early ballots were Bartlett Tripp, the Democrats' 
leader; J. :J. Harden, a Democratic Alliance man; and George 
Crose and Alonzo ·vardall, both high ranking Alliance officers. 
Neither the Independents nor the Democrats seemed willing to 
give up the chance of sending a man of their own affiliation 
to the Senate. 
The ballots continued for nearly f ou~ weeks. ;,Jl'len it 
was apparent that he could not garner sufficient support, 
Moody released the legislators pledged to him. Most of the 
Republicans switched to A.B. Melville, a proponent of arte- 
sian irrigation, but others scattered their votes. The In- 
dependents put their strength behind :iardall, then Harden, 
60 but neither succeeded. They then turned to Hugh J. Campbell. 
3ehind the official votes, there was a good deal of 
maneuverin~. A number of office holders with positions in 
the national govern~ent re~ained in Pierre to exert their 
influe~ce for the Repuhlicans, to the ire of the Democrats 
and !njependents.61 Ttere was a ru~or that the Democra~a 
wn·;l-:! .:;iv-e ~~.8ir v o t s s 0~1 t h e senator Ln return for a De~> 
cratic representative and presidential electors in 1892. Some 
Republicans schemed to give their party's vote to George Crose 
rather than see the opposition pick another candidate. ~.T. 
LaFollette, brother of Wisconsin's Robert LaFollette, coun- 
seled Kellette to strike a bargain with Independent James H. 
Kyle and send him to the Senate with Republican votes. An- 
other Republican warned Mellette in late January that the 
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Independents would throw their weight behind Kyle and hope 
for Democratic support.62 
For the Republicans, this last prediction proved sadly 
accurate. In the thirty-first ballot Kyle received the In- 
dependent vote and the Republicans switched back to Moody. 
The Democrats continued to stand by Bartlett Tripp. In mid- 
February the Republicans tried out Thomas Sterling as a 
candidate, but he was unable to do better than Moody. Then, 
on February 16, enough Democrats turned to Kyle to give him 
the margin of victory. It had been rumored that the Demo- 
cratic support was the result of a bargain between legisla- 
tors in Illinois and South Dakota. The Democrats in South 
Dakot~ were to back the Independent choice while the Inde- 
pendents in Illinois were to vote for the Democrats' man. 
The rumor was fueled when the Speaker of the House traveled 
to Illinois in early February. Three days before the fingl 
ballot a Republican resolution condemning any interstate 
agreement with Illinois affecting the election was defeated 
by a strictly partisan vote. The Republicans also charged 
that the Democrats received a plejge that resubmission would 
be passed i~ Kyle was elected.63 
Kyle's election was something of a fluke. Kyle, a Con- 
gregationalist minister, had been asked to speak at a Fourth 
of July gathering in Aberdeen the previous summer when the 
planned speaker could not attend. The farmers in his audi- 
ence were so impressed with his presentation that they nomi- 
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nated the clergyman for the state senate at the Independent 
convention the following day.64 
The question of resubmission to the poeple of the pro- 
hibition amendment was an important issue that surfaced 
periodically during the session. The Democrats had pledged 
to work for resubmission and the first bill providing for it 
came on January 9. The measure succeeded in the House and 
the majority report of the committee considering it in the 
Senate recommended that it pass there. In the closing hours 
of the session, the upper house turned the bill down "after 
a warm discussion."65 Governor Mellette had been under pres- 
sure by ardent prohibitionists not to let their prized vic- 
tory be undermined before it had been tested.66 
Among its other actions, the 1891 legislature establish- 
ed the Australian ballot in the state, allowed townships to 
finance the construction of artesian wells for irrigation 
through the sale of bonds, and memorialized Congress for the 
free and unlimited coinage of silver as legal tender and the 
direct election of senators.67 
From its inception, the Dakota Farme~s' Alliance realized 
that some of its goals were possible only through political 
action. These objectives were limited in the beginning, 
but as the decade of the 1880s wore on, farmers experienced 
more problems and more obstacles to solving those difficul- 
ties. 
South Dakota's farmers originally believed that the 
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existing political parties could serve as means to agrarian 
ends. Such hopes proved illusory, for the Republicans and 
Democrats would not act on agricultural problems as the Alli- 
ance demanded. Therefore, in June 1890 the annual convention 
of the Farmers' Alliance chose to strike a new course inde- 
pendent of the old parties. Thus was born the Independent 
party. Although not powerful enough to loosen the Republi- 
can grasp on the state's executive branch, the new party 
polled nearly a third of the electorate and displaced the 
Democrats as South Dakota's second strongest party. In 
cooperation with the Democrats in the 1891 legislature, the 
Independents were able to unseat a Republican U.S. senator 
and replace him with a man of their own party. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE REPUBLICAN YEARS, 1891-1895 
The 1891 election of Kyle proved to be the Populists' 
sole significant victory during the first half of the decade. 
Although the new party would gradually boost its share of the 
electorate in the coming years, the Republicans continued to 
hold a plurality--and, by 1894, a majority--of the state's 
voters. Despite these years in the wilderness, however, the 
Populists remained the state's second strongest party. By 
contrast, the Democrats lost steadily until their 1894 share 
of the votes comprised less than twelve percent of the ballots 
cast. 
By the mid-nineties, in spite of a poor record in its 
early contests for office, the fortunes of the Populist party 
appeared to be waxing. It had been able to retain the loyal- 
ties of a substantial share of the state's voters and con- 
ducted vigorous educational campaigns. R.F. Pettigrew, the 
leading Republican politico, adopted important points of Pop- 
ulist doctrine--a fact that set him apart from the sentiment 
of his own party and marked him as a likely candidate for 
conversion. The ryemocrats, stunned by a disastrous showing 
in 1894, were more open to fusion in the future. The Re- 
publican administration, rocked by a scandal that imperiled 
the state's solvency, gave the Populists a weighty issue for 
the 1896 election. 
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The Farmers' Alliance did not fare as well as the Pop- 
ulist party. Some of its vital leadership was lost when 
Henry Loucks and Alonzo Wardall took positions with the na- 
tional alliance. The men succeeding to the highest positions 
in the Alliance opposed the direct involvement of the order 
in the world of politics and worked to separate the organiz- 
ation from public affairs. The Alliance was further dis- 
credited by the continuing problems of its cooperative en- 
terprises. 
The Independents received another chance at office in 
1891 when a special election was called to fill a congres- 
sional seat left open by the death of the incumbent. The 
fall campaign was marked by calls from all parties for an 
increased money supply and by efforts to resubmit the con- 
stitutional clause on prohibition. While the Independents 
endorsed the prohibitory law, the Democrats opposed it and 
the Republicans sidestepped the issue. Republican R.F. 
Pettigrew, however, advised Germans that the best hope for 
a representative unsympathetic to prohibition lay with the 
GOP.1 
This election was the first in which the subtreasury 
plan was advocated in South Dakota. The subtreasury was a 
proposal whereby farmers could store their crops in govern- 
ment warehouses and borrow eighty percent of the value of 
those crops at one percent interest per year. Such a scheme, 
claimed the Southern Alliance, would allow farmers to avoid 
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selling their crops when the market was glutted and prices 
were depressed. It could also curtail speculation in commod- 
ities, establish a system of short-term rural credits, and 
provide a means of making the nation's money supply more 
flexible in times of need. One of South Dakota's Congress- 
men, John A. Pickler, introduced the bill to implement the 
subtreasury in the House of Representatives, although Re- 
publican Senator R.F. Pettigrew derided the measure as 
'''the most absurd piece of legislation I have ever seen 
presented. ' "2 
:'/hen the votes were counted in November, the Republi- 
cans carried the day with 17,614 votes, for 44.5 percent of 
the electorate. The IndependentG captured 14,687 votes, for 
37.1 percent of the vote. The Democratic candidate polled 
only 7,299 votes, just 18.4 percent of the votes cast.J The 
Republicans had managed to attract the same proportion of 
votes as they had in the 1890 contest, while the Independents 
were able to gain slightly over five percent more of the 
votes. The Ruralist attributed the loss to the fact that 
Republican townsmen could turn out for the election with 
little trouble, while many farmers were not willing to lose 
the time it took to go to the polls and support the Indepen- 
dents. 4 
Although the Republicans often maintained that pros- 
perity would destroy the Independent movement, the 1891 elec- 
tion showed that agrarian unrest had become strong enough for 
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a third party to hold the support of a significant share of 
the state's voters--and even increase its proportion of the 
vote--in a year when conditions showed some improvement in 
the farm economy. In 1891 corn and wheat production increas- 
ed substantially and wheat prices rose slightly, although 
corn prices dropped fifteen cents a bushel.5 
Undaunted by the defeat, the Independents recognized 
that they would have to convince South ~akotans that the old 
parties were unwilling and unable to cope with the state's 
needs and that a third party was the answer. Therefore, the 
party mounted an intense campaign to educate the voters 
about the issues troubling the farmers. 
Newspapers espousing Independent doctrine were a large 
part of this campaign. By la~e 1891 there were about forty 
such newspapers being published in the state and the editors 
f d f . t• 6 had orme a re orm press assoc1a ion. The leading paper 
continued to be the Dakota Ruralist, but a number of other 
papers achieved prominence in the reform movement. Freeman 
Knowles' s Deadwoo:i Daily Ind_§J2endent and ·.'iillian E. Kidd's 
Aberdeen Star furnished Independents with their first two 
urban daily papers. A host of new papers began and many 
small country papers abandoned the GOP to join the new move- 
ment.7 The Ruralist expanded its size and offered its read- 
ers joint subscriptions to other reform and agricultural 
papers, including German and Norwegian publications.8 
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Through the winter of 1891-1892 and on into the fall 
campaign, the Independent party kept up its efforts to con- 
vert men to new ways of thinking and voting. The reform 
press urged the formation of local circulating libraries 
stocked with literature of the new movement, and newspapers 
offered such books and pamphlets at low cost. For example, 
on the eve of the 1892 election, the Deadwood Daily Indepen- 
dent advertised a list of reform books that included James 
B. '\feaver's ~Call to Action, Ignatius Donnelly's Caesar's 
Column, Hamlin Garland's Jason Edwards, and articles re- 
printed from Arena.9 The Alliance sponsored farmers' insti- 
tutes with pre-planned topics designed to stimulate thought 
and gain Independent votes. Some of the issues dealt with 
included the abolition of the national bank system, the vol- 
ume of the money supply, the subtreasury, free silver, and 
government ownership of the railroads.10 As the election 
approached, Independent newspapers carried advertisements 
for campaign songs such as "The Coal Baron's Song" and "The 
'.·forker' s Battle Hymn of Freedom," devices geared toward 
stirring voters' enthusiasm.11 Such methods of campaigning, 
particularly the educational drive that was carried on 
through the winter months, were respected by the opposition, 
one representative of which compared this quiet campaign to 
"'old fashioned Methodist experience meetings. 11112 
The state's Independents were the first party to con- 
vene in the 1892 election year. Gathering in Redfield in 
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June, the agrarian party endorsed the St. Louis platform and 
the record of Senator Kyle. To aid debt-ridden farmers, the 
platform favored reducing the legal rate of interest to eight 
percent and taxing the holders of mortgages rather than the 
ones mortgaged for the value of those mortgages. In an 
appeal to labor, the convention adopted resolutions opposing 
the use of Pinkertons against workers and demanded work safety 
and compensation laws. The delegates recognized veterans in 
resolutions praising their sacrifices and attacking the old 
parties for favoring bond holders over soldiers. The con- 
vention opposed the sale of any more of the state's school 
lands and endorsed an amendment making initiative and refer- 
endum part of the fundamental law. In the only issue that 
brought dissent, there was a move to include a statement 
calling for the resubmission of prohibition. The assemblage 
instead chose to include a statement opposing repeal of any 
. . lJ F . of the state's criminal laws. or governor the convention 
picked A.E. "Honest Abe" Van Osdel, the candidate for lieu- 
tenant governor in 1890. The Scandinavians received at least 
one spot on the ticket in the person of S.G. Mogan, candi- 
date for secretary of state. Mrs. R. B. Hassell, the first 
woman in the state's history to be accorded nomination to 
state office, was selected for superintendent of public in- 
t t . 14 s rue ion. 
The Republicans congregated in Madison in late July for 
their convention. The platform, a lengthy document, endorsed 
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the national platform and Harrison's administration, high 
tariffs, and reciprocity agreements. Reflecting the Re- 
publican effort to retain the farm vote, the convention 
adopted a series of planks that overlapped the demands of 
agrarians. The party pledged support for bimetallism, 
government aid to irrigation, postal telegraph and postal 
savings bank systems, rural free delivery, equitable taxa- 
tion, the regulation of the rates of express companies, and 
an elected railroad commission with the power to set rates. 
The Republicans opposed speculation in agricultural commod- 
ities. They appealed hesitantly to labor in a plank sup- 
porting working men and opposing both Pinkertons and the 
"agitation of demagogues" that promoted unrest between labor 
and capital. The party endorsed better roads and proper 
recognition of the nation's veterans.15 
The party's nominations also exhibited concern for 
various interest groups. For governor the convention selec- 
ted Charles H. Sheldon, a Day County farmer, who, as an Alli- 
ance ~an, had served in the territorial legislature. The 
Republicans hoped the farmers would be satisfied with "Farmer 
Sheldon," as the gubernatorial candidate was sometimes known. 
Sheldon and the congressional nominees were all Civil War 
veterans. Norwegian-born Thomas Thorson was chosen to run 
for secretary of state against a Populist candidate who had 
also come from Norway. J.E. Hipple was nominated for auditor 
to please the Germans and Russian-Germans.16 
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The Democrats met in Chamberlain in early September. 
The platform that was adopted included support for resub- 
mission and a moderation of the current laws enforcing pro- 
hibition, a call for tariff reform, and a resolution against 
the use of Pinkertons to break strikes. The convention op- 
posed fusion with the Independents and nominated a complete 
slate, but authorized the state central committee to remove 
the names of some candidates if fusion could be effected.17 
The third party's opposition to the Republicans in 1892 
took several courses. During the campaign, the Populists-- 
as the Independents began to be called that year--attacked 
the tariff as a sham issue promoted by the old parties to 
18 distract the voters from more serious problems. In the 
Black Hills, where Populists appealed to wage earners rather 
than to farmers, newspapers concentrated on labor issues. 
The Deadwood Daily Independent warned miners that a vote for 
the Populists could help prevent the use of militia and Pink- 
ertons a~ainst strikers. Sheldon's criticisms of Loucks's 
ethnicity in 1890 left him open to charges of nativis~. The 
Dakot~ Ruralist characterized him as the "know-nothing candi- 
date for governor."19 Reform editors showed themselves as 
adept at underhanded political tricks as their foes when they 
ensnared a number of their Republican colleagues in a scheme 
to sell editorial space to a fake Chicago firm that desired 
to run anti-alliance articles. During the spring of 1892 the 
Rural~~t gradually revealed the details of the trap and the 
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of the Republican papers that had fallen into it.20 
The Populists' inexperience in the world of political 
campaigns and the loose nature of bonds to the third party 
were revealed by some of their methods. Lacking the.support 
of large businesses that would contribute to their canvass, 
the Populists sought to obtain money at the grass roots 
level. The Dakota Ruralist "tried to raise $1,000 through 
$1.00 pledges and local alliances agreed to plant wheat, the 
proceeds of which would be used in the fall campaign.21 As 
th~ election approached, Populist newspapers took pains to 
remind the farmers how necessary it was for people to take 
time to vote during a busy harvest season.22 
The Republicans counterattacked by using some of the 
same objections to the Populists as they had against the 
third party at its birth. Former Republicans who had turned 
their backs on their old party were called office seekers. 
Editors concerned about the state's public image cautioned 
the electorate that support for the Independents might "en- 
gender a popular suspicion that the state was the abode of a 
dissatisfied, disgruntled, revolutionary and possibly fam- 
ishing people."23 Voters were warned that a bal~ot for the 
Populists could prevent Benjamin Harrison's re-election and 
give the presidency to the Democrats. The decision of the 
Democratic convention to leave open the possibility of fusion 
with the Populists led to rumors that secret negotiati6ns 
were being conducted that could deliver the traditionally 
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Republican state over to the opposition.24 
Pettigrew was particularly interested in retaining the 
loyalties of South Dakota's ethnic groups. Hence, he fielded 
a number of agents to cultivate those segments of the state's 
population. He exhibited special concern for funding the 
Norwegian paper in Sioux Falls, the Syd Dakota Ekko, and 
solicited money for it from the national party committee.25 
Election day brought a resounding victory for the Re- 
publicans. They swept the state executive offices and both 
congressional seats. The Independents took only six places 
in the senate and eleven in the lower house of the state 
legislature. In the gubernatorial race, Sheldon won by 
nearly 11,000 votes over Van Osdel and by nearly 20,000 over 
the Democratic candidate. The Republicans took 47.5 percent 
of the total vote, a gain of three precent over their 18)0 
share. The Independents made a slight gain in terms of 
their prop0rtion of the vote, but obtained 2,000 fewer votes, 
possibly because some of the farmers who had supported the 
third party in 1890 had been fJrced out by drought in the 
intervening years. The Democrats slipped about three per- 
cent from their tally in 1890. ~Jeaver ran about four thou- 
sand votes ahead of Van Osdel as South Dakota Democrats chose 
the People's party candidate for president over Cleveland 
even though they remained loyal to their party on the state 
leve1.26 This may have been due to dissatisfaction with 
Cleveland over such issues as veterans' pensions or it might 
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have been because state Democrats were the only party in 1892 
to support resubmission of prohibition. 
The Dakota Ruralist laid blame for the defeat on two 
factors. First, the Independents were split over who should 
guide the party, the old Alliance leaders or men less con- 
nected with the farm order. Second, the party had failed to 
take a firm stand on prohibition. This alienated Republican 
prohibitionists who saw little reason to leave their old 
party, but was not enough to entice resubmissionists to 
switch to the Independents. The Independents' past record 
on the issue demonstrated that party's support for prohibi- 
tion, even if it had not emphasized the reform in the cam- 
. 27 paign. 
Analysis of the voting patterns in 1892 has shown that 
the towns of the state were the strongholds of the Republican 
party. The population of towns of three hundred or more 
people cast over 55 percent of their ballots for the GOP, 
but under a quarter of their votes for the Populists. The 
Populists drew the bulk of their support from the rural sec- 
tions of the state, particularly those areas specializing in 
wheat production and those inhabited by farffiers of native or 
Scandinavian origins. The ranching counties of the northern 
Black Hills also turned to the Populists. The areas of the 
state characterized by corn and swine production, the regions 
settled by Russian-Germans, and the mining counties of the 
central Hills tended to vote Republican. Democrats were 
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slightly more successful in the towns than were the Populists. 
The Democracy gained a larger share of the vote in the German 
Catholic counties in the central and southern portions of 
the eastern half of the state. They also fared better in 
the western counties than elsewhere.28 
In addition to the preponderance of townsmen who backed 
the Republican party, the inclusion of a number of Populist 
reforms in the Republican platform and promises of aid to 
the agricultural economy probably helped keep farm voters 
in the GOP folct.29 The fact that 1892 was a presidential 
election year may also have contr~buted to the decision of 
many voters to remain in the party of Lincoln. 
Unlike the 1891 legislature, the body that convened in 
Pierre in January 189J was predominantly Republican. The 
session brought no major changes, although it enacted sev- 
eral measures concerning railroads and the problems of 
debtors. 
The issue that attracted the most attention in the 
legislature seems to have been the state's railrcads. A 
series of bills were introduced both by Republicans and 
Populists that would have achieved some degree cf regulation 
over railroads, but many of these were defeated. Moreover, 
much of this legislation constituted only piecemeal attacks 
on the roads' power. Efforts to set a flat passenger rate 
and to give the board of railroad commissioners the power to 
fix rates met staunch Republican opposition. Nor was a res- 
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elution to prosecute the railroads for bribery for distri- 
buting railroad passes among lawmakers any more successful.JO 
Even minor regulations often failed to succeed, such as ones 
calling for spark arresters on locomotives and establishing 
railroad liability for injuries to persons and livestock.Jl 
The session did provide for the popular election of the board 
of commissioners and gave that body power to order the con- 
struction of side tracks, connections with competing lines, 
fireguards along the right of way, and the construction of a 
certain kind of switch.32 
In other actions aimed at defusing Populist demands, the 
Republican legislature enacted measures to aid debtors, limited 
elevators and monopolies, promoted irrigation, and amended 
the state's secret ballot law. The body also appropriated 
$60,000 for South Dakota's exhibit at the :~orld's Fair.33 
The legislature narrowly rejected a bid to resubmit 
prohibition, but this was accomplished only when a member 
who had favored the proposal changed his mind after intense 
lobbying.34 The men in Pierre also turned down reques~s by 
Black Hills interests for an anti-Pinkerton law and defeated 
a bill calling for initiative and referendum, a reform that 
had been one of the planks of the Populist platform.35 
As the Populist party grew more and more a part of South 
Dakota's political scene in the early 1890s, the Farmers' 
Alliance--the organization that had given birth to the third 
party movement--began to decline. The business concerns of 
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the agrarian order continued to meet opposition from elements 
outside the Alliance. The character and quality of the lead- 
ership changed as the old warhorses who had led the farmers 
into the Independent movement were replaced by men of the 
second rank who sought to divorce the farm order from poli- 
tics. 
In the early ni~eties the ~akota Farmers' Alliance 
Company was taken over by the National Union Company, a firm 
that had been formed from the National Cordage Company. 
This latter business had been part of a trust controlling 
jute and twine prices. The purpose of the National Union 
was to create a national wholesale firm that would cater to 
the various state alliances and assume control of the local 
stores that belonged to the state cooperative purchasing 
companies. Opponents of this idea assaulted the takeover as 
a scheme to defraud the Alliance and as gross hypocrisy for 
conniving with a trust.36 
Republican papers had a field day when the state in- 
surance inspector found fault with the manner in which th~ 
Alliance Hail Association was paying claims. After the in- 
spector charged that the association favored some claimants 
over others, the state auditor refused to grant the company 
a certificate to continue operations. Although the AHA was 
destroyed, the Alliance organized the Union Hail Association 
to replace it. .i/hen an insurance firm unconnected with the 
farm order went bankrupt in 1891, the Alliance also drew 
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criticism because Alonzo Wardall, a prominent Alliance of- 
ficer, was involved in the defunct company.37 The failure 
of the Alliance Hail Association appears to have contributed 
to the termination of contracts to build an Alliance office 
building in Huron, an incident that hurt the Alliance and 
the Populist party in that city.38 
Failures such as. these gave the opposition plenty of 
ammunition. The Republicans charged that Alliance leaders 
were bilking the farmers through poorly organized cooperative 
ventures. Not only were these leaders skimming off a profit 
for themselves through high wages and expense accounts, 
charged Republicans, but they were also using the farm order 
to boost their own political purposes.39 
During the early nineties the Farmers' Alliance lost 
its two most noted officers. Upon the death of Leonidas L. 
Polk, president of the Southern Alliance, Loucks succeeded 
to that order's top position in 1892. In late 1893 Alonzo 
Jardall moved to Topeka, Kansas, to head the Alliance Aid 
A . t' 40 ssoc1a ion. In 1892 J.R. Lowe was elected tJ replace 
Loucks as the president of the state organization. Lowe, 
who had been serving as the associate editor of the Dakota 
Ruralist, was joined by two vice presidents arid a secretary- 
treasurer, all of whom were new to their positions. The 
Alliance thus lost the continuity of leadership that had 
characterized it for the previous several years. The 1892 
Alliance convention also decided to end the free subscription 
10) 
to the Dakota Ruralist that had been sent to all the state 
order's members. Thus both the Alliance and the third party 
lost a major source for promulgating their doctrines.41 By 
1894 the Alliance experienced another turnover in leadership. 
H.N. Smith, who had been the Independents' standard-bearer 
in the 1891 specia.l election, was chosen president and a 
Mrs. Anderson from Manchester was elected vice president. 
Furthermore, Smith pledged to keep the Alliance out of poli- 
tics.42 In 1895, although Smith was re-elected, new indivi- 
duals filled all of the lower offices. That convention de- 
cided the state alliance had declined so far that it had to 
be reorganized and county meetings were called for that pur- 
pose.43 
The involvement of the Alliance in politics against 
the better judgement of some of its members, the loss of 
major leaders, and the continuing problems of its business 
op~rations all combined to undercut the organization's 
strength. ihe order's afficers eventually decided to remove 
it fro~ politics and to reor~anize it. This experience was 
similar to the course of the North Dakota Alliance, which 
was disrupted by every election until 1892 when the damage 
44 caused was too great for the farm group to recover. 
The judicial elections of 1893 proved another defeat for 
the Populists. Of three supreme court seats and eight cir- 
cuit court positions, the Republicans w~n all but one, which 
went to an Independent from Deadwood. In the races for the 
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supreme court, the Republican candidates all topped 20,000 
votes while their Populist foes drew less than lJ,000 apiece 
and the Democrats attracted under 8,000. Victory was elusive 
for the opponents of Republicanism despite a degree of fusion 
. t 1 t d .bl 1 . 't 45 in a eas one an possi y severa circui s. 
Loucks charged this loss to the failure to wage an 
aggressive campaign--something the Dakota Ruralist had clam- 
ored for in September--and ihe burden of fusion. Other Pop- 
ulists blamed Loucks for the defeat, claiming his opp0sition 
to the state central committee was a major cause. T.M. 
Simmons, chairman of the state committee, allegedly attri- 
buted the Populist defeat to the Alliance leader, maintain- 
ing that Loucks had been too interested in his own politi- 
cal future and had tried to manage the campaign even though 
he was not officially connected with it.46 
The 1894 political season opened with the Populist 
convention at Mitchell. Displaying their grass roots origins, 
some of the county delegations made the journey to the city 
in farm wagons.47 The convention affirmed its support for 
the Omaha platform, the 1892 document that had become the 
foremost statement of the Populist creed. The remainder of 
the state platform reads like a hodge-podge of likes and 
dislikes. The platform criticized the Sheldon administration 
for "reckless and extravagant mismanagement and maladministra- 
tion" and sought the removal of the state's institutions of 
higher education from politics. To aid the farmers, the con- 
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vention wanted mortgage holders to be taxed for the value of 
the mortgage and those with mortgages on their property to be 
exempted from such taxation. To benefit laborers, the plat- 
form included a plank calling for laws to improve working 
conditions and to compensate injured workmen. As a means of 
better regulating the consumption of alcohol, the delegates 
favored nationalizing the traffic in liquor. The gathering 
also endorsed woman suffrage, although a resolution to that 
effect apparently was not officially added to the platform. 
Other portions of the document advocated the initiative and 
referendum, opposed the sale of state school lands, demanded 
federal ownership of all coal fields and endorsed veterans' 
. 48 pensions. 
The Dakota Ruralist offers few insights into the con- 
vention and the struggles for control by various factions. 
The Republican press alleged that there were elements that 
had opposed Loucks's management of the convention but that 
the farm leader had been able to stave off these threats. 
Robert Buchanan, the unsuccessful aspirant for the guberna- 
torial nod, was portrayed as the major figure opposing Louc~s 
and the issue on which the two men were divided was fusion. 
The convention, however, chose to stick to the middle of 
the road between the old parties and avoid combining with 
the Democrats, an action that would have risked compromising 
the party's principles in the pursuit of office. The ~ioux 
Falls Press, a bitter opponent of the Ruralist, charged that 
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Loucks had been able to prevent the re-election of T.M. Sim- 
mons as the state central committee chairman.49 The Press 
also claimed that reform papers were split over the issue of 
suffrage and that some editors refused to print the resolu- 
tion endorsing it.5° 
To head their ticket, the Populists named Isaac Howe 
of Spink County. Howe, a Vermonter who had trained in medi- 
cine and law before coming to Dakota Territory in 1882, had 
been a Republican judge before joining the Independents. He 
converted in 1890 and was elected to county office under the 
banner of the new party that year. In the 1894 convention, 
he was Loucks's choice for candidate at the top of the Pop- 
ulist slate. It was an unfortunate selection. Already in 
his seventieth year, Howe's health was not equal to the task, 
although that may not have been apparent at the time of the 
nomination. By November there were rumors that he was seri- 
ously ill and before that month was out he was dead.51 
The Republicans gathered in Yankton in late August for 
their convention. Aware of the growing importance of the 
silver issue and in favor of an increased money supply, Petti- 
grew had come out in support of the free coinage of silver 
in 189). In the months prior to the convention the senator 
worked to start Republican bimetallic clubs that would boost 
the reform, and he tried to convince Republican leaders in 
the state of the necessity of a strong silver plank to steal 
the Populists' thunder. His efforts were partly rewarded, 
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for one of the major elements in the platform was a declara- 
tion favoring the coinage of all American-mined silver at a 
ratio to gold of sixteen to one.52 The remainder of the 
platform endorsed a protective tariff and reciprocity, imrni- 
gration restriction to keep out ''pauper and criminal classes," 
legislation to limit the power of trusts, laws to give the 
railroad commissioners authority to prevent discrimination, 
and the recognition of veterans. The document pledged sup- 
port for an orderly labor movement and backed courts of ar- 
bitration to settle disputes. The convention also praised 
''the admirable manner in which the present administration 
had conducted the affairs of the state, maintaining the 
public credit at all times.'' Although the Republicans ac- 
corded a suffragette a seat on the rostrum, the platform was 
silent on voting rights for women and on prohibition.SJ 
The gathering nominated Sheldon for re-election to the 
governorship and put forward the names of John A. Pickler 
and Robert J. Gamble for U.S. representatives. The candi- 
dates for the ~ajor state offices of lieute~ant governor, 
secretary of state, auditor, and attorney general were the 
incumbents, but Kirk G. Phillips was named for treasurer i~ 
place of J.J. Taylor, who had been the party's choice in 
1892.54 
~eeting in Sioux Falls in early September, the Democrats 
endorsed Cleveland's administration (with the exception of 
his action on soldiers' pensions) and favored free trade, the 
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coinage of silver and gold, the direct election of senators, 
proper treatment of Civil War veterans, and state aid to ir- 
rigation. Aiming to reduce the influence of corporations, 
the convention called for legislation prohibiting members of 
the cabinet and Congress from owning stock in companies that 
were affected by national laws, legislation to control trusts, 
and a measure forbidding politicians from accepting railroad 
passes. The platform denounced the state Republican party 
for heavy taxes, excessive salaries, the deposit of state 
funds in banks for partisan purposes, the failure to regu- 
late railraods, and unjust taxation of farmers and laborers 
while the rich avoided taxes. The delegates derided the Re- 
publicans for catering to prohibitionists while hypocritically 
failing to enforce the law on the matter. The Democrats con- 
tinued their support for resubmission. An effort to get the 
convention's approval of a plank for free silver and the 
direct issue of paper money to the people was not successful. 
55 The delegates rejected fusion with the Populists. 
!he most striking feature of the 1894 election in South 
Dakota was R.F. Pettigrew's strenuous efforts to be returned 
to the U.S. Senate. With the attention that a master crafts- 
man devotes to his work, Pettigrew initiated an intense and 
well-organized campaign that would assure his re-election. 
During much of 1894 the senator gave his time to contacting 
various Republican leaders throughout the state and to de- 
veloping an organization of supporters in all of the counties. 
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His aim was to see that enough Republicans sympathetic to 
his political goals would be in the next session of the state 
legislature to give him another six years in Washington, an 
objective that much of the Republican press shared.56 
Senator Pettigrew exerted himself and his resources to 
see that interest groups throughout the state would be reach- 
ed in his canvass for re-election. Among the state's largest 
ethnic groups the senator hoped to cultivate support through 
the immigrant press and prominent speakers. He requested 
the editors of the Norwegian Syd Dakota Ekko and the German 
Dakota Freie Presse to translate and publish an article that 
had first appeared in the Sioux Falls Press that enumerated 
the benefits he had already gained for the state while in 
office.57 Pettigrew tried unsuccessfully to get national 
committee funds to subsidize the Presse during the campaign. 
He did, however, order that 250 to JOO Germans in his home 
country receive six month subscriptions to the paper at his 
expense, hoping that these traditionally Democratic voters 
could be swayed to his cause.58 Pettigrew's correspondence 
included evidence of his attempts to send speakers and cam- 
paign workers among the state's Scandinavians, Germans, 
Russian-Germans, Finns, Czechs, and Indians.59· 
Pettigrew apparently had important support among religi- 
ous groups. A number of clergymen actively backed his·candi- 
dacy, including the influential Catholic Bishop ifiartin I1iarty. 
Marty asked a number of priests under him to use their in- 
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for an easy route to office. Indeed, there were rumors in 
the spring of 1894 that James Kyle and Robert Buchanan were 
in Washington bargaining with state and national leaders of 
the Democracy.62 Loucks was not adverse to Democrats sup- 
porting the Populists, however, and counseled them to join 
ranks with the reform party as the only means of defeating 
Sheldon. Pettigrew was much concerned that fusion might 
occur in the legislative races, an event that might deprive 
him of re-election.63 
By 1894 some of the men who had joined the Independents 
in 1890 were drifting back to their old parties, disillusion- 
ed about the Populists' inability to effect reform, lured 
back by concessions in the old parties' platforms, or jis- 
gusted with the willingness of some Populists to fuse with 
the Democrats. The Republican press seized this opportunity 
to discredit their opponents and recounted the stories of 
these disaffected reformers. The GOP often put these men to 
work on the campaign trail to convince other Republicans of 
the futility of the third party.64 
In some cases resubmission became an issue in the 
legislative races, for the men who convened in Pierre in Jan- 
uary would have to deal with that question. By the mid- 
nineties many in the state questioned the practicality of 
prohibition. The Republicans and Populists, both of whom 
had once vigorously defended prohibition, hedged on the issue 
in 1894 while the Democrats kept up their strong opposition 
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fluence to help elect legislators sympathetic to Pettigrew, 
a move that apparently stirred some degree of anti-Catholic- 
ism. Pettigrew noted the bishop's action in a letter to a 
GOP leader in Davison County, but disavowed any foreknowledge 
of the endorsement, explaining, "I was a very liberal sub- 
scriber to the fund to build the Bishop's house at this place 
[Sioux Falls] and I presume he feel[s] kindly towards me." 
In the same letter Senator Pettigrew related that he also had 
Lutheran support "because I gave the grounds upon which their 
school stands and several hundred dollars in money besides.1160 
Pettigrew also relied on the railroad corporations doing 
business in the region. The Great Northern apparently con- 
tributed $5,000 to his campaign. The senator asked various 
favors from the roads, including intervention to influence 
the political behavior of employees and changes in train 
schedules to permit crews to vote in selected precincts. In 
Brown County, where the Republicans expected a close race, 
Milwaukee road officials assured the senator that "they would 
d . . d h i . 61 o everything they can" to a1 1m among their workers there. 
The perennial issue of fusion surfaced again during the 
1894 campaign. Prior to the convention Loucks had preached 
against any combination with the Democrats that could split 
the reform party and prompt droves of former Republicans to 
return to their old political fealty. His great fear seems 
to have been that there might be an arrangement between Demo- 
cratic leaders and men among the Populists who were looking 
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to the measure. In Clay County the Populists claimed that 
the Republican legislative nominees were willing to approve 
resubmission and the Republicans replied by making the same 
charge against Populists.65 
Caught in the backlash against Cleveland's administra- 
tion following the Panic of 1893, the Democrats lost heavily 
at the polls. Of over 75,000 ballots cast in the guberna- 
torial contest, the Democrats captured less than twelve per- 
cent, substantially less than their 1892 total and less than 
half of their 1890 strength. The Populists, although doing 
poorly compared to the Republicans, drew nearly thirty-five 
percent of the state's electorate, its best performance yet. 
Prohibitionists, fielding a separate ticket for the first 
time in the 1890s, attracted about 1,000 votes. The Re- 
publicans returned to their status as the state's majority 
party, with 52.6 percent of the vote. The GOP swept the 
state races and obtained a firm hold on the next legislature. 
In Clay County, where fusion on the legislative slate ~anaged 
to give those seats to the GOP's opponents, the Republican 
editor said somewhat enviously, "The whole wide world went 
Republican Tuesday--with the exception of Texas and Clay 
County. "66 
The Republican success extended to the county level as 
well. One GOP newspaper tallied the results of county elec- 
tions in fifty-one organized counties and found that the Re- 
publicans had won an overwhelming victory. Counting eight 
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"fairly lucrative" offices in each county, the Republicans 
took nearly eighty percent of the positions, the Populists 
slightly over eighteen percent, and the Democrats less than 
two percent.67 
The 1895 legislature, dominated by Republicans, easily 
gave Pettigrew the re-election for which he had labored. 
He was unanimously selected.the choice of the Republican 
caucus and won by a large margin in the legislature.68 
The 1895 session considered legislation that would have 
enacted Populist reforms, but, in the end, chose to avoid 
such changes. One of the major issues was the regulation 
of the railroads, particularly to allow the railroad com- 
missioners the power to set rates. The Republicans, despite 
the advice of Pettigrew who had begun to see the need for 
such a law, turned back efforts to strengthen the regulatory 
body in an significant fashion. The lawmakers did pass a 
memorial to Congress calling for free silver, but on re- 
consideration the Republicans decided to rescind the measure 
and to expunge all mention of it from the official journals. 
Nor did a bill establishing initiative and referendum suc- 
ceed.69 
As the culmination of several attempts in the sessions 
of the 1890s, the proponents of resubmission finally were 
victorious. The legislature approved a joint resolution to 
place the question of prohibition on the 1896 ballot.70 
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One issue that required much of session's attention 
came quite unexpectedly. In his message to the legislature, 
Governor Sheldon praised the former state treasurer in glow- 
ing termss 
Mr. ~:1.W. Taylor, our efficient and 
faithful outgoing treasurer, is entitled 
to the thanks of the people for the zeal 
and energy which he has at all times dis- 
played in the management of his offices, 
and it is a matter of pride to him ... that 
he leaves the public service carrying with 
him the unbounded respect of those who 
have known his business methods and his 
desire7to preserve the credit of the 
state. 
These words came back to haunt Sheldon, for Taylor also left 
public service carrying with him the state treasury. His 
accounts were short some $J67,000. 
During his term as treasurer, Taylor had handled the 
state's money unwisely. He made loans to a number of Re- 
publican politicians, only some of whom could repay him on 
time. Other funds had gone into bad investments and to prop 
up banks owned by members of his party--banks that went under 
during the economic stresses of the Panic of 189). As his 
tenure of office came to a close, Taylor realized he could 
not produce the state's funds and so absconded. He eventu- 
ally returned, but only, according to charges made by both 
Republican and Populist newspapers, after a deal promising 
leniency. With the funds he brought back, his own property, 
and the holdings of some of his bondsmen, Taylor was able to 
reimburse the state for all but about $98,000. In punishmer.t, 
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he was sentenced to five years in prison, a term that was 
reduced to two years by the state supreme court--upon which 
sat a judge to whom Taylor had loaned money.72 Among those 
hurt by the defalcation was former governor Arthur C .. Mellette, 
one of the treasurer's bondsmen. Mellette lost heavily when 
the state attached the property of those who had offered 
surety for Taylor, his health failed, and the ex-governor 
died the following year.73 
Such a disaster demanded action from the legislature. 
The lawmakers enacted legislation appointing a committee to 
investigate the scandal, established a reward for Taylor's 
capture, and authorized the attorney general to begin pro- 
ceedings against the ex-treasurer's property and that of 
his bondsmen. To save the state from financial disaster, the 
legislature allowed the new treasurer to issue bonds to re- 
place money taken from the school funds and levied a defici- 
ency tax to raise additional revenue. To prevent such a 
fiasco in the future, the legislature passed laws to ens~re 
the safety of public funds and to tighten standards of ac- 
countibility from state officers.74 
The first half of the 1890s held few successes for the 
Populists in South Dakota. With the exception of mustering 
enough strength through fusion with the Democrats to elect 
a U.S. senator, the new party was unable to place any of its 
candidates in major office. The party proved tenacious, for 
it increased its share of the electorate between 1890 and 
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1895 despite its string of defeats. The Republicans, however, 
were able to retake ground lost in 1890 and by 1894 had re- 
established themselves as the state's majority party. The 
GOP was victorious in its quest to regain its old glory be- 
cause of strong efforts to solicit the farm vote through con- 
cessions in its platforms and candidates, the traditionally 
Republican orientation of the state's townsmen, through vig- 
orous campaigning, and by benefiting from the nation-wide 
repudiation of Cleveland's administration. The Democratic 
party, never dominant in South Dakota politics to begin with, 
was a shadow of its former self by 1894. 
The early 1890s were also characterized by the decline 
of the Farmers' Alliance. Deprived of its old radical lead- 
ership through the assumption by Loucks and Wardall of nation- 
al alliance office, the farm order was taken over by men 
from a different cut of cloth--men who sought to divorce 
the organization from politics. Furthermore, the Alliance 
was shaken by the difficulties or failure of a number of its 
business operations. 
The second half of the decade held some promise for the 
Populists. The leading Republican politician in the state, 
Richard F. Pettigrew, had embraced free silver as the solu- 
tion to the nation's economic woes and was advocating more 
stringent regulation of railroads. Such positions estranged 
him from the majority of his party and made possible his 
movement into the sphere of opposition leaders by 1896. The 
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1894 disaster left the Democrats with little choice other 
than to throw their diminished numbers behind the Populist 
party through fusion. The Republicans, although they had 
returned to majority control in 1894, would have to carry 
the onus of the Taylor defalcation into the next election, 
a burden that proved heavy indeed. 
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CHAPTER V 
FUSION, VICTORY, AND DEFEAT 
By 1896 events made fusion possible among those politi- 
cal groups discontented with the Republica~ party. Richard 
F. Pettigrew, estranged from his party over the issues of 
silver and railroad regulation, bolted the national Repub- 
lican convention with other Silver Republicans. When the 
state convention also turned down a silver plank, his fol- 
lowers walked out to form their own party. In the Populist 
ranks a fusion element finally gained sufficient power to 
commit that party to union with other pro-silver intere3ts. 
The Democrats, seizing on the opportunity to defeat the Re- 
publicans, joined the reform coalition without even both8r- 
ing to hold a convention. Under the leadership of Andr·ew 
E. Lee, the fusionists managed to win a narrow victory in 
the fall election. 
'fictory at the polls, however, did not bring the suc- 
cess for which the silver coalit~on had hoped. Their hold 
on state government was incomplete, for the Republicans re- 
tained most of the executive machinery. The reformers' unity 
was weak. Although they controlled a majority of the leg- 
islature, the fusion forces failed to elect a U.S. senator, 
allowing James H. Kyle to be returned to Washington with Re- 
publican votes instead. Nor were the reformers able to unite 
on all of the measures Lee deemed vital. 
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As disappointing as this was, it was the climax of 
fusionist success. In 1898 the Republicans regained control 
of all but the governorship, and Lee could do little by him- 
self. The 1900 election swept the reform coalition from 
every position in the executive branch and left them with a 
mere handful of seats in the legislature. 
By 1900 the spark that .had ignited the Populist revolt 
had gone out. Farm prosperity returned as prices edged up- 
ward, as normal rainfall resumed, and as agrarians developed 
better methods for farming the Plains. The Republicans had 
been able to counter much of the Populist threat by conces- 
sions in their platforms and choice of candidates. When 
Populists did gain power, they did little to further their 
goals. New issues diverted the electorate's attention from 
conditions in the state to affairs of the world. This com- 
bination destroyed any further hopes for Populist success. 
With the circumstances that had provoked rebellion in the 
first place gone, voters returned to their traditional voting 
patterns and the Republican party resumed its dominance. 
Pettigrew gradually moved out of the mainstream of his 
party over the issue of silver. Convinced that popular sent- 
iment was going in the direction of free silver and his own 
fortunes badly hurt in the Panic of 1893, the senator took 
up the cause of the financial reform by that year. This 
stance and his attempts to persuade the 1895 legislature to 
enact strong regulatory measures alienated him from powerful 
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elements within the South Dakota GOP. Although Pettigrew 
managed to get elected a delegate to the national Re!-'' ·"-lican 
convention in St. Louis in 1896, his opponents in the party 
forced upon the delegation a pledge to support the national 
ticket and platform. ~then the national convention over- 
whelmingly rejected a minority report calling for endorse- 
ment of free silver, Pettigrew joined other silverites in 
walking out of the convention.1 
The state Republican convention in Aberdeen in July was 
the scene of a showdown between silverites and those who 
chose to abide by the national convention's decisions. When 
the gold forces defeated a silver plank in the platform by 
a wide margin, a number of the delegates--principally from 
Pettigrew's home county--withdrew from the convention. The 
remaining delegates condemned Pettigrew and resolved that he 
"has ceased to be in touch with the Republican party of this 
state and has forfeited its political respect and esteem."2 
The convention adopted a platform endorsing the actions of 
the St. Lou is convention and c ornme nd i ng the .Sheldon admini- 
stration. The state Republicans also asked for arbitraticn 
to end strikes, a more powerful railroad commission, strong 
efforts against trusts and combines, and better regulation 
of grain elevators. For governor the Republicans nominated 
Norwegian-born A.O. Ringsrud.3 
The Populist state convention was held in Huron in mid- 
July. The party's platform called for inflationary measures 
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such as free silver and the issue of legal tender notes, 
government ownership through purchase or construction of 
enough railroad mileage to lower rates through competition, 
government ownership of the telegraph and telephone, .postal 
savings banks, initiative and referendum, direct election of 
senators, tariffs set by a nonpartisan commission, free homes 
for settlers, a tough railroad bill, and repossession of all 
idle land held by corporations and land owned by aliens. The 
delegates condemned the present administration, commended the 
work of James H. Kyle and Pettigrew, and backed ~illiam Jen- 
nings Bryan for the presidency. This last item caused some 
dissention among the men in Huron, as did an abortive attempt 
to place a prohibition plank in the platform. The convention 
chose instead to endorse the resubmission amendment and call- 
ed upon voters to consider the issue without reference to 
parties. For governor the Populists offered Andrew E. Lee, 
a Vermillion merchant and reform mayor who had been born in 
4 Norway. 
The 1890s marked the inauguration of a new era for South 
Dakota's immigrant groups. Prior to this decade the state's 
politics had largely been the province of the native-born and 
the political position of ethnic groups had been determined 
by attitudes on cultural issues. With the advent of Populism, 
economic issues began to take precedence and neither of the 
old parties could take for granted the continued loyalty of 
some significant blocs of immigrant votes. The result of 
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this development was an increased awareness by politicians of 
the importance of some foreign-stock groups. This led to the 
nomination of foreign-born men to state office in an effort 
to attract certain ethnic voters. The trend reached its 
peak in 1896 when both the Republicans and the Populists 
selected Norwegians as their gubernatorial candidate. The 
choice of Lee may have been crucial for the Populists' vic- 
tory, for it split the Scandinavian strength in the election.5 
Scandinavians, one of the state's two largest ethnic groups, 
continued to occupy a favored position in South Dakota's polit- 
ical circles for some time to come. In 1898 the fusionists 
renominated Lee and in 1900 both the Republicans and the re- 
form coalition offered men of Norwegian stock for the govern- 
orship. 
The Silver Republicans met in Huron at the same time as 
the Populists and chose to cast their lot with the reform 
party. For their support, the Pettigrew followers were al- 
lowed one place on the state ticket, which went to :'/. T. La- 
Follette, who was nom l na t ed for railroad c omm i s s i oner. The 
Democratic state committee, seeing an opportunity to create 
a coalition strong enough to displace the Republicans, can- 
celled the party's convention and joined the fusion forces, 
thus becoming the third leg in a tripod of silverites.6 State- 
wide fusion, a specter that had haunted Republicans and old- 
line Populists alike during the first years of the decade, 
had finally been accomplished, although there was some oppo- 
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sition to it among reformers.? 
For the few remaining Democrats, fusion with the Pop- 
ulists should not have presented major problems with read- 
justment. The issues that separated the Democrats from the 
other parties in 1890 no longer occupied a position of im- 
mediate importance. Prohibition and personal liberty had 
been supplanted by economic problems. Resubmission of the 
prohibitory clause of the constitution, while still before 
the public in 1896, was no longer opposed by any major party. 
Furthermore, Democrats would not feel alien in the reform 
coalition, for many former Democrats had joined the ranks of 
the Populists since 1890. While the Republicans gradually 
regained voters lost in the first election of the 1890s and 
the Populists increased their share of the electorate, nun- 
bers of Jemocratic voters fell precipitously. Ideologically 
unsuited for the Republican party, many of these Democrats 
must have turned to the reform party. South Dakota fits the 
patterns established in two Plains states to the south. In 
~ansas and Nebraska the new party drew most cf its support 
from Republicans in 1890. After that year, when cultural 
issues no longer sharply divided them from the other parties, 
Democrats began to filter into the Populist party. At the 
same time, Republicans who had flirted briefly with the third 
party in 1890 returned to their former affiliation.8 · 
The fusion forces in South Dakota were by no means in 
complete agreement on all issues. By 1895 the division be- 
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tween those who wanted to stand by the Omaha platform in its 
entirety and those who sought to trim the platform to a few 
basic issues was becoming acute. Some elements believed that 
a broad platform could bring in more voters even though some 
might disagree with particular features of the program. Others 
felt the emphasis should be on the financial plank, specifi- 
cally on free silver. The Panic of 1893 and the repeal of 
the Sherman Silver Purchase Act had brought new life to the 
silver issue, with many new converts to the Populists main- 
taining that it must precede all other reforms. The fusion 
of 1896 was based on free silver and the South Dakota state 
Populist platform did not endorse the Omaha platform as had 
the 1894 document.9 The division in the Populist ranks in 
1895 was evident in Senator Kyle's decision to withdraw fro~ 
the boarj of directors of the Aberdeen Star, one of the lead- 
ing Populist dailies, because he favored free silver as a 
primary objective and could not endorse some of the radical 
features of the Populist program.10 
In the fall campaign the fusionists emphasized the pri- 
macy of silver. It was the foremost issue in the contest for 
them and was the necessary prelude to other reforms. To Pop- 
ulists the demonetization of silver--the "Crime of 1873"--had 
been a conspiracy on the part of the monied interests to sad- 
dle the nation, particularly debtors, with dear money based 
solely on gold. Now the same monied interests--personified 
in the financial leaders of New York and London--stood behind 
1)2 
McKinley to beat back the threat of free silver. The men of 
Wall Street and Lombard Street--particularly the Rothschilds 
and other European .rews--were again involved in a conspiracy 
against the American people. Silver was the weapon with which 
to fight back. South Dakotans were aided in their advocacy 
of silver when William Jennings Bryan made a brief tour of 
the state in October on behalf of the free coinage issue and 
the leading fusion candidates.11 
~ith the T&ylor defalcation still relatively fresh in 
the minds of the voters, the fusionists had an issue upon 
which the Republicans were vulnerable. The corruption that 
had characterized the previous administration was an easy 
target for the opposition to use against particular indivi- 
duals and the Pepublican party as a whole.12 
The Republicans charged voters not to let the minor 
issue of silver draw attention from the important matters of 
the tariff and restoring the Republicans to national power. 
As the fusionists placed more emphasis on silver, the Repub- 
licans shiftej their attacks to the dangers and difficulties 
of the white metal. Such a move would, contended the Repub- 
licans, benefit mine owners and harm laborers. The i3sue also 
frightened away badly needed capital and settlers.13 The 
Populists had maintained that there was a direct connection 
between the price of silver and wheat and that as long as the 
price of the first commodity was depressed, the price of the 
latter would be as well. When wheat prices began to edge up 
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in the fall of 1896 while silver dropped, the Republicans 
capitalized on the opportunity to show the falsehood of their 
14 opponents' arguement. Some Republican newspapers, particu- 
larly those in areas settled by Russian-Germans, pointed out 
that silver sentiment was low among that nationality because 
of unhappy experiences with the metal in Russia~5 
The Republican press also found fault with Andrew Lee. 
An astute businessman, Lee had amassed a fortune by the time 
he entered state politics. Republicans attacked him as a 
"millionaire plute candidate" who could hardly represent the 
average farmer and queried how he could have gained such 
wealth if economic conditions were as dismal as the Popu- 
16 lists portrayed them. The Republican editors also accused 
Lee of being a poor public speaker, implying that he was 
handicapped by a poor command of the English language.17 
The 1896 election marked the peak of Populist success. 
-~en the votes were counted they found that the reform coal- 
ition had narrowly carried the major races. Bryan edged 
'iilliarn ~cKinley by fewer than 200 ballots. Lee jefeated 
Ringsrud by a margin of J19 out of over 82,000 votes cast. 
The fusion forces also managed to elect the attorney general, 
both congressmen, and the three railroad commissioners. The 
bulk of the state's executive offices, however, remained 
under Republican control. The legislature went to the fu- 
sionists by a majority of nineteen. The Black Hills, badly 
shaken by the depression, swung to the fusionists,a factor 
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th t . d d th . f . t l 8 a provi e e margin o vie· ory. 
Resubmission of the prohibition question, an issue in 
the state's politics in some fashion for most of the decade~ 
was temporarily settled when the electorate, despite the 
strenuous efforts of prohibitionists, chose to repeal the 
prohibitory clause of the state constitution. Prohibition 
was defeated by a margin of nearly 7,000 votes and balloting 
on the issue ran over ten thousand votes ahead of the other 
amendments put to the people. The Prohibition party candi- 
date for governor drew about seven hundred votes away from 
. 19 the other parties. 
One of the first orders of business when the legislators 
convened in Pierre in January was the election of a U.S. 
senator. Kyle's term was about to expire and a legislature 
controlled by fusionists W)uld again have the opportunity to 
fill a Senate seat. The problem that plagued the lawmakers 
of 1891 was present again; the fusion forces could not a€ree 
on a candidate. The Republicans united behind John A. Pick- 
ler i n r.'lid-January, but the r-e fc.rrn caucus could not se t t l e 
on a single man and fcur fusionist candidates divided the 
fielj. Kyle, F.~. Goodykoontz, A.J. ?lowman, and Henry 
L k 11 . d t th 't' 20 L d P tt• ouc s a aspire o e posi ion. ee an, e igrew op- 
posed Kyle, although other factions in the party stood bc- 
21 hind the clergyman. The balloting continued for weeks be- 
fore the Republ Leans suId e n.Ly switched to Kyle. V"Ji th the aid 
of a small number of Populists and Democrats, the Republicans 
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were able to return Kyle to Washington. The circumstances 
of his re-election moved him closer to the Republicans dur- 
ing his second term.22 
Governor Lee pushed for effective railroad regulation 
in the 1897 legislature. With both parties pledged to such 
legislation in their platforms, a regulatory law was enacted 
relatively early in the session with overwhelming bipartisan 
support. I'he Palmer-t'lheeler bill widened the investigatory 
powers of the railroad commission, prohibited rate discrim- 
ination and combinations in restraint of trade, ordered 
railroads to furnish cars whenever requested, and empowered 
the commissioners to set maximum rates. The right to control 
rates was vigorously contested by the various railroads in 
the state. Sympathetic courts granted injunctions to the 
roads to prevent the imposition of rates until the U.S. 
Supreme Court finally ruled in 1901 that such commissions 
could not establish railroad rates.2J 
Prohibiton having been repealed, the legislature was 
left with the task of providing somG means of regulation of 
the liquor trade in the state. The leeislators enacted a 
high license bill to serve as a temporary meas~re and sub- 
mitted an amendment to the people that would establish a 
state dispensary system for alcohol. The new law also per- 
mitted local option.24 
In other actions the legislature dealt with a variety 
of proble~s and minor reforms. The lawmakers revised some 
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of the state's executive machinery and added an oil inspector 
and an insurance inspector. This latter position was cre- 
ated to take the distribution of insurance statements to 
newspapers out of the hands of the Republican auditor. A 
measure that would have revised the Board of Charities and 
Corrections so as to give the fusionists control of the state's 
penal and charitable institutions failed. Still pursuing 
the Taylor defalcation, the legislature established a three 
member committee to re-examine the evidence from the previous 
investigation and to look for corruption elsewhere in the 
state government. To ensure that anyone who bilked the state 
of its treasury would receive tougher treatment in the courts, 
the legislature stiffened penalities for embezzlement of pub- 
lic funds. At the request of Governor Lee the lawmakers 
required the treasurer to produce the state funds to be 
counted. Unlike his predecessor, treasurer Kirk G. Phillips 
was able to account for all of the money in his care. Other 
acts passed by the legislature that touched on traditional 
farmer and Populist concerns included laws dealing with bal- 
lot reform, ~ine safety, irrigation, and combination to limit 
competititon. In ad~ition to the dispensary measure, the 
legislators submitted to the voters at the next election 
amendments dealing with woman suffrage and the initiative 
and referendum.25 
The 1897 legislature was at best a qualified success. 
The fusion forces--although holding a majority of the seats 
1)7 
--were unable to unite on some basic measures. The reformers 
could not generate enough support to break the Republican 
hold over some of the state's major institutions. The Re- 
publicans seized the initiative and elected a U.S. senator. 
Although the legislators enacted a railway regulatory act, 
it was a measure to which both parties had pledged themselves. 
As one Republican editor summed up the fusionists' success 
in Pierre, the record upon which they would have to run in 
1898 "is not an enviable one."26 
The judicial elections of 1897 also proved disappoint- 
ing to the fusionists. Of the eight circuit court positions 
to be filled, the fusionists managed to capture only three. 
Nor were the groups opposing the Republicans able to main- 
tain even the degree of unity they had achieved the preceed- 
ing year. In one of the races the Populists and the Demo- 
crats nominated different candidates.27 
A major task for reform leaders in 1898 was preserving 
the fragile bond among the fusion forces. To that end Petti- 
grew labored diligently in the months prior to the first 
conventions of the various anti-Republican parties. The 
senator was concerned that the mid-road Populists--those who 
wanted to keep the reform party in the middle of the road 
between the old parties and who believed that any combination 
with either the Republicans or Democrats was tantamount to 
heresy--would succeed in turning the Populist party back to 
its independent stance. Furthermore, Pettigrew worried that 
1J8 
a gold wing of the state's Democrats might scuttle an attempt 
at fusion. To prevent this he sought to convince other reform 
politicians that the Democrats should be accorded four posi- 
tions on the next ticket.28 
Pettigrew's effort was successful. '.\TJ'len the Populist 
state central committee met in March to set a date for the 
party's convention, a resolution favoring fusion received wide 
support. Henry L. Loucks and Robert W. Haire opposed the 
measure, but to no avai1.29 The three parties held separate 
conventions in Aberdeen in July and settled uoon a sinGlc 
ticket, which was headed by Governor Lee. The parties then 
adopted individual platilirms which were similar to one an- 
other, and a series of resolutions that were co~~mon to all 
of the parties. The common features included calls for free 
coinage of silver at sixteen to one, initiative and referen- 
dum, government ownership of public utilities, election of 
Supreme Court justices, and an end to federal court injunc- 
tions. The resolutions also supported the war with Spain. 
Planks in the separate platforns included de~ands for more 
regulation of trusts, postal savings banks, direct election 
of senators, an income tax, labor legislation, and more equit- 
able taxation.JO 
The Republicans, convening in Mitchell the following 
month, chose Kirk Phillips to oppose Lee. Following Republi- 
can principles, the delegates endorsed the gold standard and 
protection for American products. The party also favored the 
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annexation of Hawaii, postal savings banks and a postal tele- 
graph, and the Nicaraguan canal. The convention also con- 
demned illegal trusts and supported the railroad commission 
in its struggle to set rates. The convention was pleasantly 
surprised when Henry Loucks announced his return to the GOP 
in a letter he asked to be read to the convention. Loucks 
stated that he could not countenance the takeover of the Pop- 
ulists by the Democrats. He also urged the Republicans to 
include a plank favoring the initiative and referendum in 
their platform, although the convention obliged him cnly to 
the extent of suggesting that voters study the matter. Before 
the November election Senator Kyle joined Loucks in convert- 
ing back to the Republicans.31 
In the course of the campaign, Pettigrew continued his 
courtship of the state's ethnic groups, especially the Ger- 
mans. He was particularly concerned with converting the 
Germans from Russia to free silver and offered to send lit- 
erature to circulate among that group. He was also inter- 
este) in persua)ing the ~akota Freie Presse to take up the 
cry for silver and was approached by a silverite who hoped 
to obtain sufficient funding to purchase that Russian-German 
organ. However, Pettigrew could not raise the money.32 One 
of the Democratic nominees on the fusion ticket was a German 
from Hutchinson county, a Russian-German area, a choice that 
Lee hoped would help swing that ethnic group into the fusion 
column.33 
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Lee attempted to undermine his opponent by inquiring at 
various banks around the state whether or not Phillips as 
treasurer had been pocketing interest received on deposits 
of state funds. Naively, Lee simply asked bank officers if 
Phillips had received any interest or other consideration 
for doing business with their banks. Phillips, a banker by 
profession, certainly would ·not have made such transactions 
with men whom he did not trust. Lee's efforts before the 
election were rewarded by an indignant letter from one cash- 
ie~ who hinted that Lee was propelled by political motives 
rather than concern for the state's treasury.34 
The Cuban crisis gave the :fusionists an issue with which 
to condemn the McKinley administration. Before American in- 
tervention Populist newspapers castigated the president's 
weak policy. America's duty, they claimed was to free the 
Cubans from the clutches of Spain on humanitarian grounds. 
Such newspapers charged that ~c~inley was conciliatory be- 
cause the "money power of the world" dictated that Cuba must 
remain under Spanish Misrule because financiers like the 
Rothschilds held Cuban bonds that would only be paid if Spain 
controlled the islanj.35 
Governor Lee also supported military intervention in 
the Caribbean but wanted it go no further. Lee argued that 
American action against Spain after the sinking of the Maine 
was necessary both to liberate Cuba and to defend American 
honor. The territories gained from Spain, moralized the 
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governor, must not be returned. Rather, the U.S. should 
dedicate itself to uplifting the struggling peoples and to 
protecting them from foreign nations as well as from American 
capitalists. When the First South Dakota Volunteer Infantry 
was sent to the Philippines and deployed against the native 
rebellion in 1899, Lee demanded their return, maintaining 
that the regiment's term of enlistment had expired with the 
end of the war and that any further use of the troops would 
only benefit capitalists.36 
Pettigrew also favored intervention to alleviate Cuban 
suffering and saw a money power plot behind the president's 
actions. Such was the work of "the Roth[s]childs and :Jrexel- 
Morgans." However, there was danger, too, in a war of con- 
quest, for such would only aid the plutocrat and war con- 
tractor. Furthermore, the tropical islands were inhabited 
by "inferior races" that might enjanger American institu- 
tions.)? 
Republican papers often agreed with their opponents on 
the neej to rescue the Cubans from Spain, but they differed 
with fusionists over the disposition of conquered lands. 
Territorial acquisition was the prerogative of the victor. 
Having freed these lands, it was the duty of America to pro- 
tect and govern the territories until they were capable of 
caring for themselves or were fit to be admitted as states. 
The time had come for the United States to expand overseas 
and open new markets; the nation should retain the former 
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Spanish possessions and raise a larger army to guard them.38 
Other Republican tactics in the 1898 campaign included 
publicizing fissures in the fusion ranks and criticizing Lee 
for corruption in his administration. Republican papers took 
delight in pointing out unrest at the fusion convention and in 
enumerating the old-line Populists and Democrats who found 
the tri-partisan combination unpalatable. Republican editors 
charged that Populists in office under Lee were as guilty of 
misusing public funds as had been their Republican predeces- 
sors, and indictment that bore some truth. Some also claimed 
that Lee had covered up such graft.39 
The November election proved disastrous for the fusion- 
ists. Lee barely held onto his office, winning by a margin 
only slightly larger than he had had in 1896. Every other 
reform candidate for state office met defeat. The Republi- 
cans gained a solid majority in the legislature. For a time 
Lee was threatened by a contest from Phillips, but the for~er 
treasurer decided to drop the matter. Lee was still pressins 
for an investi~aticn of Phillips' transactions and the Re- 
publican may have chosen not to go farther in hopes that Lee 
would do likewise. 1'lhen the governor did seek action he 
found the legislature and the attorney general uncooperative.40 
The amendments on the ballot er.countered mixed success. 
The voters approved the measures allowing initiative and ref- 
erendum and a state dispensary system to control liquor sales. 
The woman suffrage amendment, however, was defeated 22,985 to 
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19,698. The campaign for suffrage in 1898 was far more re- 
served than it had been eight years earlier. This time the 
National Suffrage Association sent in only one lecturer for 
an extended tour and a few other speakers of some note ap- 
peared briefly.41 
Lee found plenty of factors to blame for the Populist 
loss. He claimed to various correspondents that the defeat 
was due to voter aJB,thy, the intense effort of the saloon 
element in the Black Hills, poor management, the absence of 
many silver supporters from the mining counties because they 
were overseas in military service, and voting fraud.42 Ap- 
parently he did not seriously examine the possibility that 
South Dakota's electorate simply did not believe the fusion- 
ists could solve all of the state's problems or that the Re- 
publicans presented a more attractive alternative. 
Pettigrew attributed the defeat partly to voting fraud 
anj heavy spending on behalf of the Republicans by the rail- 
roads. A more important cause, according to the senator, was 
the breakdown of fusi1n on the c~unty level .. Jithout that 
~rassroots unity, the election of reform candidates was im- 
possible. Nor had the fusion forces sufficiently emphasized 
the vital national issues of free silver and public ownership 
of railroads.43 
After 1896 other factors combined to reduce fusionist 
voting, both in the state and in the nation. Financial prob- 
lems, a major impetus to the formation of the Independent 
144 
movement, seemed less pressing as the economy began to improve 
during McKinley's administration. An increasing gold supply 
due to new finds and be~ter processing techniques enlarged 
the money supply. The Spanish-American War sparked a wave 
of patriotism and diverted attention to foreign affairs. Some 
Populists could not abide with fusion with the Democrats and 
the dilution of old principles. For these, the Republican 
t ff d 1 . 1 t' 44 par ~r o ere a more appea a ng so u a on . 
The 1899 legislature did little to further the reforms 
the fusionists had sought. The lawmakers did enact legisla- 
tion to put the initiative and referendum into effect, made 
some changes in voting laws, allowed taxpayers to pay their 
taxes in two semi-annual installments, and passed a pure food 
act. Presented with three different bills to establish a 
state dispensary system, the legislature chose to act on none 
of them, deciding instead that such a system would be too ex- 
pensive. Instead the lawmakers decided to refer the dispen- 
sary a~endment back to the voters in 1900. The Republican 
do~inated lesislature also refused to pass a measure that 
would have given Lee the power to remove his own appointees.45 
Nor did fusionist fortunes fare any better in the judi- 
cial elections later that year. This time the fusion forces 
managed to maintain their unity and offer a single candidate 
for each of the three state supreme court positions in con- 
tention. The highest court in the state, a bulwark of Repub- 
licanism and suspected of protecting corruption among GOP of- 
145 
ficials, was an important target for the reform groups. The 
Republicans, however, easily held on to their control of the 
court.46 
The 1900 political season began early in South Dakota 
when the Populists who were amenable to fusion held their na- 
tional convention in Sioux Falls in early May. The body nom- 
inated ~lilliam Jennings Bryan and Charles A. Towne for its 
presidential and vice presidential candidates. Towne's se- 
lection came only after a protracted struggle between extreme 
fusionists who wished to leave open the second position for 
the Democratic national convention to fill and a faction who 
felt the Democrats must concede a place on the ticket. The 
latter group won the skirmish but lost the war, for Towne was 
unacceptable to Bryan and the Democrats, who replaced him with 
Adlai E. Stevenson. The platform adopted in Sioux Falls call- 
ed for the free coinage of silver, a graduated income tax, a 
reduced tariff, public ownership of railroads, postal savin~s 
banks, direct election of senators, initiative and referendum, 
and i~~igration restriction. The attendance was f2r short of 
what city and party planners had hoped for, and probably fewer 
than two thousand dele~ates and spectators appearect.47 
Two weeks later the Republicans convened in Sioux Falls. 
The platform lauded the McKinley administration, acknowledged 
the contributions of Civil War veterans, and praised the here- 
ism of South Dakota's contingent in the Spanish-American jar 
and in the Philippines. The delegates approved of the free 
1~ 
homestead bill, endorsed strict action against trusts, and 
expressed their satisfaction with sound money. To appeal to 
the groups who had supported the Populists, the convention 
encouraged widening the powers of the railroad commission to 
the regulation of telephone, telegraph, and express compan- 
ies, and endorsed rural free delivery. The delegates also 
pronounced their support of national Republican policy ·toward 
the territories taken from Spain.48 
The convention continued the trend of recognizing the 
state's ethnic population in its choices for office. The Re- 
publicans picked Norwegian-stock Charles N. Herreid as its 
gubernatorial candidate. Herreid was joined on the ticket 
by a fellow Scandinavian, O.C. Berg, who ran for Secretary 
of State. A representative of the state's Dutch population 
joined the slate as a candidate for railroad commissioner.49 
The Populists and Democrats gathered in convention in 
Yankton in mid-July. There were not enough Silver Republicans 
on hand for them to hold a separate convention, but the other 
two le~s of the reform co~lition ~et individually to for811la~e 
their respective tickets. The ~emocrats announced their su~- 
port of Lee, Pettigrew, Bryan and Stevenson, and the natio~al 
party platform. The party denounced ~c~inley's policy on the 
Philippines, but com~ended the state's soldiers for bravery 
in the insurrection. The delegates called for a feder~l in- 
come tax and better railroad regula~ions, anj decried the act- 
ions of the 1899 legislat1Jre and the Republican controlled 
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board of assessment and equalization. The convention also 
supported the South African republics in their fight against 
British imperialism.so 
The Populists endorsed the Sioux Falls platform, Lee, 
Pettigrew and Bryan. On foreign affairs the delegates de- 
manded Philippine independence under an American protectorate, 
lauded South Dakota's men in the Philippines, criticized cor- 
ruption in the administration of Cuba, demanded full U.S. cit- 
izenship for Puerto Ricans, and sympathized with the South 
African republics. On economic and business issues the con- 
vention opposed trusts and sought public ownership of the 
"means of production and distribution" whenever necessary, 
the direct issue of money by the government, postal savings 
banks, and silver at 16 to 1. In addition, the platform in- 
cluded planks condemning the board of assessment and equali- 
zation, praising the railroaj commissioners, calling for lili- 
eral pensions, and deploring the use of troops against strik- 
. . 51 ing miners. 
The Jemocrats de~anjed a larger share of the state tictet 
than they had received during the past two major electior.s. 
7hey received the secretary of state, the com~issioner of p1 ~- 
lie lands, the treasurer, the auditor, and two presidential 
electors. The gubernatorial selection was Burre H. Lien, a 
businessman and former mayor of Sioux ?alls. Lien's nomination 
continued tne practice of ethnic politics; he was of No~wegian 
stock and had been instrumental in forming the state's most 
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important Scandinavian newspaper. Lee reluctantly accepted a 
nomination to the U.S. House of Representatives.52 
The fusion coalition in 1900 tried to make an issue out 
of American imperialism, particularly with Russian-German 
voters. These people, reasoned the fusionists, had left Rus- 
sia to avoid militarism. McKinley's policies overseas meant 
a large army that must be supported with high taxes and would 
lead to war. Russian-German attachment to the Republican 
party, however, was too firm.53 The fusionists also directe1 
blows at the leading Populists who had returned to the Repub- 
licans, charging that Kyle had been bought by the Republicans 
in 1897 and that Henry Loucks--the man who had led the Inde- 
penjent movement in 1890--was a political traitor who was 
seeking to replace Pettigrew as senator when the legislature 
met in 1901.54 
The 1900 campaign was markej by speaking tours by sev- 
eral important politicians. In late September William Jen- 
nings 3ryan sped across the state, making a dozen stops in a 
single day.55 In October ~ark Hanna conducted a tour of west- 
ern states that included some forty-four speeches in South 
Dakota. Hanna and Pettigrew were the bitterest of foes. The 
South Dakotan believed that Hanna was responsible for the 1896 
Bryan defeat and vituperatively attacked him in the Senate. 
The feud on the Senate floor between the two men climaxed in 
early June when Pettigrew accused Hanna of bribery in 1898. 
Though Hanna never publicly used Pettigrew's name, his tour 
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was aimed in part at ensuring a Republican victory in South 
Dakota in 1900, a victory that would place the question of 
Pettigrew's re-election in the hands of a hostile legislature.56 
The 1900 election was complicated by the presence of two 
minor parties. One was the Prohibition party, a common fea- 
ture in several of the major state elections of the 1890s. The 
other billed itself as the Po~ulist party, in contrast to the 
People's party of the reform coalition. The miniscule Popu- 
list party claimed to be the true mid-road portion of the 
ori~inal Populist party. The fusionists derided it as a Re- 
publican ploy to split the opposition. Whatever its purpose, 
the Populist party of 1900 was a failure. Neither of these 
factions was important in the campaign--the Pro~ibitionists 
received less than 1,400 votes and the Populist party slightly 
over three hundred.57 
The 1900 election was the death stroke for the fusion 
movement in South Dakota. Every candidate on the state ticket 
went to defeat. Lien lost by nearly 14,ooo. Lee led the fu- 
sionist candidates, but by any standards his loss was a land- 
slide. In the leg.1.9.ative races, only fifteen fusionists were 
elected comparej to 117 Republicans.58 
The 1900 election did not kill the Populist party imrnedi- 
ately; the victim lingered on for some time before finally suc- 
cumbing. In 1902 the ~emocrats and Populists fused again, 
this time with results even more dlscouraging than the pre- 
ceding election. In 1904, the Populists fielded a separate 
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ticket that attracted a mere 1,114 votes--far less than either 
the Socialists or the Prohibitionists received.59 
By this time only minor leaders of the old reform coal- 
ition were left. Loucks and Kyle had both returned to the 
Republican fold, although Kyle died in 1901. Lee, Pettigrew, 
U.S.G. Cherry, and W.T. LaFollete moved into Democratic ranks. 
filliam E. Kidd, Father Robert W. Haire, and H.W. Smith became 
Socialists. Freeman Knowles, who had been one of the Populist 
Congressmen elected in 1896, ran for Congress in 1902 and for 
governor in 1904 and 1906 on the Socialist ticket. As late 
as 1924, opposition politicians of the Populist era were still 
involved in the state's public affairs. That year an aged 
Henry Loucks ran as an Independent for the U.S. Senate. Two 
of his opponents were U.S.G. Cherry, a former Silver Republi- 
can, and Thomas Ayres, once Lee's personal secretary.60 
Many of the c )ndi tions that had spawned the Popu Li s t 
party had been remedied. A large share--though by ~o means 
all--of the state's farm population had taken the angry path 
of the !njependent movement in 1890 because of financial trou- 
bles and the belief that the old parties were unwilling to 
listen to agricultural demands. Low prices, drought, and a 
heavy burden of debt had made success precarious to men who 
were often overextended and unable to cope with the exigencies 
of the environment. 'Vhen the old parties seemed more inter- 
ested in irrelevant issues and to be under the domination of 
corporations, many farmers throughout the Plains states took 
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matters into their own hands, converting the organization of 
the Farmers' Alliance into a political party. 
By 1900 farm conditions were improving. Crops had fared 
well in the state during 1890 and 1891, although prices were 
mixed. From 1893 to 1894 yields fell, and farmers, expecting 
prices to rise as a result, were dismayed when prices dropped 
even further . Growing conditions were a bit better in 1895, 
but the market was worse. In 1896 South Dakota farmers har- 
vested large crops and the price of wheat edged upward, though 
corn prices sagged further. The worst was over, however. 
From 1897 on, prices tended to climb and drought no longer 
ruined hopes of a good harvest. A new period of agricultural 
. t . th k. 61 prosper1 y was 1n e ma ing. 
Nor were farmers so ill-prepared for the circullistances 
of farming in Dakota by 1900. A major proble:n in the late 
1880s and early 1890s had been the emphasis on a single cash 
crop, the failure of 'vh i ch left unfortunate farmers in des- 
parate straits. Thro·1gh the course of the nineties there was 
considerable effort on South Jakota farms to build a he~ge 
against just such a disaster through various means. One sol- 
ution that flourished briefly was the use of artesian irri- 
gation as a way to avert the destruction of drought.62 Others 
took the more practical route of learning to farm in the en- 
vironment in which they lived. New methods of dryland farm- 
ing were developed in South Dakota to suit the conditions 
found there. In Brown County Hardy Webster C&mpbell devised 
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new techniques of working the soil to preserve its moisture. 
The state established sub-experiment stations to test irri- 
gation procedures and to try out new crops. Agricultural 
scientists travelled abroad to find new strains of plants 
that were better suited to the dry climate found on the 
Plains.63 Most importantly, farmers began to diversify 
their operations so as not to rely too heavily on a single 
crop. Sometimes this entailed switching to livestock in 
areas where rainfall was '.::oo .tndependable. In other places 
diversification might mean growing a variety of crops rather 
than just one. This was the era when the dairy industry 
boomed.64 It required a major drought to convince farmers 
that their meth0ds must change to accomojate the land.65 
The major political parties--particularly the Republi- 
cans--threatened by the Populist upstart in 1890, began to 
realize that they could not always take the farm vote for 
granted. ~he res~lt was a series of platforms in the nine- 
ties that included man:' of the Populists' major demands and 
e and i da t e s who were idsntified with the farm e Lezerrt . 'I!':is 
was a means of def~sin~ agrarian disconte~t until conditions 
improved, other issues distracted the voters, and minor re- 
forms could satisfy farmers. The fact that the Republicans 
managed to hold on to so much of the state government attests 
t~ the efficacy of this tactic. In a jecade of major unrest, 
the Populists never won an important office without the aid 
of the Democrats. The few victories the Populists did have 
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were often won by slim margins; nor were they lasting victor- 
ies. 
As the nation recovered from the Panic of 189J, as 
the state's agricultural economy climbed out of the depths 
of drought and depression, as fusionists proved themselves 
no more successful at significant reform than the Republicans 
had been, and as new issues far removed from local concerns 
demanded the attention of South Dakota's electorate, the Re- 
publican party returned to unassailable power in the state. 
That was the party to which the bulk of South Dakota's voters 
were tied through old loyalties. The disruption of the 1890s 
may have weakened the bonds between party and voter, but it 
did not sever them. As the circumstances that had given rise 
to the Independent movement in 1890 disappeared, voters drift- 
ed back to their old parties. 
The Populists passed from the scene with many of their 
goals un~et. Serious financial reform and public ownership 
of transportation were beyond their power on the national 
level. On the state level ~~ch of the cre~it for what re- 
gulatory leg~slation wns passed during the 1890s helon~s to 
the reformers, either directly or indirectly. The laws, 
however, were all too often ineffective or were struck down 
by hostile courts. Lasting rate regulation, for example, 
would have to wait for another era. The Pop~lists did pro- 
vide the impetus for the initiative and referendum in South 
Dakota. Businesslike Andrew Lee brought a measure of honesty 
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and integrity to state government at a time when those qual- 
ities were sorely needed. However, many of the Populist 
goals were left to a new generation of leaders, working with- 
in the structure of the Republican party to achieve. 
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CHAPTER VI 
PROBLEMS OF POPULISTS IN POWER1 
THE ANDREW E. LEE ADMINISTRATION IN SOUTH DAKOTA, 1897-1901 
When the Populist party captured the governorship of 
South Dakota in 1896 it had great hopes for reform. After 
three unsuccessful bids for major state office, the Popu- 
lists had managed to form a coalition that could muster 
enough votes to defeat the dominant Republican party. The 
newly elected governor, Andrew Lee, was a sound businessman 
who promised, among other things, honesty and economy in 
government, more equitable taxation, and railroad regulation. 
With fusion forces in control of the legislature, these goals 
seemed within reach. The high hopes, however, were soon 
dashed. Although they achieved some refor~s, the fusionists 
made few lasting changes. This chapter focuses on three ma- 
jor barriers that prevented the success fusionists sought. 
First, Lee and his allies faced the problem of incom- 
plete success. They never gained full possession of the ex- 
cutive, legislative, and judicial branches. Although the 
reformers won the governorship, most other elected state of- 
ficers were Republicans, some of whom used their positions 
to obstruct Lee's plans. Fusion forces held a majority in 
the 1897 Legislature, but could not act in unison to accom- 
plish some of the measures Lee sought. In 1899 the governor 
had to contend with a Republican legislature. The fusionists 
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were never able to gain control of the elected judiciary, 
so their reforms often faced hostile courts. 
Second, the very nature of the fusionists militated 
against united action. They were composed of three separ- 
ate parties, each of which had to be satisfied from an in- 
sufficient pool of appointments and offices. They often 
did not work well together, as was evident in 1897 when a 
U.S. senator was elected by a combination of Republican and 
Populist votes. Consequently, leaders had to devote much 
time to keeping the alliance intact. Moreover, the Popu- 
lists themselves were seriously split over the question of 
fusion with the Democrats and Silver Republicans. The Pop- 
ulists were also divided by personal rivalries, notably that 
between Lee and his attorney general, Melvin Grigsby. 
Third, Lee experienced embarrassing troubles with his 
own appointees. Because of the loose nature of the reform 
coalition and Lee's own inexperience in state politics, he 
lacked adequate knowledge about some of his officers. Sub- 
sequently, so~e of them proved to be as corrupt as the Re- 
publican officials Lee had replaced. Others were disloyal 
to the governor. 
The 1896 election in South Dakota stands as one of the 
most hotly contested political battles in the state's his- 
tory. In July of that year Senator R.F. Pettigrew led a 
faction of Republicans out of their party over the issue of 
free silver. This force joined the Populist convention a 
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few days later and the combined groups adopted a platform 
and ticket acceptable to each. Andrew Lee headed the ticket. 
The South Dakota Democrats endorsed the action of the Popu- 
list-Silver Republican convention and effected fusion among 
the three parties, with the free coinage of sil~rer at a ratio 
of sixteen to one being the major issue binding the old pol- 
•t• 1 . 1 1 ica enemies. 
Andrew E. Lee, a Norwegian-born merchant in Vermillion, 
first came to political prominance for his stand opposing a 
local water company, even though he owned stock in the firm. 
His support for the taxpayers against his own economic in- 
terest earned him a position on the city council in Vermil- 
lion and later two terms as its mayor. His reputation for 
this incident spread beyond the boundaries of Cl~y County. 
In 1896 Lee's background as a reformer, his support for the 
regulation of corporations, and his endorsement for free 
silver garnered for him the Populist nomination for governor~ 
The results of the 1896 election were hardly an over- 
whelming endorsement for the People's party, as the fusion- 
ists were called. Lee carried the state by only 319 votes 
out of over 82,000 cast. The only other state officers the 
reform coalition captured were the attorney general and the 
railroad commissioners. The U.S. representatives went to 
the People's party and South Dakota gave its electoral votes 
to :villiam Jennings Bryan.3 As difficult as this situation 
may have been for an executive who wished to make reforms, 
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affairs only worsened in 1898. After the election of that 
year, only Lee remained to represent the fusion forces 
against the Republicans. Lee's own margin of victory was 
4 so slim that his opponent threatened a contest. 
The consequence of such victories was that th~ reform- 
ers faced the problem of incomplete success. So many Re- 
putlicans continued to hold office that Lee always felt the 
threat of obstruction by his political enemies. The gover- 
nor had no mandate from the people with which to cow the Re- 
publicans who stood in his way: nor did he have enough of 
his own officers to give him all the support he needed. 
A number of the positions in the executive branch were 
controlled by elected Republican officials who used their 
powers to hinder Governor Lee. H.E. Mayhew, in his cap- 
acity as auditor, managed to delay investigations into state 
affairs by a special tripartisan investigating co~~~ttee 
created by the legislature. ~ayhew refused to recognize 
the legality of the commission, which wanted to examine his 
condiict in office and that of other state officials as part 
of the aftermath of a major defalcation with state funds two 
years earlier. Lee urged the members of the committee tQ 
begin operations even though Mayhew threatened to turn down 
their vouchers. The governor hoped that the commission would 
find enough evidence of wrongdoing in its first month to in- 
sure that Mayhew would not risk the political consequences 
of blatantly covering up for corruption in public office. 
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Mayhew's tactics were successful. The commission did not 
make any investigations, although Lee used the public exam- 
iner, Maris Taylor, in much the same fashion he had hoped to 
employ the commission.5 
The state Board of Equalization at the time was com- 
posed of elected state officers, most of whom were Republi- 
cans during Lee's tenure. Although equal taxation of indi- 
vidual and corporate property had been one of Lee's major 
goals, the members of the board chose to ignore most of his 
recommendations. Lee secured some readjustment of the as- 
sessments of railroad property, but his correspondence re- 
flects disillusionment with the board. He termed the results 
of the 1898 meeting of the board to examine rates as "gra!1d 
stand play" by his political opponents, a situation that 
only grew worse by 1900.6 
Some appointive positions in state gover~~ent remained 
in Republican hands until the current appointee's term of 
office expired. These also served as a point of aggravation 
for aovernor Lee. Lee evidently sought to replace the sup- 
erintendent of the insane asylum in Yankton whom he consid- 
ered "rank and abusive to our party" and whom he believed 
was simply using his office to serve his own political ends. 
C.~. Ainsworth, the superintendent of the reform school, had 
benefited financially from his capacity, warned the children 
in the institution that they would be mistreated under new 
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management and encouraged them to run away. Lee was forced 
to demand the early resignation of the state oil inspector, 
a GOP holdover, after a Standard Oil agent complained that 
the man was neglecting his duties.7 
Another headache for Lee arose when the former Board of 
Regents refused to step down. The board has been reconsti- 
tuted by means of an amendment on the ballot in November 1896, 
but the old regents sued to keep their positions on the basis 
of a technicality concerning how the ballots were printed. 
Lee believed the motives behind the contest were to maintain 
control of the state school treasury, to keep Republican 
friends on the faculty of the schools, and to embarrass the 
d .. t t" 8 new a m1n1s ra ion. 
A major portion of the 1897 legislative session was 
spent wrangling over the election of a U.S. senator. James 
H. Y.yle, the incumbent, had been elected by a combination of 
Independent and Democratic votes in 1891, but was alienated 
from various segments of the fusionist forces. Both Lee and 
R.F. Pettigrew, the leader of the Silver Republicans and 
South Dakota's other senator, opposed Kyle's re-election. The 
fusion forces, however, were unable to unite on a single candi- 
date and Kyle was elected through a combination of votes, 
mostly coming from Republicans.9 
Karel Bicha has viewed Populists as conservatives whose 
ideology differed little from that of their opponents. He 
terms the 1897 Legislature in South Dakota a "reformer's 
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fiasco" that wasted much of its time on investigation while 
achieving few reforms. Bicha fails, however, to note the 
long struggle over Kyle's election and deep rifts in the 
anti-Republican forces, factors that militated against re- 
forms that did not have widespread support. The Populists 
could not muster enough votes to control the legislature 
themselves and the reform coalition did not have enough un- 
ity to elect a U.S. senator, much less accomplish any major 
changes. Perhaps the lack of party discipline explains the 
paucity of results more than any deficiencies in ideology.10 
In the 1897 session Lee and his allies were particularly 
anxious to revise portions of the state's administrative 
structure to insure fusionist control of most of the state's 
patronage. Part of their plan called for the creation of 
the office of insurance commissioner whose responsibility 
entailed examining the insurance companies operating in the 
state and designating the newspapers in which the companies 
must publish legal statements. The insurance patronage, 
which was considered a lucrative polit~cal pl~m hy partisa~ 
newspaper edito~s who could prosper if their party controllei 
it, was unjer the management of the state auditor, a Repub- 
lican, until the 1897 Legislature established a separate 
insurance commissioner in what was seen by friend and foe 
alike as a blatant move ~o secure patronage for the fusion- 
ists.11 Another in~ortant part of the action to secure the 
state's patronage was the revision of the Board of Charities 
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and Corrections. Lee confided to a Populist that if the 
present board could not be altered "there will be but little 
patronage for our boys who have worked so hard in our party.1112 
The failure of this reform--through the defection of several 
Populists and Silver Republicans--left the control of instit- 
utions like the insane asylum, penitentiary, and reform school 
temporarily in Republican hands. 
Governor Lee was convinced that there was a plot among 
the Republican legislators in 1897 to keep the state's rev- 
enues down and its expenditures up to embarrass his admini- 
stration financially. Lee had promised a businesslike and 
economical approach to state affairs and one means of attain- 
ing this was a high liquor license law to replace the con- 
stitutional prohibition that had been repealed in November 
1897. Lee feared that the Republicans opposed this measure 
because they did not want the new administration to function 
any better than their own party had. Althou~h the high li- 
cense bill succeeded and helped raise badly needed revenue, 
Lee exhibit2d the sa~e fears with the 1899 Legislat~re, 
which was under Rep1 blican dominance. The apprehension was 
justified, for the legislat~re appropriated about $400,000 
more than it provided revenue for.13 
Lee accepted the fusionist loss of the legislature in 
the 1898 election with resignation. As he bemoaned the de- 
feat to a Black Hills Populist, "there is no great fun in 
being elevated to the Governor's chair with a hostile legis- 
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lature and state house to train with, but that seems my fate.1114 
Lee's fears for 1899 were well placed, for the legisla- 
ture attempted to hinder his control of the state's admini- 
stration in several ways. During his first term Lee had man- 
aged to gain some measure of control over the Board of Char- 
ities and Corrections through the appointment of new members 
to it. One bill in the legislature that failed to become 
law would have reduced the board to three members, a move 
that would have left the Republicans in control of it and 
the institutions it governed. Only Lee's veto prevented the 
abolition of the office of Insurance Commissioner, which 
would have returned the insurance patronage to the Republi- 
can auditor.15 
Lee experienced some problems with his own appointees 
during his first term and was hopeful that this legislature 
would enact legislation allowi!'lg him to remove appointed of- 
ficers for cause. Although such a bill passed the House, it 
died in the Senate. Lee m0urned the defeat, "I am therefore 
at the ~ercy of my appointees during my term of office.··16 
The Senate also rejected two of his appointees and threatened 
to turn down others.17 
Even if the People's party had been able to gain secure 
control over both the executive and legislative branches, the 
state's judiciary was generally controlled by the Republican 
party. This Republican dominance constituted another obstacle 
to the fulfillment of Lee's goals. 
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A major portion of Lee's efforts in his first term was 
aimed at the investigation and prosecution of corruption 
among state officials. In 1897 the governor helped finance 
a case against H.E. Mayhew, the state auditor, for withhold- 
ing fees paid to him. Lee felt so strongly about the matter 
that he was willing to pay the attorney's fees out of his 
own pocket if necessary. The case, however, came before a 
hostile Republican judge and was dismissed. Lee complained 
bitterly that "the court made the rankest ruling I ever 
heard •... He [the judge] showed his malice from begin[n]- 
ing to end and is so bitter agains[t] populists that he 
could not conceal it.0018 
One of the outstanding issues in the 1896 campaign was 
the regulation of railroads, but legal action against the 
corporations was useless without the cooperation of the 
judicial system. The legislature gave the state railroad 
commissioners power to regulate freight rates in 1897, but 
the law did not stand up in court. The major railroads in 
South Jakota managed to get injunctions in U.S. district 
court to prevent the enforcement of ths new rates, and, after 
years of legal battles, the U.S. Supreme Court held the law 
unconstitutional. In December 1897 the state supreme court 
ruled unconstitutional a railroad litigation fund the pro- 
ponents of the legislation had hope to use to defend the 
rates.19 
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When Lee was trying to oust the old Board of Regents to 
replace it with one of his choosing, he did so with trepida- 
tion, knowing that he faced a court that opposed him politi- 
cally. He conveyed this pessimism to a correspondent, "The 
Supreme Court being radically republican we can expect no 
mercy from them if there is any way for them to find an ex- 
t . t ,.20 cuse o go agains us. 
The reformers recognized the need to control the courts 
to insure success in their programs. They understood that 
Republican judges could not be depended on to stand against 
the in te r-e s t s of railroads and other corporations, nor would 
they be sympathetic to prosecutions of Republican office- 
holders. Some believed that~.~. Taylor, the state treasur- 
er who had embezzled over $350,000 and left the treasury vir- 
tually empty, would have received nore than a light sentence 
of two years had not his party controlled the bench.21 Tr.e 
difficulty was that the Populists had problems mobilizing 
their voters for judicial elections. Lee saw part of the 
pr ob.Lem as the timing of the elections. Held in the ye ar s be- 
tween gubernatorial elections, farmers felt their time was 
better spent on the farm than at the polling place. An 
embittered Lee wrote of the problem after the Mayhew de- 
cision, " ... the populists will stay at home and husk ~o~n 
and let such men [as the hostile judge in the case] be re- 
elected to domineer on them"22 Lee tried to arouse support 
for the 1899 campaign by writing letters asking help at 
176 
election time, but after the defeat mused that the 150 he 
did send out should have been fifteen or twenty thousand 
instead.2J 
The fusionists' tenuous control of the state government 
was further complicated by the fact that much of the state's 
patronage remained outside of Lee's control. The Republicans 
were often able to reap the advantages of office-holding 
while the Lee administration was saddled with the responsi- 
bility of seeing that the government was run in the interests 
of the people. Lee was left without enough positions at his 
command to satisfy the normal demands on any elected offi- 
cial, such as the claims of ethnic groups for recognition 
in public office. 
Lee's complaints about not having enough control over 
the state's appointive positions were common. In 1897 he in- 
formed an office-seeker that he could promise nothing as all 
of the institutions were controlled by the Republicans but 
the Soljier's Home at Hot Springs, even though his admini- 
stration was charged with the proper manage~ent of them. Ee 
viewed the situation as untenable and dangerous to the future 
welfare of the reformers' party. The abuses, however, con- 
tinued and tried Lee's patience. In 1899, after learning of 
graft at the state penitentiary, he snapped at one of his 
political allies, "It is the same old story. Everything 
belongs to the Republican machine. They can steal the State 
blind and the people will laud them all the more for it.1124 
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He deeply regretted his inability to place L.T. Norman, whom 
he called "the man to whom I owe my election" for an 
article in a Norwegian paper in Chicago. He tried to get 
him jobs at the penitentiary and the asylum but failed be- 
cause those institutions were dominated by local interests. 
The Board of Regents seemed more interested in giving spots 
to the Republicans than to Lee's recommendations. He finally 
asked his public examiner to give the man a position as a 
deputy.25 
Many of South Dakota's ethnic groups placed demands on 
Lee for proper recognition for their nationality for support 
rendered during his campaigns. His own countrymen, the Nor- 
wegians, who formed a large segment of the state's voting 
population, were particularly insistent on recognition and 
,,.11 
critical when they felt they had been slighted.36 The Ger- 
~ans, another sizeable bloc in voting strength, also felt 
they were due more than they received. Lee sought to sooth 
ruffled feathers, compliment the Germans for their contri- 
butions, anJ explain that he had given that nationality one 
position but could not do more for them from his insufficient 
pool of appointments.27 The Irish and Czechs also laij claim 
28 to jobs under the governor's control. 
Moreover, the reform forces found they were unable to 
control the federal patronage in the state. Pettigrew cut 
himself off from the Republican party when he joined the bolt 
of Silver Republicans at the national GOP convention ir. 1896. 
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Kyle's re-election to the Senate in 1897 with Republican 
votes made certain the fact that whatever patronage a U.S. 
senator could affect would go through an opponent of Lee and 
29 Pettigrew. 
The second major obstacle to the success of the People's 
party was the fact that they were a loosely joined coalition 
of forces, bound by the silver issue and the desire to re- 
place the Republican party as the controlling force in the 
state's politics. As such, they were composed of a variety 
of groups whose allegiance to the old parties had often been 
rooted in strong philosophic or cultural ties and who could 
easily be persuaded to return to old patterns of voting 
behavior. The leaders of these diverse groups were old pol- 
itical opponents who were sometimes hesitant to abandon 
their earlier differences. Nor were the leaders always ready 
to give up their own personal political ambitions for the 
sake of party unity. 
The tri-partisan nature of the reform forces complicated 
an already difficult situation with regarj to patrona~e be- 
cause each group needed to share in the spoils of office for 
theunion to survive. Lee was aware of the trying task before 
him. Senator Pettigrew, an experienced hand at dealing out 
patronage, warned him early in his administration of the prob- 
lems involved. He counseled Lee not to neglect the Populists 
although he felt QOSt of the patronage should go to the Demo- 
crats and Silver Republicans because the PoPJ,lists had gotten 
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most of the elected officials.JO 
Lee made strong efforts to please the different parties, 
but inevitably drew criticism that indicated dissent within 
the coalition. His major error seems to have been giving 
too much to the Democrats. That party's share of offices 
included appointments to the wardenship of the penitentiary 
and a portion of the administration of the insane asyl~~. 
Lee objected to the degree of control his Democratic appoint- 
ees sought to establish over these institutions, even to the 
point of rejecting Lee's suggestions for minor positions 
under them.31 Some Populists were angry over this apparent 
neglect by Lee for his own party. A disappointed office- 
seeker c omp La i ned , ". . I deplore the fact that the major- 
ity of the honors justly earned by our party, should be re- 
linquished to the Democrats ... 32 
One group in particular that felt alienated because of 
the distribution of patronage was the old Alliance lea-Jer- 
ship. that had been the core of the independent movement in 
the first place. Lee was especially concerned that Henry 
Loucks, who had heaJed the Independent movement in 1890, was 
disappointed because men who had been fighting for the party 
for years were not receiving their just reward.JJ 
Leaders of the fusionists found it nearly impossible to 
weld the separate parts of their party into an effective pol- 
itical unjt. They lacked the leadership, discipline, and 
cohesiveness of a regular party. Often caring more for their 
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own political futures than for the good of the coalition, 
some politicians worked at cross purposes from ethers. 
This weakness was best illustrated in the 1897 Legis- 
lature when splits in the reform forces became prevalent in 
key issues. Although the fusionists were in the majority, 
they could not combine to elect a U.S. senator without the 
aid of Republican votes. The balloting for senator dragged 
on for nearly a month with the Republicans united behind one 
candidate and the fusionists split among fotrmain ones. When 
the Republicans suddenly switched to James H. Kyle, he re- 
tained enough supporters among the Populists and Democrats 
to get elected. He received the votes of fifty-two Republi- 
cans, ten Populists, and three !:>emocrats. Leaders of the 
new party saw the lack of unity among the reform forces, the 
political ambition of several of the candidate~ who refused 
to withdraw from the race, and the unreliability of the Demo- 
crats as the major causes of the defeat.34 Lee viewed the 
event with discouragement. He termed Kyle's election the 
"foulest and dirtiest piece of work" he ha.: ever seen, and 
informed Pettigrew, "I feel at this writing as though our 
whole administration is going to be a failure ... J5 
The failure to elect the senator without Republican 
support contributed to the disunity among the reform force~. 
Up to that point Pettigrew had planned to join formally the 
Populist party, but ~yle's victory convinced him that he 
could serve best by further organizing the Silver Republicans 
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and keeping them as a separate entity for the time being.36 
Lee's hopes for a new Board of Charities and Corrections 
were defeated when several members of the reform union op- 
posed his plan in the senate. This defection disgusted Lee, 
who felt the loss left all of the important state patronage 
with the Republicans.37 Lee's major complaint was against 
C.S. Palmer, a Silver Republican from Minnehaha County, who 
evidently voted against the governor's wishes as a protest 
to the way some of the Populists who had voted for Kyle were 
lured back into the party with favors rather than being 
castigated.JS 
A substantial portion of party leaders' efforts was 
devoted to healing the rift between the reform forces and 
making them into a viable political force that could attract 
enough votes to stay in power. Pettigrew spent about two 
months in mid-1897 trying to reconcile the differences be- 
tween Lee and Palmer. He sought to arrange a deal where- 
by Lee would lend his support to Palmer's choice for the 
penitentiary warden and Palmer would en:orse Lee's car.jidate 
for the commandant of the Soldier's Home. It was a com- 
plicated arrangement and Pettigrew privately believed that 
Palmer's choice would be unacceptable to the Board of Chari- 
ties and Corrections that would consider his choice anyway. 
He also had to contend with the stubbornness of both Lee and 
Palmer. Palmer was too resentful of his treatment and Lee 
was too interested in punishing the state senator for easy 
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compromise. The two opponents eventually came to terms and 
Pettigrew was hopeful that the political trading had healed 
old wounds .39 
Apart from these major quarrels, politicans still saw 
handicaps in the effective performance of fusionists in the 
legislature. The observations of R.F. Pettigrew, one of South 
Dakota's most experienced politicans, were perhaps most in- 
sightful. Although he complimented them on their overall qual- 
ity, he still saw the need for better leadership in their ranks. 
He termed them an "unorganized mob" and pointed to the jeal- 
ousies that divided them, as well as their wariness of being 
bossed about. 4o N th' bl ' db P 1· t or was is pro em misse y opu is s. 
Lee complained of the legislators during the midst of the 
senatorial election that they were "worse than a lot of sheep." 
One Populist editor lamented the fact that the legislators 
44 accomplished little because they were so split by factions. 
The three parties had been able to combine their strength 
in the 1896 election, but that was no guarantee they would be 
able to duplicate the feat in 1898. ·.Ji th each party having 
an interest in preserving its own identity to a degree, this 
was no mean task. Pettigrew spent a considerable amount of 
his time in the first half of 1898 to insure cooperation 
among the parties. He was of the opinion that the parties 
coulj draw more votes by maintaining their distinct bodies 
rather than by fusing outright, and that the Populists should 
place the names of four Democrats on their ticket and let the 
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other party endorse it. He recommended that the Democrats be 
given the treasurer, audtior, superintendent of schools, and 
either the secretary of state or the lieutenant governor, 
while the Silver Republicans would be recognized with·two of- 
fices. He even suggested to a leading Democrat that the cen- 
tral committee chairmen of the Silver Republicans and Demo- 
crats meet prior to the state convention and choose their 
candidates for the combined state ticket, hardly a method 
acceptable to Populists who had opposed slates made in back- 
42 roo~s. 
The actions of the conventions, which met at the same 
time in Aberdeen, closely followed Pettigrew's suggestions, 
although the Republican press claimed there was dissent in 
the Populist convention over the issue of distributing some 
of the offices to the other elements of the anti-Republican 
forces. Each settled on the same ticket after consultations 
through conference committees. Although each party adopted 
a platform that was slightly at variance with the others, the 
bodies for~ulated a single fusion platform they could all 
stand by.4J 
Not all members of the parties opposing the Republicans 
supported the combination with old political enemies and the 
endorsement of new principles. This dissatisfaction mani- 
fested itself in a series of defections to the Republicans 
by prominent leaders of the reform forces. Several had re- 
turned to the Republican fold in 1896 when fusion was first 
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accomplished, but the number increased in 1898 as politicians 
found the union unpalatable. Republican papers had a heyday 
with such embarrassing incidents to the fusionists. The Gary 
l!ll.er-State published a lengthy interview with Bartlett Tripp, 
formerly a leading Democrat, who turned to the Republicans in 
1898. Just before the election of that year, the Vermillicn 
Qakota Republican listed the major opposition leaders who had 
come into the Republican fold in protest over the combination 
of the other parties.44 
The Populist party in particular suffered from some 
severe divisions during the late 1890s. The most pronounced 
of these was over the issue of fusion itself. Many old-line 
leaders had opposed fusion with the Democrats for years for 
fear of destroying the.Populist party or of diluting the prin- 
ciples for which it stood. This eventually led to Henry L. 
Loucks's ~eturn to the Repub~ican party. Moreover, the Pop- 
ulists were split by personal rivalries, especially one be- 
tween Lee and his attorney general. 
Loucks was willing to work with the refer~ coalition at 
first, though he was not wholly in favor of it. In December 
18)7 Pettigrew saw him as theleader of the middle-of-the-road 
Populists, those who felt the best policy for the third party 
was to remain clear of both of the old parties, but still was 
optimistic for Loucks's support for the union in 1898 and 
claimed the agrarian reformer was a friend. In early 1898 
Pettigrew urged his correspondents to treat Loucks with care, 
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believing the man would join the fusionist ranks fully after 
the Populist convention endorsed union. Pettigrew's position 
on Loucks hardened after the latter opposed fusion at the 
meeting of the Populist state central committee in March, 
but he still hoped the Alliance leader would fall into line 
when the nominating convention met. During April 1898 Petti- 
grew became more suspicious of him and more defensive about 
the need for fusion. By April 29, the senator was ready to 
confide to one of Loucks's old foes that the man was "an in- 
fernal old scoundrel."45 Though Pettigrew was careful to 
speak cautiously of Loucks to other early Populists, he hint- 
ed to members of his own party that the man might be pla.nnin.§; 
a move to the Republicans or that he was already in their pay. 
Whatever Loucks's course, Pettigrew believed more firmly as 
the summer wore on that the old reformer would do little 
damage to the party if he left it.46 
Although his drift away from the fusion camp was evijent, 
Loucks's renunciation of the Populist party came as a sur- 
prise to many. In a letter a~dressed to Doane Robinson with 
the request that it be read at the Republican state conven- 
tion,Loucks rejoined the party he had fought for so many years 
and asked the gathering to endorse initiative and referendum 
to draw other middle-of-the-road Populists.47 
Lesser lights in the old Populist ranks sharej Loucks's 
distaste for fusion. C.B. Kennedy and W.E. Y.idd expressed 
some opposition to fusion in 1898 and Kidd's allegiance to 
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the reform coalition was questioned in 1900.48 In 1900 a small 
convention in Yankton in October by middle-of-the-road Popu- 
lists fielded a formal Populist ticket in opposition to the 
fusionist People's ticket. The Yankton Press~ Dakotan, a 
Silver Republican paper, criticized the new party as nothing 
but a Republican trick to defeat the reform union. Whether 
it was because the new party was seen by voters as such a 
scheme or because it entered the race too late is uncertain, 
but the candidates it offered drew only a handful of votes.49 
No party is free of rivalry among its leaders, but the 
Populists in the 1890s were plagued with a particularly acri- 
monious feud between Governor Lee and Melvin Grigsby, the 
attorney general. Grigsby had been a gubernatorial aspirant 
at the 1896 Populist state convention, but had placed third 
in the balloting. Grigsby received the nomination for attcr· 
ney general instead and carried the state by a slightly larger 
margin than Lee's own.5° 
The new administration had not even taken office before 
party leaders voiced suspicions of the new attorney general. 
Pettigrew predicted that he would side with the railroad cor- 
porations against any new regulations.51 In the course of 
Lee's first year in office Grigsby proved himself such an 
irritation that ~ee addressed a lengily letter to him in late 
October 1897 setting forth his complaints against the man. 
The governor accused him of attempting to prevent investiga- 
tions of Republican officeholders suspected of misconduct, 
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trying to sabotage Lee's railroad program by crippling the 
legislation intended to regulate the corporations and by help- 
ing the railroads escape just taxation, and obstructing the 
prosecution of government officials being tried for diverting 
funds to their own purposes.52 Grigsby sought to further his 
political fortunes by securing the command of a regiment of 
cowboys during the Spanish-American War. Raised under the 
same law that authorized Theodore Roosevelt's Rough Riders, 
Grigsby's Cowboys, as the unit was known, never saw combat, 
but still proved a useful tool for developing a political 
base. Grigsby's bid at replacing Lee at the head of the Pop- 
ulist ticket in 1898 failed, however, and he never again 
posed a serious threat to the governor.53 
A third barrier to Lee's administration was the trouble 
he experienced with his own appointees. ~his problem, though 
less serious than the other obstacles examined earlier, pro- 
ved a constant source of irritation for the Populist governor. 
Because of the loose nature of the reform forces and Lee's 
own inexperience in state politics, he lac~ed sufficient in- 
formation about some of his appointees. As he surveyed his 
administration in 1900, "I hav8 had many things to co~tend 
with and one of the greatest troubles of all was we were al- 
most all strangers to on[e] another and worked to great dis- 
advantage ... 54 Part of this was because the members of the 
reform coalition had recently been political foes and many 
did not know each other until 1896. Another part was prob- 
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ably because Lee had never held state office before and did 
not have the ties to people around the state that other poli- 
ti.ci ans could rely on. 
The inevitable result of these deficiencies was that 
Lee made errors in his appointments. He regretted his mis- 
takes, for the failures of his appointees reflected on his own 
performance.55 In some cases, ill-planned appointments proved 
embarrassing when Republicans noted that Lee's own men were 
guilty of the ~me offenses of which he accused his political 
opponents. In other instances, blunders severely crippled 
aspects of his control over state affairs. 
One of the most troublesome offices at Lee's disposal 
was that of the insurance commissioner. His first appointment 
to the position was J.H. Kipp. H.E. Mayhew, the auditor who 
had previously conducted the insurance business. charged Kipp 
and a deputy with the same corrupt practice of overcharging 
for examinations for which Lee was prosecuting iV'.ayhew. Lee 
eventually removed Kipp, but still had problems with a tern- 
. th . . 56 porary replacement 1n e pos1t1on. 
In April 1898 Lee asked for the resignation of another 
appointee, R.E. ~owdell, the oil inspector. Dowdell had been 
guilty of failing to turn in all of the fees he received for 
his work, a complaint that Lee had made against many of the 
Republican state officials. Dowdell was not prosecuted, but 
had to reimburse the state for the funds he retained. Repub- 
lican newspapers seized on such opportunities to embarrass Lee. 
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Shortly before the 1898 election the Vermillion Dakota Re- 
ID:!,blican brought up the issue of Dowdell's seemingly favored 
treatment and speculated that the reason might be Dowdell's 
support for Lee at the Populist convention at Aberdeen.57 
The most serious of Lee's mistakes with appointments 
involved his selection of the Board of Regents. A constitu- 
tional amendment passed in 1896 cleared the way for Lee to 
appoint a new board to replace the one formerly in charge of 
the state's educational institutions. A number of the appoint- 
ees to the new board, how~ver, showed themselves to be incom- 
petent or disloyal to the governor. Lee found his choice for 
the Republican member of the board, C.N. Herreid, was deter- 
mined to use his office for his own political ends. He viewed 
two other members as occasional allies of Herreid and possibly 
jishonest. A fourth was incompetent. Only one mem~er was 
reliable, and he became so disillusioned with the difficulties 
of dealing with the other members that he submitted his resign- 
ation to the governor--a resignation that Lee refused to ac- 
ce~t because he could count on him "to help keep them [the 
rest of the board] straight and prevent them disgracing my 
administration ... 58 Lee's inability to manage his Board of 
Regents cost him badly needed patronage as well, since he had 
great difficulty getting the regents to accept any of his 
recom~endations for positions.59 
The three hindrances to Lee's administration enumerated 
here were by no means the only difficulties the Populist gov- 
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ernor met during his two terms in office. Lee took office as 
the state and nation were recovering from years of drought 
and depression. South Dakota was still suffering the conse- 
quences of the theft of state funds two years earlier. In 
keeping with the dominant economic philosophy of his day, Lee 
sought retrenchment in state expenditures to provide tax re- 
lief during the lean years. Lee also served during the 
Spanish-American War, a time when America had to make de- 
cisions about·the role the nation should play in the world 
and how it should view the territories it received from Spain. 
Lee, along with many other Populists, supported the war 
against Spain to liberate Cuba for humanitarian reasons, but 
opposed the annexation of any of the lands taken from the 
defeated power. :'Jhen a South Dakota regiment was sent to 
the Philippines to quell the native rebellion, Lee strer.u- 
ously protested the use of the state's troops for reasons 
other than those for which the men had enlisted. This em- 
ployment of South Dakota soldiers, the question of bringing 
them home, and the value of foreign territories to the 
United States were all issues that sidetracked the normal 
affairs of the state for a time.60 
Andrew Lee's administration cannot be called one of 
great reform. Too many obstacles stood in the way of success. 
The reform coalition was never able to gain control of the 
entire state government so bulwarks of Republicanism stood 
in its way. The diverse backgrounds and aspirations of the 
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elements of the coalition made cooperation difficult and co- 
hesion impossible. Lee's own misfortune at selecting the 
wrong men to fill the offices within his grasp compounaed the 
difficulty, especially since he had too few places to give 
out in the first place. These were some of the problems that 
a Populist could face when trying to capture and control a 
predominantly Republican state with an untried and sometimes 
uneasy union of forces tied together by the issue of silver 
and the hope of defeating the GOP. 
But Lee's years in office can not be called a complete 
failure either. He did not achieve many of his major goals 
such as lasting railroad reform, but he managed to bring a 
degree of honesty to a government that had seen too much 
graft in the preceding years. Lee has been criticized for 
wasting too ~uch of his time pursuin~ corruption and petty 
policies rather than using it to bring about lasting refor~s. 
but, given the barriers to a more successful administration, 
the governor may have done the best he could.61 His own 
popularity outstripped that of his party, as was evident in 
the 1893 election, but mere popularity could not achieve 
tangible results. Perhaps the most noted historian of the 
Populists expressed the dilemma best, "Evidently their genius 
lay in protest ~ather than in performance.1162 
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CHAPTER VII 
SOUTH DAKOTA'S ETHNIC GROUPS DURING THE POPULIST ERA: 
A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
The use by historians of social science techniques dur- 
ing the past two decades has opened up a new frontier in the 
study of the past. It is now possible to study in detail 
the grassroots electoral behavior of masses of individuals. 
This frees historians from heavy dependence on the writings 
of the leaders whose views of society and history found their 
way into the written ·records while the common man stood mute. 
This chapter involves a statistical study of ethnic 
groups in six South Dakota counties. Its goal is to deter- 
mine how various ethnic groups--and subgroups within those 
bodies--acted during the political campaigns of the Populist 
era. This is possible by the isolation of select counties 
with strong ethnic communities and bivariate analysis of the 
precincts within those counties. 
Several factors determined the choice of the half dozen 
counties included in the study. Foremost among these factors 
was the ethnic mix of the county. An effort was made to in- 
clude all of the major foreign stock groups in the state in 
1900 if a county could be found with a large enough element 
of that group to make analysis feasible. Population stabil- 
ity through the decade was also nec e saary . :vi +h.in the con- 
fines of that restriction an attempt was made to sample eth- 
nic groups in various regions of the state. For example, of 
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the four sample agricultural counties in which Scandinavian 
settlements were found, two were in or near the wheat belt of 
the northern half of the state and two were in the corn belt 
of the southeastern section. 
Secondly, election statistics on the precinct level had 
to be available for the Populist era or a large portion there- 
of. This restriction forced the selection of Campbell County 
for the Russian-German representative in the northern section 
of the state because no precinct level returns have been pre- 
served in McPherson County, the most Russian-German of those 
counties in 1900. Nor were complete returns available in 
Edmunds County. Instead, Campbell County was substituted, 
although it was settled later, had a smaller population, and 
had less stable precinct boundaries. 
Shifting precincts caused some difficulties in all of 
the counties under study. Hardly a decade old as a state 
when the Populist era drew to a close, South Dakota was yet 
too young to be confined by immovable boundaries. The typi- 
cal problem was the separation of towns from townships as 
separate voting precincts sometime during the 1890s as these 
towns grew in size. This situation was commonly met by 
simply reaggregating the data for town and township to pro- 
duce a stable voting district for the entire period. This 
was the method followed in Clay and McCook counties. In Deu~l 
County a town was created along the border between two town- 
ships so those two districts were aggregated into a single 
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unit of analysis. In Bon Homme County large-scale changes 
were made between 1892 and 1894 when a number of new pre- 
cincts were organized. Since the exact boundaries of the 
1890 precincts were not available, the first two elections of 
the Populist period were ~mply eliminated from the study. In 
Campbell County the creation of a new precinct between 1890 
and 1892 took place, but the exact boundaries in that area 
of the county was omitted from analysis. In Lawrence County 
the presence of many very small precincts, the lack of pre- 
cise boundaries, and suspicions of shifting precincts led to 
the inclusion of only the mining centers of Lead and Deadwood 
in the analysis. 
Clay County in the southeast was chosen because of its 
large population of Scandinavians. Deuel County in the north 
provided a second large Scandinavian settlement in addition 
to offering a German community. McCook County in the corn 
belt was one of the most German counties with a stable popu- 
lation in the decade and proved a Scandinavian group as well. 
Bon Ho~.rr.e along the Missouri in the southeastern quarter of 
the state contained precincts of Czechs, Russian-Germans, and 
Germans. Campbell County represented the Russjan-German 
counties of the north central portion of the state and con- 
tained a Scandinavian settlement in several precincts. Law- 
rence County was the center of the Black HilJs mining region 
with its wide range of ethnic groups. 
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The technique selected was Spearman's rank-difference 
correlation, a method that produces a coefficient of corre- 
lation based on the degree of relationship between the ranks 
of two variables. If the rank of one variable increases at 
the ~ame time the rank of the second variable does, the re- 
lationship between the two variables is positive. This is 
expressed by a coefficient that ranges from O.O to +1.0, the 
latter figure indicating a perfect match in the changes of 
rank. If the rank of one variable decreases as that of the 
other increases, the relationship is negative and can range 
as high as -1.0. Simple to compute, the Spearman correlation 
offers the additional advantage of reducing the distortions 
in the data caused by changes in the ethnic composition of 
the county. The 1900 Federal census was used to determine 
the ethnic base of each precinct in the study. Although the 
exact percentage of ethnic voeters within small districts 
over the course of a decade may have changed through in- and 
outmigration or through differing rates at which young men of 
various groups enter the p~ten~ial voting population, the rank 
1 of a group is less likely to change. 
The correlation coefficients that are p~esented in the 
pages to follow are generally those correlations that pro- 
duced a positive correlation with the group in question. 'When 
negative coefficients appear strong enough to reveal something 
about a group's behavior, this will be noted. For the first 
three elections of the decade coefficients were computed for 
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all three major parties. With the fusion of the Populists 
and Democrats in 1896, only two parties of note appeared on 
the ballot and only two correlations were computed. The two 
variables involved in each computation were the proportion of 
adult males--defined as men aged twenty-one or older--of the 
ethnic group in question in each precinct of the county and 
the proportion of votes for a particular party in those pre- 
. t 2 cine s. 
Clay Coun.ll 
Clay County, located along the Missouri River in the 
second tier of counties west from the Iowa border, was one 
of the first counties in South Dakota to be settled. Among 
the earliest settlers into the area in the summer of 1859 
were a number of Norwegians who took up residence in the 
. J vicinity of what would today be Meckling. 
These first Norwegians set the tone for future settle- 
ment. Scandinavians from Norway, Sweden and Denmark filled 
the county during the coming decades. By 1900 over seventeen 
percent of the county's population had been born in Scandi- 
navia and over forty-five percent of the adult males of Clay 
County were of Scandinavian stock.4 
The Swedes, the most numerous of the Scandinavian peo- 
ples in the county, were concentrated in the Dalesburg settle- 
ment in the eastern townships of Glenwood and Gariield.5 The 
Danes were scattered throughout the county, but had their 
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greatest numbers in the northern two-thirds of Clay. These 
people were a spillover from the large Swan Lake settlement 
in Turner County to the north.6 The highest proportions of 
Norwegians in Clay County were located in the townships west 
of the Vermillion River.7 
The next largest foreign stock group in Clay County 
were the Irish, who composed nearly eight percent of the 
adult males of the county. They made up over thirty percent 
of the potential voters in Star township in the northwest 
corner of the county, and nearly fifteen percent of the 
voters of Bethel township in 1900.8 
The county's native stock population had its greatest 
concentration in the southern townships of Fairview and Ver- 
million and in the city of Vermillion. Only in this area 
did the proportion of native stock adult males exceed the 
county average of J0.8 percent. The natives of Fairview 
township shared their region with a community of French- 
Canadians that had its locus in Union County to the east.9 
During the latter part of the nineteenth century Scan- 
dinavians, particularly Norwegians and Swedes, showed a 
strong attachment to the Republican party. rv:any of the 
Scandinavians had opposed slavery and had fought for the Un- 
ion or had benefitted from the Homestead Act. This Republi- 
can loyalty remained firm until the last part of the century 
when other fa~tors intervened. The 1820s had been marked by 
heavy emigration from the Scandinavian countries, which 
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brought to America many who had no old ties to the GOP. The 
wave of agrarian radicalism of the 1890s appealed to many 
Scandinavians in the Great Plains, a large proportion of whom 
were farmers adversely affected by agricultural conditions.10 
Scandinavians also had a tradition of reform-mindedness 
that could affect their voting behavior. These northern Eur- 
opeans were predominantly Protestants with a pietistic orien- 
tation. Such pietists saw the key to salvation in a personal 
conversion experience and proper moral behavior. Willing to 
use government as a tool to enforce morality, pietists were 
drawn to the Republican party, which advocated a positive 
state that would intervene to direct the course of society. 
Hence, pietists supported prohibition as a means of imposing 
their own moral codes on others. 
The religious viewpoint opposing pietism was ritualism. 
Comprised largely of Roman Catholics and German Lutherans, 
ritualists stressed the importance of form and proper belief. 
The path to salvation was orthodoxy rather than conversion 
and morality was the affair of the church rather than of the 
state. Thus ritualists were drawn to the Democratic party 
with its philosophy of the negative state that governed as 
little as possible. To pietistic Scandinavians the Democratic 
party was an anathema that drew only a small fraction of their 
votes. The Populist part~'· however, with its insistence on 
a variety of moral, social, political, and economic changes 
that appealed to the plight and the reformist bent of many 
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11 Scandinavians, was often greeted warmly. 
During the 1880s Clay County was strongly Republican, 
with some precincts, particularly ones inhabited by Scandina- 
vians, being virtually solid for the GOP. For example, in 
the 1889 gubernatorial race the Republican candidate over- 
whelmed his Democratic opponent 1J11 to 249. In the Swedish 
townships of Garfield and Glenwood the Democrat garnered a 
t t 1 f th t d . N t h0 nl ' 12 o a o ree voes, an in orway owns 1p o y six. 
The advent of agrarian radicalism into the political 
arena, however, substantially altered voting patterns among 
the county's Scandinavians. The Republican majority of 1889 
was reduced to a plurality in 1890 as former centers of Re- 
publican strength cast large numbers of votes for the new 
Independent party. This situation continued in 1892, although 
in 1894 the Republicans were able to gain a near majority. Th~t 
year, however, four county offices and the legislative seats 
went to the Qe~ocrats and Populists, who had fused on the 
county level. Republicans regained firm control of the 
county and legislative offices in the final elections of the 
decade, although Andrew Lee, a Vermillion businessman, carried 
the county for the fusionists in the gubernatorial contests of 
1896 and 1898.lJ 
The course of the Populist party among Clay's Scandina- 
vians may be seen in Figure 1, which graphs the Spearman cor- 
relations for the county from 1890 to 1900.14 During the first 
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FIGURE 1. Coefficients of correlation between percent- 
ages of potential Scandinavian voters according to the 1900 
Federal census and the percentages of votes cast for Popu- 
list and fusion candidate5 for governor in Clay County, 
South Dakota, 1890-1900.1 
affinity for the Populist party, with coeff5cients ranging 
from +0.6485 to +0.68JO. At the same time, correlations with 
both the Democrats and Republicans were negative. 
The election of 1896, however, abruptly ended this rela- 
tionship with the Populists, with the coefficient droppine; to 
-0.0035. Two reasons may be noted for this sudden change. 
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Scandinavians were strongly anti-Democratic and, though evi- 
dently willing to cooperate on a county level, many were not 
agreeable to statewide fusion with the Democrats. Further- 
more, 1896 marked the inauguration of a new era in South Dak- 
ota politics, during which the state's political parties 
would seek the support of major ethnic groups by nominating 
gubernatorial candidates of immigrant origins. That year 
both the Republicans and the fusionists put forward Norwegians 
at the head of the state ticket. This choice among two of 
their own ethnic origin probably contributed to the division 
among Scandinavian voters that destroyed the former attach- 
ment to the Populists.15 
For 1898, when only the fusionists offered a Scandinavian 
candidate for govern6r, the correlation between the percentage 
to fusionist votes rises to +0,3257, While this figure in- 
dicates some interest for the fusionists among the Scandina- 
vians, the relationship was far weaker than it had been in 
1894. The relative strength of a correlation is indicated 
by the square of the coefficient. Hence the 1894 correlation 
of +0.68JO reveals a relationship between the Scandinavians 
and Populists over four times greater than the 1898 coeffi- 
cient. It seems that Lee's presence on the ticket was an im- 
portant drawing point for Scandinavians. For 1900, when both 
parties again ran Norwegian gubernatorial candidates, the 
correlation drops to nearly zero. 
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One of the characteristics of the Spearman correlation 
is that the coefficient is reduced by the presence of another 
group in the county who show similar voting behavior. In Clay 
County, Fairview township--with less than thirteen percent of 
its adult male population Scandinavian--was consistently one 
of the most Populist precincts. The township's French-Canad- 
ian and native-stock farmers evidently backed the agrarian 
party strongly.17 In contrast, Star township, where poten- 
tial Irish voters outnumbered Scandinavian ones, was the ban- 
ner Democratic precinct in 1890 and 1894 and was the second 
highest precinct for that party in 1896. 
Deuel County 
Deuel County, located along the eastern edge of the 
state's wheat belt, borders on Minnesota in east cental South 
Dakota. A large influx of Norwegian immigrants in the 1870s 
and 1880s, many of them from Iowa and Minnesota, gave rise to 
a dense concentration of that element in the southeastern 
townships of the county. In the 1900 census Deuel County 
registered the highest percentage of Norwegian-born residents 
in the state. That year Scandinavians comprised over ninety 
percent of the voting population of Blom and Scandinavia town- 
ships and over eighty percent of Norden township. The small 
town of Toronto was virtually pure Nordic with only two adult 
males who were not of Scandinavian stock. The few Danes in 
the county were spread along the eastern border and most 
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likely were attracted to the area because of the Danish set- 
. 18 tlements at Canby and Tyler, Minnesota. 
In less populated areas of northern and western Deuel 
County, Germans predominated in 1900, constituting over 
sixty percent of the adult males in Rome, Altamont, and 
Hidewood townships. Havana township contained a small 
Dutch community. Goodwin and Portland townships contained 
numbers of Irish settlers.19 
Prior to the advent of the Populist party the county 
appears to have been solidly Republican. In the 1889 gub- 
ernatorial election Republican Arthur C. Mellette soundly 
defeated his opponent with ninety percent of the votes 
cast. In 1890 Henry Loucks, a resident of Deuel County, 
cut Mellette's 1889 strength by more than half and won the 
county by a plurality. During the remainder of the 1890s 
the Populists or fusionists managed to take the county 
twice more--in 1892 and in 1898.20 
Figure 2 presents coefficients of correlation between 
the proportion of Scandinavian adult males and the proportion 
of Republican votes case in the elections from 1892 through 
1900.21 The percentage of Republican votes was selectec be- 
cause that is the only variable that provided a positive cor- 
relation with potential Scandinavian voters. The coefficients 
obtained are generally low, though consistent, ranging from 
+0.175J in 1892 to +0.2002 in 1898. The 1900 result jump~d 
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FIGURE 2. Coefficients of correlation between percent- 
ages of potential Scandinavian voters according to the 1900 
Federal census and the percentages of votes cast for Repub- 
lican candidates for governor in Deuel County, South Dakota, 
18)2-1900. 
the correlation with the Populist vote exceeded the Repub- 
lican vote correlation,+0.2357 to +0.1753, In 1894 the cor- 
relation of the Populist vote with potential Scandinavian 
voters was nearly zero, and, as in Clay Ccunty, dropped con- 
siderably when the Populists fused with the Democrats in 1896. 
Although the degree of negative correlation diminished slightly 
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in 1898 when only the Fusionist offered a Scandinavian candi- 
date for governor, the reform party continued to be less at- 
tractive to Deuel County Scandinavians than was the Repub- 
lican party. 
This shunning of the Populist and fUsionist parties by 
the Deuel Scandinavians may be due to differences in church 
affiliation. In Clay County, where there was strong support 
for the Populists among Scandinavians, diverse churches 
among that North Eurorean group abounded. Although some of 
the earliest churches in southern Clay County had been mem- 
bers of the conservative Lutheran Norwegian Synod, the area 
was often served by lay preachers of a more evangelical cast. 
Norwegians of Prairie Center township organized a congrega- 
tion affiliated with the pietistic Eielson Synod. Vermil- 
lion contained a Swedish Methodist church. The Swedes of 
the Dalesburg settlement were served by Baptist, Mission 
Covenant, and Augustana Lutheran Synod churchs. The Danes 
formed a Baptist congregation at Lodi and an Inner Mission 
church at Irene in Clay County. The Danish settlement just 
to the north of Clay County--to which some of the county's 
Danes must have been oriented--contained Lutheran, ~ethodist, 
Baptist, and Seventh-Day Adventist congregations. Such groups 
tended more toward pietism than did the Scandinavian Lutherans 
and would have been more attracted to Populist reforms and 
zeal.22 
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In contrast, the Scandinavians of Deuel County seem to 
have congregated in Norwegian Synod churches. At least 
six such bodies existed around the 1880s and 1890s, served 
by a single pastor for a time. A minority of more pietistic 
Lutherans also existed in the county. Churchgoers at Toronto 
were served by a Haugean Lutheran church and a congregation 
of "strongly Haugean" Norwegian Augustana Synod was located 
near Astoria. In Deuel County these groups maintained their 
loyalty to the Republican party, although other studies have 
suggested that these bodies were likely to show some affinity 
for the Democrats at some point during the Populist era.23 
The strength of support among Germans for the Democrats 
and later the fusionistsis shown in Figure J. In the 1892 
and 1894 elections, German adult males showed a moderate 
affinity for the Democratic party, possibly because Germans 
still associated the Republicans and Populists with cultural 
issues. The former had supported constitutional prohibition 
and many leaders in the latter had been fervent advocates of 
suffrage and prohibiton, issues that threatened German cul- 
tural values. The election of 1896 produced the lowest cor- 
relation of the series, possibly because some Germans found 
the moralism of 1illiam Jennings Bryan, his free silver pol- 
icy, or fusion with the Populists a difficult pill to swal- 
24 low. The last two elections of the decade, however, brought 
a resurgence of support for the fusionists. For 1900 the 
coefficient reaches +0.7650. This trend may be due to German 
FIGURE 3, Coefficients of correlation between percent- 
ages of potential German voters according to the 1900 Fed- 
eral census and the percentages of votes cast for Democratic 
and fusionist candidates for governor in Deuel County, South 
Dakota, 1692-1900. 
reaction to the imperialism of the McKinley administration, 
an issue that was present in the platforms of all three of 
the elements making up the fusion party.25 
The correlation coefficients themselves, however, do not 
tell the full story. Deuel's German precincts were not homo- 
geneous in their political preferences. Several precincts 
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gave the Republicans solid majorities in a number of elections, 
while other precincts avoided the GOP consistently. Hence 
Rome township, with sixty percent of its adult males German, 
gave Republican majorities for every election except 1898 when 
it offered the fusionists over seventy percent of its ballots. 
With even more regularity, Hidewood township, with nearly 62 
percent German males, provided the Populists and fusionists 
with substantial majorities. Although information on the 
exact denominations present in the German precincts is not 
available, the 1906 census of religious bodies reveals that 
there were no Roman Catholic parishes in the county. While 
there were over 1,500 Scandinavian Lutherans in Deuel County, 
there were less than 100 other Lutherans. No other denomina- 
tion had enough strength to dominate the county; Deuel's Ger- 
mans must have been divided among a number of diverse Protes- 
tant religious groups. This would account for the divisions 
in political preferences among the Germans and would explain 
why some Germans sought a haven in the Republican party.26 
~cCook County 
McCook County, situated in the southeastern portion of 
the state, was first settled in the 1870s. By 1900 the larg- 
est foreign-born group in the county were the Germans,whose 
greatest concentration was in the southwestern two-thirds of 
McCook. With nearly nine percent of its population German- 
born, McCook ranked third among the state's counties for that 
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ethnic group in 1900. Its populatlon, however, was more stable 
than that of the two counties with higher proportions of Ger- 
mans, thus making it the best choice for a German county. A 
few Russian-Germans were· sprinkled in the southern half of 
the county.27 
McCook's Germans were considerably more homogeneous than 
those of Deuel County in religious faith. The large Roman 
Catholic parish at Salem was a German congregation. Catholics 
in the vincinity of Canistota and Spencer were evidently mostly 
German. In Bridgewater German and Irish Catholics established 
a church, and an Irish Catholic church at Montrose served the 
remaining members of that faith who worshipped in the county. 
German Lutheran congregations were organized in Canistota, 
Bridgewater, Spencer, and in Pearl township. A small group 
of German Lutherans worshipped at Salem but had no formal 
organization until after 1900. German Baptist churches ser- 
ving the county's residents existed for a time at Bridgewater, 
several miles south of Canistota, and north of Salem. A 
small German Reformed church st0od in Salem. The Russian-Ger- 
mans of the southwestern corner of the county were Mennon- 
't 28 1 es. 
A Swedish settlement dominated the north central town- 
ships of Sun Prairie and Brookfield and extended into Ramsey 
township along the county's eastern border. Another pocket 
of Scandinavian settlement was in the county's southeastern 
section. Like the Dalesburg community of Clay County, the 
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Sun Prairie settlement Swedes were divided among Baptist, 
Lutheran, and Mission Covenant congregations. A Norwegian 
Lutheran church existed near Bridgewater.29 
Two areas of Irish settlement existed in McCook. One of 
these was strung along the east fork of the Vermillion River 
that cuts through the eastern range of townships in the county. 
The other community was in Jefferson township in the south- 
western region of McCook.JO 
'fli th ov er- thirty percent of its adult males of German 
stock and another ten percent of Irish stock, McCook County 
had a substantial proportion of its voters who were prone to 
stand with the Democrats. In 1890 the Democratic candidate 
captured a plurality in the county. In 1892 and 1894, al- 
though the Republicans won the tickets, the voters of McCook 
gave the Democrats sizeable proportions of their votes. In 
all of the fusion contests of the last half of the decade, 
the reform coalition bested the Republicans by a wider ~argin 
than was done in the state as a whole. 
The Spearman correlation coefficients between the per- 
centage of potential German voters and the Democratic and 
fusionist voting totals in the various precincts are depicted 
ir. Figure 4. That combination of variables was the only one 
that produced positive correlations throughout the Populist 
era. During the first three gubernatorial contests of the 
decade, the coefficients ranged from +O.J924 to +0.5418. This 
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FIGUR2 4. Coefficients of correlation between percent- 
ages of potential German voters according to the 1900 Fed- 
eral census and the percentages of votes cast for Jemocratic 
and fusionist candidates for governor in OCcCook County, South 
Dakota, 1890-1900. 
and the Democracy. It was also the period during which South 
Dakota "wets" struggled in vain against constitutional pro- 
hibition, suggesting that a German ethnocultural conscious- 
ness expressed itself as a political action in defense of cul- 
tural norms. The strength of the relationship declined after 
1892, possibly as Germans joined the general movement away 
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from Cleveland's Democrats and as some German farmers swelled 
the ranks of the Populists. Correlations with nemocratic 
strength continued to decline until 1900. 
McCook County's Scandinavians at first showed no clear 
preference for the Populist party, as is shown in Figure 5. 
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FIGURZ 5. Coefficients of correlation between percent- 
ages of potential Scandinavian voters according to. the 1900 
Federal census and the percentages of votes cast for Populist 
and fusionist candidates for governor in McCook County, South Dakota, 1890-1900. 
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In 1892 and 1894 the coefficient rises to a moderate +0.3478 
and +0.2767 respectively. The figure derived would have been 
higher had not Ramsey township, ranking third in percentage 
of Sc and Lnav l ars but having a small community of Britons, been 
the banner Populist county in 1894. The Scandinavians in the 
county gave the reform coalition strong support for the re- 
mainder of the decade. The coefficients for the last three 
elections of the Populist era are not high, however. The 
Scandinavians may have voted for fusion candidates, but eth- 
nicity alone cannot explain the relationship. The presence 
of two Scandinavian candidates on the ballot in 1896 and 1900 
may have reduced the tendency to vote as an ethnic group in 
a distinctive fashion. As was the case with other counties 
with Scandinavians, the coefficient for 1898--when only the 
fusionists nominated a Norwegian for governor--rose slightly. 
Bon Hom.~e County 
Bon Homme County, also in southeastern South Dakota, 
lies on the Missouri River in the fourth tier of counties 
from the state's eastern border. The county began experienc- 
ing strong immigration during the 1870s, pa.rticularly of 
groups from central Europe. By 1900 the largest foreign-born 
group in Bon Homme were the Germans from Russia, who were 
closely followed by Czechs. Indeed, the county is more noted 
for its Czech population and Tabor, the center of settlement 
for that group, styles itself South Dakota's Czech capital 
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in much the same manner Wilbur does in Nebraska. Although 
the Russian-Germans had a higher percentage of total popula- 
tion in 1900, they and the Czechs each comprised nineteen 
percent of the adult male population that year.Jl 
Russian-Germans formed the dominant ethnic group among 
potential voters in seven of Bon Homme's sixteen townships, 
although in one of these--Bon Homme township--all of the Ger- 
mans from Russia were members of a Hutterite colony and pre- 
sumably eschewed political involvement. The area of greatest 
concentration was in the four northern townships and in Frank- 
lin of the second tier from the north. The final Russian- 
German precinct was Hancock township in the southwestern cor- 
ner. This ethnic element was apparently all or nearly all 
Protestant in religious preference and was scattered among a 
number of denominations. In the north, around Scotland, in 
a settlement of Protestant Black Sea Germans called Odessa, 
these immigrants were served by Lutheran churches of the Iowa 
and Missouri Synods and by German 8ongregational churches. 
Located in the center of Bon Hom.~e. the county seat of Tyn- 
dall had a Missouri Lutheran and two Baptist churches that 
Russian-Germans attended. German Congregationalists were 
also in the area. The Danzig settlement of Black Sea Germans 
located around Avon had a Baptist congregation, a Missouri 
Synod Lutheran church, and two Mennonite organizations. The 
Mennonites were Prussians who had settled in Russia and in 
areas of Poland for some time before emigrating to the United 
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States.32 
The Czechs were concentrated throughout the eastern 
third of the county, with Tabor township being over eighty 
percent Czech. Virtually all of the Bohemian immigrants to 
this country were either Roman Catholics or freethinkers. Al- 
though the exact distribution within Bon Homme county is not 
available, Catholics seem to have held a slight majority. 
Tabor Czechs were more Catholic than those around Tyndall or 
Scotland and that place had a Catholic Sokol, a gymnastics 
society. Tyndall and Scotland at one time supported lodges 
of the ~estern Bohemian Fraternal Association, the social 
organization that fulfilled many of the roles of the church 
for freethinkers. Tabor also had such a lodge, indicating 
the presence of freethinkers there as well.JJ 
The Germans, comprising about fourteen percent of the 
potential voting population in 1900, were to be found through- 
out the county, but had their highest density in the three 
northern townships in the western range of the county. No 
data are available concerning church affiliations, although 
the townships with the highest concentrations of Germans 
would have been served by the churches of Avon, which was a 
strongly German community. These included Missouri Lutheran 
and Baptist congregations. 
Other groups of interest in the county ir.clude Irish 
and Dutch. Irish formed approximately twenty percent of the 
males of voting age in Albion and Runn i ng Water townships and 
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no doubt contributed to the high proportion of Catholics in 
the county. Of 5,000 Bon Homme churchmembers reported in the 
1906 census of religious bodies, Catholics number J,000. The 
townships of the southwestern corner had Dutch settlers, re- 
flecting the presence of a large Dutch community in the ad- 
jacent county.J4 
Because of a major preclnct change that took place be- 
tween 1892 and 1894, the first two elections of the decade 
were omitted from statistical analysis. Nevertheless, the 
results of those contests are of some interest. In 1890, the 
Democrats managed to win the county with a plurality, al- 
though the Republicans consistently won Bon Homme with a 
majority of all votes cast the remainder of the decade. As 
was the case in Nebraska, certain cultural and religious 
groups strongly opposed moralistic legislation that struck 
at group mores. Prohibition was just such an issue. In 
1889 the Republicans had endorsed constitutional prohibition 
and in 1890 the GOP candidate for governor supported it. The 
Democratic plurality of 1890 rray be seen as a reaction to 
Republican identification with the reform.35 
As can be seen in Figure 6, the Czechs of Bon Hor.lr.le 
County were strongly interested in the Populist and fusion 
parties. The highest correlation coefficient occurs with 
the 1894 election, but it never dropped below the +0.4647 
mark for the rest of the Populist era. The fact that the 
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FIGURE 6. Coefficients of correlation between percent- 
ages of potential Czech voters according to the 1900 Fed- 
eral census and the percentages of votes cast for Populist 
and fusion candidate~ for governor in Bon Ho~~e County, 
So~th Dakota, 1994-1900. 
and freethinkers seems to have had no difference in how 
Czechs reacted to the reform party. Tabor township contained 
both elements, yet it constantly gave the opponents of Repub- 
licanism approximately eighty percent of its vote or better. 
This willingness to vote without apparent regard to church or 
nonchurch orientation accords with Bruce M. Garver's conclu- 
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sions about Czech voting behavior, although the relationship 
with the Populist party seems stronger than he suggests.J6 
The Russian-Germans of the county registered positive 
correlations with the Republicans through the last foti' elec- 









FIGURE 7. Coefficients of correlation between percent- ages of potential Russian-German voters according to the 
1900 Federal census and the percentages of votes cast for 
Republican candidates for governor in Bon Homme County, 
South Dakota, 1894-1900. 
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if any Russian-German Catholics remaining in Bon Homme by the 
1890s. Those that resided in the county at the time were 
generally members of the various pietistic churches that dot- 
ted the countryside. This loyalty to the Republican party is 
in line with voting patterns among Protestant Russian-Germans 
in Nebraska and with what other historians have concluded 
about this group's behavior.· Studies of the Mennonites have 
noted a predisposition to the Republican party, although that 
could change given the right pressures.J7 
The correlation of the percentage of potential German 
voters in the various precincts with the precentage of Repub- 
lican votes also reveals a positive relationship (Figure 8). 
This, too, is probably related to German membership in Pro- 
testant denominations that place stress on proper behavior, 
although more data on the exact affiliations would be neces- 
sary fJr a stronger inference. 
Campbell County 
Campbell County in north central South Dakota on the 
eastern bank of the Missouri was one of the counties heavily 
settled by Germans from Russia in the 1880s. Mound City, the 
county seat was platted in 1884 and by that year Protestant 
Black Sea Russian-Germans were taking up land in the county. 
By 1900 Russian-Germans born abroad formed nearly thirty per- 
cent of the county's population and that ethnic group account- 
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FIGURE 8. Coefficients of correlation between percent- 
ages of potential German voters according to the 1900 Fed- 
eral census and the percentages of votes cast for Republican 
candidates for governor in Bon Ho~~e County, South :akota, 
1894-l~OO. 
The Russian-Germans were concentrated along the eastern 
ranges of the county where adult males of the group formed 
over ninety percent of the voting population of three pre- 
cincts. The proportion of Germans from Russia drops off in 
the center of the county to thirty to thirty-five percent of 
the adult males. Few lived in the ranges of townships washed 
226 
by the Missouri. The greatest part of these Russian-Germans 
were members of Protestant bodies, although a Catholic con- 
gregation in Herreid, a town founded in 1901, is partly 
Russian-German. Protestant denominations known to have op- 
erated among the Germans from Russia in Campbell County 
include Iowa Synod Lutherans, Congregationalists, Baptists, 
and Reformed.39 
Scandinavians, principally Norwegians, were the largest 
ethnic group in the western townships, forming over seventy 
percent of the potential voting population in the southwest- 
ern corner of the county. The composition of the northwest- 
ern corner was more mixed, but a change in voting precincts 
between 1890 and 1892 forced that portion of the county 
to be omitted from the statistical analysis. The Scandi- 
navians appear to have been served by a Lutheran church or 
churches or Norwegian ties, but whether it was a member of 
the conservative Norwegian Synod or one of the more evan- 
gelical bodies is not known.40 
Two other ethnic groups are of some interest. The C9n- 
tral portion of the county had a number of Germans, primarily 
found in the area around Mound City. Although their precise 
religious orientation is unknown, they may have been numbered 
a~ong the 241 Roman Catholics recorded in the 1906 census 
of religious bodies. In Fremont township in the north cen- 
tral portion of the county, a small Dutch community predomi- 
nated, forming over fifty-five percent of the potential voters 
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in one precinct in 1900. These settlers were served by a 
41 Dutch Reformed church. 
Politically, the voters of Campbell County favored the 
Republican party over any competitor throughout the Populist 
era, giving the GOP a clear majority in every election. The 
Russian-German townships provided the banner Republican pre- 
cinct every time, In 1900, for example, the voters of pre- 
cinct seven, with a least ninety-two percent of its voters 
of Russian-German origin, gave the Republicans over ninety- 
eight percent of their ballots. 
Figure 9 show$ the course of the relationship between 
the percentage of potential German-Russian voters and the 
percentage of votes cast for the Republican party during the 
1890s. Probably associating the Republican party with the 
detested constitutional clause for prohibition, Russian-Ger- 
mans split their strength in 1890, thus producing no clear 
correlation with the GOP. i'fuile two of the three dominantly 
Russian-German precincts voted with the Republicans, one 
deviated sutstar.tially by turning to the Independent party. 
For the election of 1892, however, the correlation leaps to 
+0.5714. That was to be the lowest coefficient for the re- 
mainder of the decade; the peak year came in 1898 when the 
figure reached +0.8095. A slight dip in 1896 may indicate 
that some Germans from Russia heeded Bryan's siren call to 
silver, for Republican majorities in the important Russian- 
German precincts were reduced that year. The decline in the 
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FIGURE 9, Coefficients ~f correlation between percent- ages of potential Russian-Ger~an vot8rs according to the 
1~02 Federal census anj the cercenta~Es ~f votes cast fer 
R~publican governor in Campb~ll Couniy, South Dakota, 1890- 
1900. 
correlation in 1900 may indicate that the neighbors of Russian- 
Ger~ans were swinging further toward the GOP as the Populist 
era came to a close. That year the Republicans received 
record majorities in some of the Russian-German precincts. 
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One political scientist has looked at the voting behav- 
ior of some Russian-German counties in South Dakota and con- 
eluded that that ethnic group was strongly Republican. This 
ignores the fact that not all Russian-German counties have 
acted in the same fashion. Edmunds County to the southeast 
of Campbell had large sections settled by Black Sea Catholics 
and, though the Republicans generally captured the county in 
the 1890s, percentages of the vote cast for Democrats were 
consistently high.42 
Scandinavians in Campbell County reacted to the politics 
of the Populist years in much the same manner of the Scandina- 
vians of McCook County (Figure 10). Although the Spearman 
correlation coefficient showing the relationship between the 
percentages of Populist votes and potential Scandinavian 
voters was negative in 1890, by 1892, a very high direct 
relationship existed. FJr 1894 the coefficient climbs to 
a remarkable +0.9027. The electio11 of 1896, with its two 
Scandinavian candidates on the ballot and fusion with the 
Demccrats, led to a sli~ht dip. When only the fusionists 
offered a Scandinavian choice for governor in 1898, the cor- 
relation with the reform party climbed, but dropped again 
when the Republicans nominated a Scandinavian from the ad- 
joining county of McPherson for governor in 1900. 
A graph of the coefficients of correlation between the 
percentages of German adult males and the percentages of votes 
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FIGURE 10. Coefficients of correlation of potential 
Scandinavian voters according to the 1900 Federal census 
and percentages of votes cast for Populist and fusionist 
candidates for governor in Campbell County, South Dakota, 
1890-1900. 
teresting pattern (Figure 11). In 1890, when only the Demo- 
crats could not be associated with prohibiton, a traditionally 
sensitive cultural issue among Germans, the Germans of Camp- 
bell reacted negatively to the Democratic party. In 1892 
the correlation with the Populists is very high, though the 
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FIGURE 11. Coefficients of correlation between percent- 
ages of potential German voters according to the 1900 Fed- 
eral census and the percenTages of votes cast for Populist, 
De~~cratic and fusionist candidates for gover~or in Camp- 
bell County, South Dakota, 189-1900. 
erable degree in 1894. The continuing support for the 
fusionists during the rest of the decade reflects a general 
German support for the reform coalition, although the co- 
efficients are higher in Campbell County than elsewhere. The 
causes of this pattern may lie in local circumstances, which 
cannot be determined because the local papers for the 1890s 
2J2 
are not extant. More complete data on the denominations 
among which the Germans were spread in the county might also 
shed light on the behavior of this group. 
The Dutch of Fremont township favored the opponents of 
Republicanism during the first two contests of the decade, 
giving the Populists a majority in 1890 and the Democrats a 
plurality in 1892. The last £our elections, though, saw 
solid Republican majorities ranging from sixty to seventy- 
two percent despite fusionist expressions of sympathy for 
the Boers in 1900. This Republican tendency among Protestant 
Hollanders is similar to findings elsewhere.4J 
Lawrence County 
The last of the six counties included in the statistical 
analysis is Lawrence of the Black Hills. Horne of Deadwood 
and Lead, this county was the scene of large-scale hard rock 
mining by the 1890s and from its rugged hills came great 
quantities of precious metals, primarily gold. The lure of 
gold and high wages brought throusands to western South Da- 
kota from home and abroad, making Lawrence's mining centers 
among the most cosmopolitan communities of the state. 
Lawrence's 1900 population was scattered among dozens 
of small camps and towns, many of which contained only a few 
voters. As lodes played out in one area and rich strikes 
were made elsewhere, people and precincts shifted, making a 
countywide study inappropriate. The lack of some voting data 
' 
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for the entire period and the problem of unstable precincts-- 
or of shifting names that make precinct identification im- 
possible--have forced some changes in the way with which 
Lawrence is treated. Only the towns of Deadwood and Lead are 
included in the analysis and the election of 1900 is omitted 
from the study because returns for Lead could not be located 
for that year. 
Deadwood, a city with as colorful a history as can be 
found in the Black Hills, had a population of nearly J,500 
in 1900. Of the males of voting age in the city, men of na- 
tive stock comprised nearly half. Germans contributed over 
twelve percent and the Irish over ten percent of the remaind- 
er. The various s6andinavian groups added about eight per- 
cent and the British, the most numerous foreign-born group in 
the Hills, contributed nearly ten percent. Deadwood's China- 
town contained slightly ever four percent of the adult males 
in the city. 
Lead, home of the great Homestake ~ining Company, was 
proportionately far more foreign-stock than was Deadwood. 
Of the adult male population in 1900 only a quarter were born 
in America of A~ierican born parents. Of the remainder, the 
British were the largest group withrineteen percent of the 
population. Sc~ndinavians and Irish both contributed about 
ten percent, Ge1·mans added seven percent, and Finns comprised 
eight percent. ~ine percent of the adult males listed Austria 
as their birthplace or their parents', but close inspection 
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of surnames reveals that these men, mostly miners, were Slavic. 
Italians added another five percent.44 
The county as a whole favored the Republican party 
through the 1890s,giving that organization a majority or 
plurality in all bt.tthe election of 1896, when its opponents 
first attempted fusion on a state level. Of the two cities, 
Lead consistently gave the GOP a majority, while Deadwood 
voters split their votes enough so as to give the Republicans 
pluralities before fusion and a minority in 1896. 
Correlation coefficients produced when the relationships 
between the proportion of ethnic voters and the percentage of 
votes for a party are analyzed should be used with care in 
counties such as LaWrence. The mining camps were character- 
ized by high rates of geographic mobility that could dramat- 
ically alter the composition of the various precincts. This 
may be particularly true during the adverse economic condi- 
tions during the 1890s. Nor were population levels stable 
through the period. Deadwood increased by fifty percent dur- 
ing the decade, but Lead grew four hundred percent in the ten 
year time span.45 It is entirely likely that the newcomers 
did not mirror the ethnic mix of the earlier residents and 
that the proportions of the various ethnic groups in 1900 was 
not the same as it had been in 1890, particularly on the ward 
level. Spearman rank correlations produce the clearest co- 
efficients when there are no other groups present whose be- 
havior is similar to that of the group under study. In the 
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Lawrence county mining centers a large number of groups did 
exist, often in similar strength, and may well have distorted 
the coefficients obtained. 
The correlations produced by the analysis of the major 
cultural groups are marked by wild swings from one half of 
the graph to the other in the space of one or two elections. 
For example, the correlations between potential Scandinavian 
voters and Populists in 1892 were nearly zero. In 1894 it 
was nearly perfect +0.9524. The comparison of trends among 
several groups reveals some similarities (Figure 12). The 
British and Finns reacted very much alike during the first 
half of the decade, with high negative correlations in 1890 
continuing in 1892 (though less strongly for the Finns) and 
suddenly shifting to high positive correlations for 1894. 
The Scandinavians, with the exception of having virtuallly no 
correlation at all in the first two elections, behaved in 
the same fashion as the first two groups in 1894. The Irish 
showed a moderate correlation with the Populists in 1890, 
something unexpected because of the proclivity of that group 
to the Democ~acy and to opposit:on to prohibition. Although 
this figure dipped in 1892, it returned to a moderate level 
in 1894. That year marked a shift in voting patterns in the 
mining cities. Lead, where the British and Finns were con- 
centrated, had given the Republicans a comfortable 60.1 per- 
cent majority in 1892 but furnished the GOP a majority by 
' only one vote in 1894. Democratic strength there was cut by 
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FIGURE 12. Coefficients of correlation between percent- 
ages of potential British, Irish, Scandinavian, and Finnish 
voters according to the 1900 Federal census and percentages 
of votes cast for Populist and fusionist ca~jidates for 
governor in Lead and Deadwood, Lawrence County, South Dakota, 
1890-1'392. 
nearly two-thirds at the same time as Lead tripled its ?op- 
ulist vote. 
In Deadwood the shift toward the Populists was also ap- 
parent, but the extra votes came from the Derr.ocra.ts. There 
the Republicans were able to in~rease their plurality by 
237 
three percent. Voters in Ward 1--eighteen percent Scandina- 
vian--turned from both of the old parties to give the Popu- 
lists a majority. The miners of Dakota. not immune to the 
worsening economic conditions following the Panic of 189J, 
expressed their discontent in the voting place. Although 
local miners could not realistically expect the free coin- 
age of silver to provide full employment in Lawrence again-- 
for little silver was mined in the state--the depression did 
dry up eastern capital that was vital to the economy of the 
region.46 In eastern states where third parties were rela- 
tively weak and offered little hope of being able to change 
the economic climate, dissatisfied Democrats turned to the 
Republicans. In South Dakota. where the Populists had re- 
placed the Democrats as the second most powerful party, voters 
saw the third party alternative as a viable choice.47 The 
same was not the case in 1896. The correlations for the 
British, Scandinavians, and the Finns dropped nearly to the 
1892 level, although the Irish figure remained close to the 
1894 correlation. This rr.ay be due to the fact that the rr.:sh 
were far more evenly scattered than the other groups, with 
percentages in the eight wards in the study ranging from 7,7 
to lJ.8 percent compared to the ranges of 10.4, 11.9, and 10.0 
percent for the British, Scandinavians, and Finns respectively. 
Thus the changes in Irish voting behavior were less likely 
to affect correlations to the same degree. 
2J8 
This does not, however, explain the voting behavior of 
natives and Germans in Lawrence County. Correlations be- 
tween the percentages of adult males of those two groups and 
Democratic and fusion votes are depicted in Figure 1J. Ger- 











FIGURE lJ. Coefficients of correlation between percent- 
ages of potential native stock and German voters according 
to the 1900 ~ederal census and percentages of votes cast for Democratic and fusion candidates £or governor, Lead and Dead- 
wood, Lawrence County, South Dakota, 1890-1898. 
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examined during the first half of the decade. For 1890 both 
groups have a positive correlation with the Populist party, 
too, as both of these groups expressed dissatisfaction with 
the Republicans. The relationship weakened somewhat in 1892, 
but took a dramatic upturn in 1894--precisely the time when 
other groups in the county were repudiating the Democrats. 
The cause of this shift is unknown, but may lie with local 
factors in Deadwood. That was the strong-hold for both 
natives and Germans in the study and there the Democrats 
managed to hold on to more of their voters than was the case 
in Lead. Though lower than 1894, the correlations between 
these groups and the fusion party in 1896 remained strong. 
In 1898 the figures dropped again as natives and Germans cast 
their ballots less as natives and Germans than as members of 
some other group. 
Quantitative methods allow historians to study politi- 
cal behavior to a degree not heretofore possible. Such tech- 
niques allow historians to approach the basic unit of politi- 
cal action--the individual voter--as closely as the available 
sources of data will allow--the voting precinct. No longer 
are we tied to the records left by the elite members of so- 
ciety. rhe application of statistical methods to South Da- 
kota politics during the 1890s reveals certain patterns of 
behavior among the state's immigrant groups that would not 
otherwise be easily discernable. 
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The state's Scandinavians--Nozwegians, Swedes, and Danes 
--entered the Populist era with long loyalties to the Repub- 
lican party. By the 1890s, though, recent immigration had 
brought many new Scandinavian voters to the Great Plains, men 
who did not have ties to the GOP. Agricultural distress and 
the Independents' reformist nature made the third party ac- 
ceptable to most of the Scandinavians and they gave strong 
support to the new groups until the Populists fused with the 
Democrats. In 1896 this fusion with a group for whom the 
Scandinavians had few sympathies and the presence of two 
Scandinavians at the head of the state tickEt ended or dim- 
inished a cl.ear relationship between the Populists and the 
Scandinavians. In 1898, with only the fusionists runnine a 
Scandinavian candidate for governor, members of this ethnic 
group were more likely to vote as Scandinavians for the re- 
form coalition. By 1900, when both parties fielded Norwegian 
gubernatorial candidates, the correlation vanished. This 
scenario holds true for three out of the four counties with 
Scandinavians studied. In Deuel County the 3candinavians 
re~ained loyal to the Republican party, probably because 
that county had a much higher percentage of conservative Nor- 
wegian Synod Lutherans who were less oriented toward the 
evangelical and pietistic behavior that made Populism appeal- 
ing. 
In two of the four agricultural counties containing Ger- 
man elements that ethnic group gawe general support to the 
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Democratic party, the party of personal liberty and the neg- 
ative state that would allow the group to defend its cultural 
values from natives who sought to reform American society. 
This was true particularly in McCook County where most of the 
Germans were Catholic or Lutheran. In other counties where 
the proportion of Catholics and Lutherans was not so high-- 
where more pietistic denomi.nat Lons like the Congregation- 
alists, Methodists, and Baptists held sway among German im- 
migrants--the group gave support to the Populists, or more 
often, to the Republicans. 
Protestant Russian-Germans, temporarily distrustful of 
the Republican party in 1890 when they associated the GOP 
with prohibition, showed their true colors by strong support 
for that party for the rest of the decade. Catholic Germans 
from Russia appear to have been much more prone to voting 
the Democratic ticket than their Protestant neighbors were. 
South Dakota's Czechs, apparently hesitant about the 
Populists early in the decade, turned wholeheartedly to that 
party in 1894. For the remainder of the decade the Czechs 
of Bon Homme County gave consistent support to the reform 
coalition, despite divisions in the community between Catho- 
lics and freethinkers. 
In Lawrence County, the mining center of the Black Hills, 
British, Finns, Scandinavians, and Irish all showed increased 
support--sometimes dramatic support for the Populist party in 
1894--reflecting their dissatisfac'tion with contemporary 
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economic conditions and with the old parties. By 1896 this 
support was on the wane and although the correlations in- 
creased for some groups in 1898, the overall trend was down- 
ward after the 1894 peak. These four groups tended to con- 
centrate in Lead; natives and Germans, located in Deadwood, 
reacted in a completely different manner. This may indicate 
that the true source of Populist voting strength in the Black 
Hills mining camps might not have been based on ethnic origins 
but on occupation in a certain industry or residence in a 
particular town that fell on hard times during the Panic of 
1893. If this is the case, and only further research would 
disclose this, the high correlations with ethnicity are coin- 
cidental. 
~thnicity can serve as a general in1icator of political 
behavior among South Dakota's immigrants during the 1890s 
but does not provide quite the precision one might hope. The 
state's foreign stock groups were not homogeneous; they were 
divided among themselves by a basic difference in religio~s 
orie~tation. Some Rotestant groups exhibited a pietistic 
background that led them to translate their religious atti- 
tudes into political action, often in support of prohibition 
and other reforms. Among these were numbered most Scandina- 
vians, although the conservative Norwegian Synod Lutherans 
apparently stayed solidly behind the GOP while more evangel- 
ical Lutherans turned to Populism. Other Protestant im.T.i- 
grant groups with pietistic leanirlgs--peoples like the Russian- 
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Germans, Dutch, and some Germans--showed loyalty to the GOP 
after first expressing dissatisfaction with the prohibition- 
ist portion of the party that had brought on a cultural re- 
form that the ethnic groups found neither necessary nor de- 
sirable. With the exception of the Czechs, most Catholics, 
with a heritage that stressed orthodoxy and belief rather 
than conversion and behavior, took up the cause of the Demo- 
cratic party and its philosophy of the negative state and 
personal liberty as a means of defending cultural values 
against assault from those who felt differently. The battle 
between pietists and ritualists waxed and waned during the 
1890s as various issues and events touched on cultural 
nerves. Behind that battle, the basic orientations of the 
diverse groups in the ~ate helped determine the course of 
South Dakota politics. 
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CONCLUSION 
During the late 1870s and through the 1880s Dakota 
Territory experienced a phenomenal rate of growth. During 
the Great Dakota Boom, as this period is known, a fl6od of 
settlement poured over the fertile prairies. The drought, 
depression, and grasshoppers of the early 1870s had vanished. 
Blessed with abundant rainfall during the 1880s, Dakota ap- 
peared to be a new Canaan, beckoning landseekers to take 
advantage of all the bounty the '.fost offered. With the aid 
of borrowed money and with the promise of easy markets via 
new railroads racing across the territory, tens of thousands 
of farmers flocked to Dakota, their hopes and dreams inflated 
with stories of rich soil and huge harvests. 
Nature, however, had played a cruel trick. The heavy 
rainfall of the 1880s was an anomaly, particularly in the 
areas of the territory that were found in the Great Plair.s. 
Drought, returning again in its periodic cycle, whithered 
the fields upon which agrarians had placed so much hope. Nor 
was man innoce~t of blame for the hardships on the Plains. 
Railroads and elevators that farmers needed in order to dis- 
pose of their harvests became ravenous corporations that 
gobbled up the slender margin of profit left after crops were 
sold in markets glutted with the produce of vast new farmlands 
the world over. Bankers from whom farmers had borrowed heav- 
ily to begin operations became wolves at the door, threatening 
' foreclosure when payments could not be made. 
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Faced with such adversity, Dakota farmers resorted to 
the organization of a Territorial Farmers' Alliance, an 
agricultural order that might give them the power to strike 
back with a unified voice. The Alliance took up the chal- 
lenge on two fronts. It started a variety of cooperative 
ventures that would cut the middleman out of the marketing 
procedure, thereby hoping to.increase farm profits. Recog- 
nizing that some agrarian goals could be met only within the 
political process, the Alliance began to act as a pressure 
group to force the old parties to heed the demands of hard- 
pressed farmers. Initially this lobbying was bi-partisan: 
it sought to force both the Democrats and the Republicans to 
offer remedies for deteriorating agricultural conditions. 
The results of these tactics were not encouragi~g. T~e 
cooperative enterprises met problems from the traditional 
mechanism of business. Leaders in the old parties were re- 
luctant to yield their power to new interests and were rr;ore 
concerned with promoting economic growth than in providing 
relief that might damage Dakota's image and drive away cap- 
ital. Even when the farm order managed to elect a majority 
of Alliance candidates to the territorial legislature, ~ore 
experienced politicians succeeded in preventing significant 
reforms. 
Barred from what they considered to be economic justice 
through the existing parties, Alliance leaders chose to launch 
their organization on a new ventu~e--the Independent party. 
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Acting at the same time as discontented elements in other 
states, the South Dakota Farmers' Alliance took the promising 
path of a third party as a means of circumventing the old 
political order. With a platform that called for wide-rang- 
ing reforms and candidates acceptable to farmers, the new 
party entered the realm of partisan politics in 1890s. Al- 
though Republican strength proved too great for the Indepen- 
dents to capture the state's executive machinery that year, 
the reformers took enough legislative seats to control the 
legislature when acting in coopention with the Democrats. 
With this strength, the Independents managed to elect one of 
their own to the U.S. Senate in 1891. 
This proved to be the only major victory of the first 
half of the decade for the Populists, as the me~bers of the 
new party soon came to be called. The Republicans gradually 
lured back many of their former adherents throu~h ha~c ca~- 
paigning and concessions to the farm vote in their party's 
platform and candidates. By 1894 the Republicans had re- 
established themselves as the majority party. Yet the Fcp- 
ulists were also growing, their ranks swelled by defecting 
Democrats. As cultural issues like prohibition and woman 
suffrage--reforms that many of the early Populists had been 
linked to--began to r~cede from partisanship, the economic 
goals of the third party attracted some groups that had trad- 
itionally supported the Democratic party. 
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By the mid-nineties, the outlook appeared brighter for 
the Populists in South Dakota. A growing sentiment for the 
free coinage of silver followed the Panic of 1893. Caught 
up in this were major elements in the Republican party, in- 
cluding Senator Richard F. Pettigrew, a long-time leader of 
the party in the state. When the national Republican con- 
vention refused to adopt a silver plank, Pettigrew joined 
other silverites in walking out. When the state Republican 
organization would not take up the cry for silver, Petti- 
grew's camp abandoned their old party. These Silver Repub- 
licans, together with the handful of Democrats left after 
the 1894 repudiation of Cleveland's Democracy, joined the 
Populists in a reform coalition. 
This fusion of forces did not come without some friction. 
Many of the early Populists could not abide with the dilution 
of principles that accompanied corr.bination with old enemies. 
For them, silver was just one of a variety of reforms that 
had to be achieved, not the common element upon which to base 
a tri-partisan campaign. Some ethnic groups found that their 
distaste for Democrats overcame their dissatisfaction with 
the Republicans and so filtered back to the GOP. 
:fuatever its weaknesses, the reform coalition was able 
to win a victory at the polls in November. Electing the 
governor, a number of other executive posjtions, and a maj- 
ority of the legislature, the anti-Republican forces were 
given the opportunity to carry ou1 their reform program. The 
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coalition, though it could unite against a common foe, was 
not strong enough to achieve any major changes. As legisla- 
tors, the reformers were too disorganized, too divided, and 
too intent upon their own interests. Indeed, the Republicans 
in the 1897 session succeeded in re-electing J arnes H. Kyle, 
a fact that moved the senator into Republican circles. 
These same deficiencies characterized the reform party 
as a whole. The coalition began to crumble as leaders who 
had thrown their power behind it in 1896 turned to the Re- 
publicans. Other scrambled for power within the coalition. 
It became more difficult to hold together diverse groups who 
were old political enemies. Republican officeholders threw 
up barriers to the Populist governor and to his plans. By 
1898 the reform groups were losing their momentum and in 
that year the only reformer returned to major office was 
Governor Andrew Lee. 
By 1900 the Populist era was over. Overwhelming ~epub- 
lican majorities swept from power all fusionists except a few 
!egislators. Aided by returning farm prosperity, the in- 
ability of the reform coalition to make lastir.g refor~s, and 
the outbreak of a war that captured ~he electorat~·s atten- 
tion, the Renublicans were able to beat back the Populist 
challenge. 
The decade of the 1890s brought some: changes. 'l'he Pop- 
ulist protest had engendered some minor reforms on the part 




Howe, Isaac. Papers, South Dakota State Historical Society, 
Pierre, South Dakota. 
Kyle, James H. Papers, microfilm, South Dakota State Histor- 
ical Society, Pierre, South Dakota. 
Lee, Andrew E. Papers, South Dakota State Historical Soci- 
ety, Pierre, South Dakota. 
Lee, Andrew E. Papers, Richardson Archives, I.D. Weeks 
Library, University of South Dakota, Vermillion, 
South Dakota. 
Loucks, Henry L. Papers, South Dakota State Historical 
Society, Pierre, South Dakota. 
Mellette, Arthur C. Papers, South Dakota State Historical 
Society, Pierre, South Dakota. 
Pettigrew, Richard F. Papers, Pettigrew Museum, Sioux Falls, 
South Dakota. 
Robinson, Doane. Papers, South Dakota State Historical 
Society, Pierre, South Dakota. 
Federal Documents 
Po21 lation Schedules of the 1900 Federal Census (rr.icrofil:r.ed). 
U.S. Bureau of the Census. Religious Bodies: 1906. 2 vols. 
:vashington: Government Printing Office, 1910. 
U.S. ~epartment of the Interior. Census Office. Compendium 
of the Eleventh Census: 1890. Part~ Population. 
:'V'ashington: Government Printing Office, 1892. 
U.S. Department of the Interior. Census Office. Report 
on Farms and Home§.l_ Prop~ietorship and Indebtedness 
in the United States at the Eleventh Ce nsus i 1890. 
Washington: Government Printing Office, 1896. 
257 
led the state's parties into an era of ethnic politics when 
South Dakota's major foreign-stock groups would receive 
greater recognition in the form of nominations to high office. 
Voters gained the powers of initiative and referendum~ Yet 
most of the objectives of the original Populist party remain- 
ed unreached. Some would be accomplished in the succeeding 
decade as a new generation of Republican leaders added their 
efforts to the national Progressive era. Other goals re- 
mained unmet. 
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